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INTRODUCTION
America's population is growing older. According to the 2000 census,
more than 35 million people in the United States (12% of the total
population) are over 65 years old. These figures are expected to grow
dramatically in the early decades of the twenty-first century as the "Baby
Boom" generation reaches retirement age and as improvements in health
care make it possible for more people to live to an advanced age.
Providing housing for this segment of the American population is
already a massive industry and one that will certainly grow as the number of,
older persons increases.3 One of the crucial issues facing this industry is
compliance with the non-discrimination commands of the federal Fair
Housing Act ("FHA"). 4 Originally passed in 1968, the FHA, as amended,
now outlaws discrimination in most of America's housing based on race,
disability, and five other criteria.' Its provisions are also mirrored in scores of
state and local fair housing laws." Most of the prohibitions of the FHA and its
state and local counterparts apply to housing for older persons,7 although
providers of such housing often seem oblivious to the mandates of these
laws. The result has been a steady increase in FHA litigation involving
housing for older persons, a trend that is likely to accelerate as the Baby
Boom generation ages.
Three recent cases illustrate some of the emerging issues. In United
States v. Lorantffy Care Center the Justice Department sued a religiously
affiliated assisted-living center for elderly Hungarian immigrants for
1. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
2. See infra Part I.A. 1.
3. See, e.g., Commission on Affordable Housing and Health Facility Needs for Seniors in
the 21st Century, A Quiet Crisis in America: A Report to Congress app. G-1 (2002) ("The
Housing Problems of the Future Elderly Population"), http://ww.seniorscommission.gov/
pages/final-report/pdfIndex.html (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
4, The federal Fair Housing Act (Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968), Pub. L. No.
90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2000)).
5. See infra Part II.A. 1.
6. In 2004, some thirty-five states and sixtyfour localities had fair housing laws that were
substantially equivalent in their substantive coverage to the FHA. For a list of these states and
localities, see ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION app. C at
C-1 to C-3 (2004).
7. See infra Part II.B. The FHA does contain an exemption for "housing for older
persons," see 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b) (1) (2000), discussed infra Part II.B.2.a, but this exemption is
only from the law's ban on "familial status" discrimination. See infra note 193 and accompanying
text. For a state or local fair housing law to be substantially equivalent to the FHA, its
substantive protections must be as extensive as the FHA's, see 42 U.S.C. § 3610(f)(3)(A)(i)
(2000), which means that if such a law contains an exemption for housing for older persons,
this exemption-like the FHA's-is not available in cases involving discrimination based on any
factor other than familial status.
8. 999 F. Supp. 1037 (N.D. Ohio 1998). The Loraniffy case is also discussed infra note 199
and accompanying text.
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violating the FHA by discriminating against African-American applicants. In
HUD v. Country Manor Apartments,9 a nursing home for older persons was
held to have violated the disability provisions of the FHA by requiring
residents who used motorized wheelchairs to purchase liability insurance. In
United States v. Resurrection Retirement Community, Inc.,' a large retirement
development settled a disability-based FHA suit for $220,000 in monetary
relief and an injunction barring it from, inter alia, imposing an "ability to
live independently" requirement on its residents.
This Article analyzes the ways in which the FHA and other fair housing
laws govern housing for older persons. Part I surveys the range of housing
choices available to older persons and describes the demographic trends
that will fuel the future demand for such housing as America's population
grows older. Part II reviews the FHA's substantive provisions and exemptions
in order to determine the extent to which this statute applies to the various
types of housing for seniors. Finally, Part III identifies the key discrimination
issues that are likely to arise in such housing and suggests how the FHA and
related laws should be interpreted to deal with these issues.
Unless otherwise indicated, this Article uses age 65 as the demarcation
point that distinguishes "older persons" and "seniors" from the rest of the
population. We recognize that this is a somewhat arbitrary choice. Some
people are "old" at 50 while others seem "young" at 80, and the Fair
Housing Act itself refers to ages 55 and 62, but not 65, in defining "housing
for older persons."" Nevertheless, 65 is the age that American society has
traditionally chosen to identify when retirement most typically occurs and
therefore when people are most likely to be entering the phase of life
associated with being in the older generation.'
2
9. 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 1 25,156 (HUD ALJ Sept. 20, 2001).
The Countiy Manorcase is further discussed infra note 312 and text accompanying note 437.
10. Consent order, United States v. Resurrection Ret. Cmty., Inc., No. 02-CV-7453 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 17, 2002), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/resurrectsettle.htm (on
file with the Iowa Law Review). The Resurrection case is further discussed infra text
accompanying notes 333-35.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(B), (C). These provisions are further discussed infra notes
187-88 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., LAwRENCE A. FROLIK, RESIDENCE OPTIONS FOR OLDER OR DISABLED CLIENTS §
1.01, at 1-2 (1997 & Supp. 2002). While the actual average retirement age in the United States is
currently a little over 63, age 65 remains a standard demarcation point for several reasons. See
id., at 1-6. Age 65 is when full Social Security retirement benefits are available and when
individuals become eligible for Medicare. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.409 (2003); 42 C.F.R. §§ 406.6(a),
406.11, 406.12 (2003). Also, mandatory retirement, though no' abolished for most jobs by the
1986 amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, was in the not-too-distant past
thought to be appropriate at age 65. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2000), codifying Pub. L. No. 99-
592, § 2(c)(1), 100 Stat. 3342 (1986) (showing that the ADEA, as originally enacted in 1967,
allowed mandatory retirement at age 65); see also 29 U.S.C. § 631(c) (1) (providing that the
ADEA allows mandatory retirement at age 65 of executives and others in high policymaking
positions); Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 12, 81 Stat. 607 (1967) (same). Age 65 is also commonly used
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I. THE GROWING SENIOR POPULATION AND THEIR HOUSING OPTIONS
A. DEMOGRAPHICS OF AMERICA 'S SENIOR POPUL4ATION
1. The Current Senior Population and the Baby Boom Projections
America's senior population will grow dramatically in the coming years,
both in absolute numbers and as a proportion of the overall national
population. Increases in the senior population will start to accelerate in
2011, when the "Baby Boom" generation (those born from 1946 through
1964) begins to turn 65.
'S
Two primary factors will drive this demographic shift. First, the Baby
Boom generation, which represented a surge in U.S. fertility rates in the
post-World War II era, accounts for a disproportionate share of the overall
American population. 14 Second, improvements in health care have resulted
in longer life expectancies in recent decades, so that as the Baby Boom
generation ages, its susceptibility to early mortality due to heart disease,
cancer, and other traditional obstacles to longevity has been substantially
reduced compared to prior generations.1
5
In absolute numbers and as a percentage of the total population, the
65-and-over population is expected to rise from 35.0 million (12.4% of the
total population) in 2000 to:
0 39.7 million (13.2%) in 2010;
* 53.7 million (16.5%) in 2020; and,
* 70.0 million (20.0%) in 2030.16
Thus, in the first three decades of the twenty-first century, the number of
seniors will double, and this age group will come to account for one-fifth
rather than one-eighth of the overall population. This proportion will be
by the Census Bureau as a demarcation point signifying an older demographic group. See, e.g.,
sources cited infra notes 13, 15, and 16.
13. See LISA HETZEL & ANNElTA SMITH, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE 65 YEARS AND OVER
POPULATION 3 (Oct. 2001) [hereinafter CENSUS 2000: 65 YEARS AND OVER], available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr0l-10.pdf (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
14. See, e.g., FRANK B. HOBBS & BONNIE L. DAMON, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 65+ IN THE
UNITED STATES 1-3 (Apr. 1996) [hereinafter 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES], available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/1/pop/p23-190/p23-190.pdf (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
More births coupled with more children living to adulthood resulted in a much larger
population for this generation.
15. See id. at 1-3, 3-1.
16. SeeJULIE MEYER, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, ACE: 2000, at 1 (Oct. 2001) [hereinafter
CENSUS 2000: AGE], available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001 pubs/c2kbr0i-12.pdf (on file
with the Iowa Law Review); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL 2000
POPUI\rION PROJECTIONS, MIDDLE SERIES (2000) [collectively hereinafter 2000 PROJECTIONS],
available at http://www.census.gov/population/projections/nation/summary/np-t3-c.pdf
(results for 2006-2010); http://www.census.gov/population/projections/natioii/summary/
np-t3-e.pdf (results for 2016-2020); http://www.census.gov/population/projections/nation/
summary/np-t3-f.pdf (results for 2025-2045).
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maintained as the Baby Boom generation reaches advanced old age in 2050,
when almost 82 million people (just over 20% of the overall population) will
be 65-and-over, and 19.4 million of these (4.8% of the total) will be over age
These figures represent a dramatic and unprecedented aging of the
nation's population." The ratio between old and young will be far higher
than at any other time in U.S. history.1 9
2. The Senior Population and FHA-Relevant Divisions
In order to give some context to the discussion infra in Parts II and III
about the Fair Housing Act's applicability to housing for older persons, we
here provide some demographic information on divisions within the senior
population reflecting the FHA's prohibitions of discrimination based on
race, color, and national origin; sex; religion; and handicap. The FHA's ban
on discrimination based on "familial status" (i.e., having a child under the
age of 18 in the household) is not considered, because the F-A provides an
exemption from this ban for "housing for older persons,"20 and we assume
for purposes of this Article that most housing of greatest interest to those
21
over 65 will qualify for this exemption.
With respect to race, color, and national origin issues, the current U.S.
senior population is overwhelmingly white, with non-Hispanic Caucasians
("whites") representing 83.5% of the overall 65-and-over population;
African-Americans accounting for 8.4% of this group; Hispanics 5.6%; and
Asians and other ethnic groups the remaining 2.5%.12 This will change over
time as the more diverse Baby Boom generation reaches old age. By 2030,
17. See 2000 PROJECTIONS, supra note 16. The growth of the 85-and-over age group will be
an important component of the increase in America's older population in the first half of the
twenty-first century. The 85-and-over population is expected to more than double between 2000
and 2030, from 4.2 million (1.5% of the total) to 8.9 million (2.5% of the total) and then more
than double again by 2050 to 19.4 million (4.8% of the total) as Baby Boomers age. Id.
18. By way of historical contrast, in 1930 just over 3% of the U.S. population was over 65.
See 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 14, at 2-3.
19. The Census Bureau describes the transition to an older population in the coming
decades as the change from pyramid to rectangle, a graphic reference of the demographic
evolution from a large number of young people at the bottom of a population chart supporting
a small number of older people at the top to a population chart whose base is not much wider
than its top. See 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 14, at 2-5 to 2-7.
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (b) (1) (2000). Thus, even if an over-65 person lives with a child-
an arrangement in which many hundreds of thousands of people live, see 65+ IN THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 14, at 2-21-and such a senior is discriminated against for this reason by a
development that qualifies for the "housing for older persons" exemption, that person could
not invoke the FHA to challenge this type of discrimination. .For a more detailed description of
the FHA's "housing for older persons" exemption, see infra Part II.B.2.a.
21. See infra Part I.B.2 for a discussion of the types of housing available to older persons.
22. See 2000 PROJECTIONS, supra note 16.
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the non-Hispanic white population will drop to 74% while the African-
American and Hispanic populations will each rise to about 11%.23
With respect to sex, 59% of the 65-and-over population in 2000 were
women, and 41% were men.24 This 3:2 ratio of women-to-men among
seniors rises to 5:2 in the 85-and-over age group.25 Higher female life
expectancy, combined with the fact that women are generally younger than
their spouses, contributes to the fact that women account for 79% of all
seniors who live alone.26 This proportion rises even higher at advanced ages,
leading to females making up the bulk of the nursing home population in
the United States.
Religious distinctions among the U.S. population are not reported by
the Census Bureau, 2 but it does recognize four private research centers as
29prominent sources for religious information. One of these identifies the
American Religious Identity Survey of 2001 ("ARIS") as the largest, most
comprehensive survey on religious affiliation among the U.S. adult
population."° The ARIS data show the following divisions:
* Christian: 159.0 million (76.5% of the total of 207 million
adults);
o Catholic: 50.9 million (24.5%);
o Baptist: 33.8 million (16.3%);
o Methodist: 14.2 million (6.8%);
23. lId The 85-and-over age group will see a corresponding increase in racial diversity, with
whites dropping from 86% of the total in 2000 to 76% of the total in 2030. Id
24. See CENSUS 2000: 65 YEARS AND OVER, supra note 13, at 3 (showing that of the total of
35.0 million persons age 65-and-over in 2000, 20.6 million were women, and 14.4 million were
men).
25. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, AGING IN THE UNITED STATES:
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 3 (1997), http://www.census.gov/ipc/prod/97agewc.pdf
[hereinafter AGING IN THE UNITED SIAIES] (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
26. Id. In 1995, the rates of those currently widowed were 33% for women aged 65-74
(versus 9% for men), 59% for women aged 75-84 (versus 18% for men), and 81% for women
aged 85-and-over (versus 41% for men). Id.
27. Id. at 4. In 1990, four out of five residents of nursing homes were age 75-and-over, and
about 70% of these were women. Id.
28. See 13 U.S.C. § 221(c) (2000). The Census Bureat did collect some religious
information in 1906-1936, but is now prohibited by law from asking any mandatory questions
about religious affiliation. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RELIGION, http://www.census.gov/prod/
www/religion.htn (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
29. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RELIGION, supra note 28 (recommending Adherent Statistics
and Religious Geography Citations and three other sources for current religious information
about the U.S. population). For additional information concerning the populations of various
religious denominations in the United States, see U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 2000 STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES tbls. 74-76 (2000), http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/
statab/sec0l.pdf (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
30. See ADHERENTS.COM, LARGEST RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3,
at http://www.adherents.com/rel-USA.html, (referring to the ARIS survey, which is available at
http://www.gc.cuny.edu/studies/ais-idex.htm) (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
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o Lutheran: 9.6 million (4.6%);
o Presbyterian: 6.0 million (2.7%);
o Other Protestants: 44.5 million (21.6%);
* Judaism: 2.8 million (1.3%);
" Islam: 1.1 million (0.5%);
• Buddhism: 1.1 million (0.5%);
" Other beliefs: about 15 million (8%); and
• Nonreligious/Secular: 27.5 million (13.2%) .
Of all the FHA-relevant characteristics, disability status is the one
most dramatically associated with old age. According to the 2000 Census,
49.7 million Americans have some type of "long lasting condition or
disability," which represents 19.3% of the relevant population studied (i.e.,
people who were age 5-and-older in the civilian non-institutionalized
population) .2 Not surprisingly, the census data show both that a
disproportionate number of these disabled persons are elderly and that, as
people grow older, they are increasingly likely to have a disability. "
31. Id. at 3, 7. Other sources and surveys yield somewhat different figures, id. at 2-19, and
there seem to be particular disputes as to the number of Jews and Muslims. Id. at 6-7 (citing
other sources concluding that the number of Jews is 5.5 to 5.6 million and the number of
Muslims is 2.8 to 4.1 million).
Whether these percentages hold true for the 65-and-over population and whether this
age group is likely to reflect similar religious divisions in the future are issues about which we
have been unable to find reliable sources.
32. See JUDITH WALDROP & SHARON M. STERN, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DISABILITY
STATUS: 2000, at 1 (Mar. 2003), http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-17.pdf
[hereinafter CENSUS 2000: DISABILITY STATUS] (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
The 2000 Census's focus on a "long lasting condition or disability" differs somewhat
from the FHA's definition of "handicap," see infra note 115, which, like other federal anti-
discrimination laws dealing with disability, includes persons with "a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more [of such person's] major life activities." See
29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B) (2000) (providing the "disability" definition in the 1973 Rehabilitation
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000) (providing the "disability" definition in the 1990 Americans
with Disabilities Act). Thus, it might be thought that the 2000 Census figures overstate the
number of persons who are protected from disability discrimination by the FHA, but in fact the
opposite is probably true for two reasons.
First, shortly before publication of the 2000 Census reports on disability, the Census
Bureau published a study, based on 1997 data, whose definition of disability was intended to
closely track the definition of this term under the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (and
therefore under the FHA). See JACK McNEIL, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES: 1997 (Feb. 2001), http://www.census.gov/prod/2001 pubs/p70-73.pdf
[hereinafter 1997 DISABILITIES] (on file with the Iowa Law Review). This study produced figures
that were similar to those reported in the 2000 Census. See, e.g., id at 1 (stating that 52.6 million
people (19.7% of the population) had some level of disability and 33.0 million (12.3% of the
population) had a severe disability). Second, the class of persons protected by the FHA extends
beyond those who have a disability to include also persons who have "a record of" being
disabled or are "regarded as" being disabled, see 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h), and in addition to those
who reside or are associated with a disabled buyer or renter. See id. 3604(f) (1), (2) (2000).
33. Indeed, the 2000 Census data probably understate the degree of disability in the
elderly population, because they consider only non-institutionalized persons, see CENSUS 2000:
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The 2000 Census identified five distinct types of non-work related
disabilities. 4 For each of these, people 65-and-over were much more likely
than those in the "working" age group (16-64) to have such a disability, as
follows:
35
" sensory disability involving sight or hearing: 14.2% (of the 65-
and-over population) vs. 2.3% (of the 16-64 age group);
* condition limiting basic physical activities such as walking:
28.6% vs. 6.2%;
* physical, mental, or emotional condition causing difficulty in
learning, remembering, or concentrating: 10.8% vs. 3.8%;
" physical, mental, or emotional condition causing difficulty in
dressing, bathing, or getting around inside the home: 9.5% vs.
1.8%; and,
* condition making it difficult to go outside the home to shop or
visit a doctor: 20.4% vs. 6.4%.
Disabilities are common within the senior population and their
incidence grows steadily with advancing age. According to the 2000 Census,
42% of those 65-and-over (almost 14 million persons) have a disability,
whereas the comparable figure is 16% for the 5-64 age group. 6 The
proportion of persons needing personal assistance also rises steadily with
age, being:
* 5.9% for those in the 55-64 age group;
* 8.1% for those 65-69;
* 10.5% for those 70-74;
* 16.9% for those 75-79; and,
* 34.9% for those 80 years and over.'
7
Thus, while old age is not per se a disability, it is clear that the likelihood of
having a disability rises as people grow more elderly and that surviving to an
DISABILITY STATUS, supra note 32, at 2, and a substantial number of the 65-and-over age group is
institutionalized (over 1.5 million persons making up about 4.5% of this age group, see CENSUS
2000: 65 YEARS AND OVER, supra note 13, at thl. 8), presumably mostly for health-related reasons.
34. These five disabilities and the number of persons and percentage of the population
suffering such a disability were: (1) a sensory disability involving sight or hearing (9.3 million
persons, amounting to 3.6% of the overall relevant population); (2) a condition limiting basic
physical activities such as walking (21.2 million persons, or 8.2%); (3) a physical, mental, or
emotional condition causing difficulty in learning, remembering, or concentrating (12.4
million persons, or 4.8%); (4) a physical, mental, or emotional condition causing difficulty in
dressing, bathing, or getting around inside the home (6.8 million persons, or 2.6%); and (5) a
condition making it difficult to go outside the home to shop or visit a doctor (18.2 million
persons, or 8.6%). CENSUS 2000: DISABILITY STATUS, supra note 32, at 1-2. The figures add up to
more than the total number of disabled persons, because some individuals have conditions that
qualify for more than one of the categories.
35. Id. at 3-4.
36. Id. at 3; see also 1997 DISABILITIES, supra note 32, at 1.
37. 1997 DISABILITIES, supra note 32, at 4.
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older and older age eventually guarantees that a person will develop one or
more disabilities.3s
B. HOUSING CHOICES FOR OLDER PERSONS
1. Distinguishing Characteristics of Older Persons
and Their Impact on Housing Needs
As the disability data in the preceding section show, older persons tend
to suffer a decline in physical strength and mental acuity. Common types of
physical deterioration include impairment of eyesight, bearing, and short-
term memory, the onset of dementia, and other neurological problems. 0
These conditions have an obvious effect on the types of housing that seniors
might prefer. For example, certain physical impairments may make the tasks
of maintaining a house more difficult, and for people with Alzheimer's or
other forms of dementia who need round-the-clock care, living alone may be
41impossible.
In addition to these physical and mental problems, older people may
face a variety of financial, social, and emotional challenges that are unique
to their age group. While older persons generally have greater net worth
than younger adults (often due to the appreciation in the value of their
42homes), many seniors experience a significant drop in income compared
38. See, e.g., Caron v. Pawtucket, 307 F. Supp. 2d 364, 368 (D.R.I. 2004); Chiara v. Dizoglio,
81 F. Supp. 2d 242, 246 (D. Mass. 2000), affd, 6 Fed. Appx. 20 (1st Cir. 2001); Chiara v.
Dizoglio, 59 F. Supp. 2d 193, 197 (D. Mass. 1999). But see Mary Crossley, The Disability
Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 704 (1999) (suggesting that there should be "an age-
relative understanding of impairment and disability for purposes of disability discrimination
law" (citing Ron Amundson, Disability, Handicap, and the Environment, J. Soc. PHIL., Spring 1992,
at 105, 113)).
39. Disability status also correlates with certain other difficulties. For example, the poverty
rate is over three times as high for individuals with a severe disability as for those with no
disability. See 1997 DISABILITIES, supra note 32, at 1. Seniors who have a disability are also less
likely to live in an independent household than their non-disabled counterparts. Id. at 5. In
addition, disability status within the senior population varies according to race, with minorities
having a higher incidence of disability. See CENSUS 2000: DISABILITY STATUS, supra note 32, at 5
(noting that 52.8% of blacks and 48.5% of Hispanics in the 65-and-over age group report
having a disability, whereas the comparable figure for whites is 40.6%); see also 1997
DISABILITIES, supra note 32, at 2-3 (noting that in this age group, "non-Hispanic Whites had a
considerably lower rate of severe disability than individuals in the other categories: 35.3 percent
compared with 49.2 percent for Asians and Pacific Islanders, 47.0 percent for Hispanics, and
51.8 percent for Blacks").
40. FROLIK, supra note 12, § 1.02, at 1-3 to 1-4.
41. Id. at 1-3, 1-5. Alzheimer's accounts for half of all dementia. Id. at 1-5.
42. See AGING IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 25, at 5 (stating that the median net worth
of householders age 65-and-over in 1991 was more than fifteen times that of those under age
35). Indeed, poverty rates among seniors have declined substantially in recent decades. See 65+
IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 14, at 4-8, 4-18. Among subgroups within the 65-and-over age
group, however, large differences in poverty rates do exist. For example, in 1995, 9% of white
people over age 65 were poor, as compared with 25% of blacks and 24% of Hispanics. AGINC IN
90 IOWA LA WREVIEW
to their pre-retirement years, and many find themselves without sufficient
funds to cover even modest rental costs, let alone the costs of long-term
care. 43 For those with assets, one key financial challenge is "how to convert
the high value of the house into disposable income while maintaining a
comfortable housing style."44 Also, for married couples and those in other
types of long-term relationships, death or serious disability of one's
spouse/companion may accompany advancing age, which invariably causes
financial and emotional disruptions and may require a different housing
arrangement.45 In addition to financial considerations, the main factors that
influence housing choice among older persons are proximity to family,
social and recreational opportunities, access to health care, and
46safety/security considerations.
In terms of estimating the age at which older people are most likely to
move to housing with health care and other supportive services, it is useful
to divide the senior population into three age-based sub-groups: 65-75; 75-
85; and over-85. 47 Those in the 65-75 group typically have fewer of the
physical and mental problems associated with old age; are relatively active
and generally capable of living without assistance; have incomes similar to
what they enjoyed in their pre-retirement years; and generally make housing
choices based on climate and other "lifestyle" issues rather than health
concerns.4 Indeed, many do not move from their prior housing: less than
5% of those aged 65-75 move each year, a much smaller figure than the
overall population.49
THE UNITED STATES, supra note 25, at 5. Women over 65 had a higher poverty rate (15.7%) than
men (8.9%). 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 14, at 4-19. Seniors over 75 had a higher
poverty rate (16.2%) than those aged 65-74 (less than 10.7%). Id. at 4-16.
43. See infra notes 57 and 94 and accompanying text.
44. FROLIK, supra note 12, § 1.02, at 1-8.
45. Id. §§ 1.03-04 at 1-9 to 1-11.
46. Id. §§ 1.05-06, at 1-14 to 1-16.
47. Id. § 1.04, at 1-11 to 1-12.
48. Id. § 1.04, at 1-11.
49. FROLIK, supra note 12, § 1.04, at 1-11; U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ECONOMICS AND
STATISTIcS ADMINISTRATION, BUREAU OF TIlE CENSUS, GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY: 1995 To 2000,
at 2 (Sept. 2003) (stating that the annual moving rate for the overall U.S. population is just over
9%), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/briefs.ht-ml (on file with
the Iowa Law Review); see also JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
THE STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING: 2004, at 35 (showing that in every year from 1993
through 2003, people who were 65-74 years old had the highest homeownership rate of any age
group, rising from that of the 55-64 age group before falling for those over 75), available at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2004.pdf (on file with the Iowa Law
Review). But see Anusha Shrivastava, A Perfect Home, Made Simple, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER,
Feb. 7, 2004, at C-2 (reporting recent trend indicating that a higher percentage of Baby
Boomers intend to relocate after retirement).
[2004]
SENIORS AND THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
For people over 75, "poor health, frailty, and concern about physical
safety increase significantly. " " Thus, "individuals in this age group are likely
to realize that they need a smaller housing unit-one without steps but with
good security and low maintenance [and certain provided services].""' These
types of concerns tend to be even more prominent for people over 85. At
this age, the key issue with respect to housing choice is often whether an
individual needs assistance in daily life activities, such as dressing, bathing,
and preparing meals, and, if so, whether a move to housing that offers• 52
personal-care assistance is required. Because of these special needs, many
people over age 85, including those who had moved earlier into senior
housing that offered only independent-living arrangements, find that they
need to move again, possibly into assisted-living housing.5"
2. Basic Types of Housing Available to Older Persons
a. Overvew
As seniors grow older, they have five basic types of residential options
from which to choose. These options-remaining in place; other types of
independent living; assisted living; nursing homes; and hospitals and
institutional hospices-are described below and arrange themselves along a
continuum based on the degree of medical and other personal services
provided, from none in the first two categories through a very high degree
of such services in the hospital-hospice category. A sixth option-retirement
communities that provide some combination of independent living, assisted
living, and nursing home units in a multi-building complex-is also
available. As will be more fully explained later, the Fair Housing Act clearly
applies to residences covered by the first three options (remaining in place,
independent living, and assisted living); probably applies to the fourth
option (nursing homes); does not apply to the fifth option (hospitals); and
applies to most, if not all, of the units in the sixth option (multi-phase
retirement communities). 54
50. FRoLIK, supra note 12, § 1.04, at 1-12. The financial situation of persons over 75 may be
less secure as well, as inflation begins to erode some of the value of their pensions and
accelerating medical costs account for an increasing part of their disposable income. Id. With
fewer dollars to spend on housing, people in this age group "may find themselves having to
reduce the quality of their housing in order to meet other expenses or to ensure themselves a
safe and physically comfortable environment." Id.
51. Id. § 1.04, at 1-12.
52. Id. Safety concerns also increase in old age, so that housing choices that offer a secure
environment while freeing residents from the burdens of maintenance and repair become
more appealing. Id. Part of the appeal of such housing derives from the fact that fewer couples
remain among persons over 85, as over 80% of the women and 40% of the men are widowed in
this age group. Id.
53. Id. § 1.04, at 1-13.
54. See infra Part IIB.
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While it is convenient to categorize an older person's housing choices
based on the degree of medical services provided, it is rarely true that a
particular type of unit is absolutely dictated by the state of an individual's
health.5 True, individuals whose mental or physical impairments make
them unable to care for themselves without daily assistance have special
service-related needs. These needs, however, do not necessarily dictate a
particular housing choice, because they can generally be met in the
individual's own home as well as in an assisted-living facility or a nursing
56 57home, at least for people with sufficient resources.
b. Independent Living-Remaining in Place
The first option for older persons is to remain in the home where they
lived in their pre-senior life. While a significant number of older persons
58.may choose this option, it is not a particularly interesting one for purposes
of the FHA, because the statute applies to such housing regardless of the age
of its inhabitants. For example, in Dadian v. Wilmette, an elderly couple won
an FHA-based disability challenge to the defendant's land-use laws that had
prevented the plaintiffs from adding a particular type of garage to their
private residence, but this result and its underlying legal analysis would have
55. FROLIK, supra note 12, § 1.05, at 1-14.
56. Id. § 1.05, at 1-13 to 1-14; see also LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & MELISSA C. BROWN, ADVISING
THE ELDERLY OR DISABLED CLIENT § 16.10 (2d ed. 2004). For similar reasons, "group homes" for
persons with a particular disability do not constitute a separate category of housing choice.
Some group homes involve virtually no medical or other supportive services--other than the
therapeutic value of living with people who have a similar disability-and are therefore
essentially independent-living situations. See generally FROLIK, supra note 12, § 10, at 10-I to 10-
84. Other group homes involve disabilities that require substantial support services and are
therefore more akin to an assisted-living facility or even a nursing home. Id. Thus, it is the
nature of the particular disability involved, rather than the label "group home," that determines
the type of housing that is most appropriate for the individual residents.
57. This is one of a number of situations in which a senior's economic status might dictate
the type of housing unit chosen. Another involves multi-phase retirement communities (see
infra Part I.B.2.f), which often charge a substantial admissions fee and thus may be available
only to reasonably well-off individuals. A third involves people with sufficiently modest means to
qualify for Medicaid, a program that has an institutional bias in favor of funding stays in nursing
homes versus other types of service-included residences. See infra note 88 and accompanying
text. In other situations, however, the basic type of unit available would not depend on one's
financial resources, as, for example, where persons of modest means are able to secure
apartments in senior-only complexes financed under the section 202 housing assistance
program, see infra note 64, that would be comparable in type, if not quality, to apartments in
market-rate senior developments. Regardless of whether an individual's economic status
dictates the type of housing unit chosen, that issue is generally not relevant to the question of
whether the F-A applies in a particular case, because FHA coverage does not turn on the type
or quality of the housing involved nor on the financial resources of its residents. See infra Part
I.B. But see infra note 164.
58. See, e.g., Motoko Rich, Eviction Threat can Loom for Independent Elderly, N.Y. TiMES, Feb.
15, 2004, at 1 (reporting recent AARP survey showing that 84% of persons 45 and older
"preferred to stay in their current home as long as possible").
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been the same even if the plaintiffs had been younger than 65.59
Furthermore, the FHA's "housing for older persons" exemption would
generally not be available in situations where older persons remain in their
original home. Thus, the housing units involved in the "remaining-in-
place" option would be, as in Dadian, subject to the FHA in precisely the
same way that all other, non-age-restricted housing would be.
c. Independent Living-Moving to a New Home
The second residential option available to older persons is to move to a
different home, but one that is still characterized by "independent living;"
that is, one that provides no special medical or other supportive services.
Within this second category, the types of housing units available include all
of those enjoyed by the general public (e.g., single-family houses; mobile
and other "manufactured" homes;' condominiums and cooperatives;62 and
apartments). One key difference, however, between this option and the
staying-in-place option is that, regardless of the type of unit involved, an
individual who chooses to move might select a community that is restricted
to older persons and therefore qualifies for the FHA's "housing for older
persons" exemption.63
Included in this category of independent-living housing would be
apartments financed under "Section 202," a major federal housing-assistance
program for older persons with limited resources.64 Also included in this
59. 269 F3d 831, 836-41 (7th Cir. 2001).
60. Because some young people are permitted to live in a housing complex that qualifies
for the FHA's "housing for older persons" exemption under 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b) (2) (C) (2000),
it is theoretically possible for such a person, after becoming a senior citizen, to "remain in
place" in an age-restricted community covered by this exemption. Rarely would such a situation
occur, however, because few younger persons choose to live in such communities and because
these communities generally also seek to qualify for the exemption under § 3607(b) (2) (B) by
admitting only persons 62 years old and over, which means they would not allow younger
persons to become residents in the first place. For a further discussion of the FlA's "housing
for older persons" exemption, see infra Part II.B.2.a.
61. For a description of manufactured housing and its popularity among older persons,
see FROLIK, supra note 12, §§ 7.02-.04, at 7-2 to 7-5.
62. The distinguishing features of condominiums and cooperatives are described in
FROLIK & BROWN, supra note 56, at §§ 16.03, 16.04.
63. See, e.g., id. at § 16.06[1] (noting that housing of various types-including apartment
buildings, retirement hotels, condominiums, mobile home parks, and retirement
subdivisions-may be restricted to older residents); Shrivastava, supra note 49, at C-2 (noting
Census Bureau figures showing that 7.7 million homes were in age-targeted communities in
2001). The FHA's "housing for older persons" exemption is discussed infra in Part II.B.2.a.
64. 12 U.S.C. § 1701q (2001). Originally established in 1959, the "Section 202 Supportive
Housing for the Elderly program... provides capital advance funds to [non-profit housing
developer-owners] ... as well as rental assistance []in the form of Project Rental Assistance
Contracts... to subsidize the operating expenses of the developments." COALITION ON HUMAN
NEEDS, SECTION 202 ELDERLY HOUSING, at http://www.chn.org/issues/article.asp?Art=330 (last
visited Aug. 20, 2004) (on file with the Iowa Law Review). "Qualified tenants must generally be
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category are units in apartment buildings-whether subsidized or market-
rate-that offer housekeeping, group dining facilities, and other modest
services, but no medical or personal-care support.
d. Assisted Living
There is a good deal of debate over the exact definition of "assisted
living,"66 but most assisted-living facilities have three common characteristics:
(1) they provide a variety of on-site health-related and other personal-living
services; (2) they are subject to some state licensing requirements; and (3)
67they offer only private-as opposed to shared-occupancy units. For
at least 62 years old and have incomes less than 50 percent of their area median [i.e., be low
income]." Id. "Some facilities have a percentage of units designed to be accessible to non-
elderly persons with [mobility] impairments or may serve other targeted disabilities. There are
more than 300,000 Section 202 units in over 3,500 developments," with an additional 6000 new
units expected to be developed based on funding from FY 2003 appropriations. Id. "According
to AARP, there are currently more than nine seniors on waiting lists for each available Section
202 unit." Id. For additional information concerning the section 202 program, see infra note 164
and accompanying text.
Other federally assisted housing programs, such as the public housing program
administered by HUD pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2000), may also provide rental units for
seniors as part of a public housing authority's decision to establish age-restricted housing
developments. Other conventional public housing units in so-called "family developments" are
available for all eligible residents including, but not limited to, seniors. For purposes of this
Article, such units may he more appropriately categorized as part of the "remaining in place"
option discussed supra Part I.B.2.b.
With respect to the applicability of federal anti-discrimiiation laws, section 202 and all
other federally assisted housing units are subject to die FHA and also to laws that prohibit
discrimination in programs receiving federal financial assistance. See infra notes 134-38 and
accompanying text.
65. Such "congregate housing" facilities generally provide private living arrangements in
apartment units along with housekeeping and some meals in a common dining room, but
residents are otherwise self-sufficient (i.e., no health care, in-unit assistance, or other forms of
personal support are provided). Interest in congregate housing seems to be waning in favor of
assisted-living facilities, discussed infra Part I.B.2.d, because most older persons are reluctant to
relocate a second time as their health fades. FROLIK, supra note 12, §§ 9.02-.03, at 9-2 to 9-3.
Thus, some congregate housing providers are adding assisted-living wings, id. at 9-3, which
means that a particular housing development may offer both "independent living" and "assisted
living" options in a single-campus setting, a concept that is further explored infa in Part
l.B.2.fs discussion of continuing care retirement communities.
66. See, e.g., ASSISTED LIVING WORKGROUP, 108TH CONG., ASSURING QUALITY IN ASSISTED
LIvING: GUIDELINES FOR FEDERAL AND STATE POLICY, STATE REGULATIONS, AND OPERATIONS 11-
15 (April 2003) [hereinafter ASSISTED LIVING REPORT] (showing that a nearly 50-member group
made up of virtually all national organizations interested in assisted-living issues that was
charged with the task of defining "assisted living" failed to develop a definition that can be
supported by two-thirds of the participating organizations).
67. This description is derived from ASSISTED LIVING REPORT, supra note 66, at 12-15. For
another effort to describe assisted living, see Assisted Living Assoc. v. Moorestown Township, 996 F.
Supp. 409, 415-16 (D.N.J. 1998). According to the ASSISTED LIVING REPORT, the three elements
included in the text's description-provision of certain health-related and other personal-living
services; subject to some state regulation; and private occupancy-are, either alone or in
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purposes of this Article, assisted living facilities ("ALFs") will be considered
to include all residences that, by providing some medical and other
significant personal-care services, fall between the "independent living"
categories described above and the nursing-home category described in the
next section. 8 Put another way, ALFs are distinguished by the fact that the
care they make available to residents is a major component of the services
provided, albeit still secondary to the more traditional housing and housing-
related services they also provide.
One of the major advantages of ALFs is that they allow "a resident to
age 'in place' without constantly moving from facility to facility as a
resident's condition evolves... [thereby helping] to ensure that a resident
maintains as much independence, autonomy, individuality, privacy, and
dignity as possible."69 This is one of the main reasons that assisted living is
among the fastest growing forms of housing for seniors.7° The typical
combination with one another, considered the key elements used to define "assisted living."
ASSISTED LIVING REPORT, supra note 66, at 12-15. But see supra note 66 and accompanying text
(combining even all three of these elements creates a definition of "assisted living" that is still
unacceptable to a substantial number of national groups interested in this type of housing).
With respect to the types of services provided, the following eight services were
considered required by those organizations that focused on this element in the ASSISTED LIVING
REPORT: (1) 24-hour awake staff to provide oversight and meet scheduled and unscheduled
needs; (2) provision and oversight of personal and supportive services (e.g., assistance with
activities of daily living); (3) health-related services (e.g., medication-management services); (4)
social services; (5) recreational activities; (6) meals; (7) housekeeping and laundry; and (8)
transportation. Id. at 12.
With respect to state licensing requirements, most states have laws regulating assisted-
living facilities. FROLIK, supra note 12, app. 9-2, at A9-11 to A9-100 (identifying such state laws);
ROBERT MOLLICA & KIMBERLY SNOWE, STATE ASSISTED LIVING POLICY: 2002, available at
http://www.nashp.org/-docdisp-page.cfm?LID=E000B754-AA71-45BB-8AD826A8F8245DF (on
file with the Iowa Law Review); JENNY SCHUETZ, JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF
HARVARD UNIVERSITY, AFFORDABLE ASSISTED LIVING: SURVEYING THE POSSIBILITIES 36-38 (2003),
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/oublications/seniors/03-l-schuetz.pdf; see also infra
note 68.
68. See, eg., SCHUETZ, supra note 67, at 1 (describing assisted living as an "intermediary
stage between independent living and skilled nursing facilities"); Assisted Living Assoc., 996 F.
Supp. at 415-16 (describing assisted living as providing a lower level of care and a more flexible
range of services than nursing homes). State laws often prevent an assisted-living facility from
admitting an individual who is bedfast and/or needs a degree of health care that can only be
provided in a licensed nursing home. FROLIK, supra note 12, § 9.04, at 9-6; see also Smith & Lee
Assoc., Inc. v. Taylor, Mich., 13 F.3d 920, 922-23 (6th Cir. 1993) (involving a state-licensed
adtlt foster care home for disabled elderly persons who require ongoing supervision, but not
continuous nursing care); infra notes 338-39 and accompanying text.
69. Assisted Living Assoc., 996 F. Supp. at 415-16; see also ASSISTED LIVING REPORT, supra
note 66.
70. FROLIK, supra note 12, § 9.03, at 9-4. More than two-thirds of all new housing for
seniors has included an assisted-living component in recent years. Id. § 9.02, at 9-2. One factor
supporting this trend is that a growing number of states have begun to allow Medicaid funds to
be used to reimburse for services in ALFs as an alternative to more expensive nursing home
care. See, e.g., MOLLIGA & SNOWE, supra note 67, at 2 (noting that forty-one states now use
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resident is over 80 years old and is impaired in three or more activities of
daily living (e.g., walking; bathing; dressing)." As is true for the
"independent living" option, assisted-living housing may or may not be
located in a community that caters exclusively to older persons.72
The housing units in ALFs range from apartments and townhouse-type
structures to single rooms that are physically similar to nursing-home units.
Such facilities may be operated by non-profit or for-profit organizations,
including some national chains.7 ' Residents sign a contract with the provider
and generally pay an entrance fee as well as a monthly fee for the level and
types of services they receive.'7 The contract may specify conditions for
termination (e.g., eviction because a resident's "health has deteriorated to
the point that the facility can no longer take responsibility for him[I]").75
However, many individuals who move into ALFs end their lives there;
indeed, the most frequent reason for termination of stay is death.7
e. Nursing Homes
Nursing homes provide skilled-nursing care or rehabilitation services
for injured, disabled, or sick persons who require full-time medical and
related services (e.g., administration of medication and prescribed
treatments), "but who do not need the acute care provided by hospitals."7
Medicare funds to reimburse services in ALFs or board-and-care facilities for more than 102,000
residents).
71. FROLIK, supra note 12, §§ 9.03-04, at 9-4 to 9-6; see also Assisted Living Assoc., 996 F.
Supp. at 416 ("[T]ypical resident of an assisted living facility needs assistance with two or more
basic daily activities, such as, toileting, bathing, or dressing, and is, on average, approximately
85 years old."); JEREMY CITRO & SHARON HERMANSON, AARP PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE,
ASSISTED LIVING IN THE UNITED STATES (Mar. 1999) (providing overview of U.S. assisted living
options and residents' needs and characteristics), available at http://research.aarp.org/il/
fs62r_assisted.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2004) (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
72. See, e.g., The 2003 Senior Class Charts: Assisted Living, N. SHORE, Aug. 2003, at 42-45
[hereinafter Senior Class] (noting that 15 of 33 ALFs reviewed are restricted to persons 55 years
old or older).
73. FROLIK, supra note 12, § 9.03, at 9-4.
74. Id. § 9.07, at 9-13.
75. Id. § 9.07, at 9-16 to 9-17; see also infra Part III.D.2.
76. FROLIK, supra note 12, § 9.07, at 9-16.
77. FROLIK & BROWN, supra note 56, § 15.01, at 15-1; see also Elizabeth K. Schneider, The
ADA-A Little Used Tool to Remedy Nursing Home Discrimination, 28 U. TOL. L. REv. 489, 491
(1997). Federal law defines a nursing home as an institution that:
is primarily engaged in providing to residents
(A) skilled nursing care and related services for residents who require medical or
nursing care,
(B) rehabilitation services for the rehabilitation of injured, disabled, or sick
persons, or
(C) on a regular basis, health-related care and services to individuals who because
of their mental or physical condition require care and services (above the level of
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Nursing homes are heavily regulated. They require a state license and are
subject to detailed state regulation7 8 and to the federal Nursing Home
Reform Act of 1987,79 which requires, inter alia, that a nursing home have a
pre-admission screening program guaranteeing that the home is an
appropriate facility for a would-be resident.8
Services in nursing homes vary considerably. Historically, nursing
homes focused primarily on older persons who needed "custodial care" (i.e.,
assistance mainly with the activities of daily living). 81 Today, many nursing
homes have added sub-acute services where recovering persons in all age
groups can receive care and rehabilitation before returning home or to a
lower level of care (i.e., as a stop over on the road to recovery rather than a
final living arrangement before death).82 Indeed, the average stay in a skilled
nursing facility is now less than a year, with about one-third of the people
who enter a nursing home staying for less than one month and only about
30% dying there.83
While modem nursing homes are generally not restricted to older
people, 4 the vast majority of residents are seniors, with the over-65 age
group accounting for some 2.0 million of the total nursing-home population
of 2.3 million s5 The average age of residents is 81.80 However, the
percentage of the elderly in nursing homes has been declining in the past 25
room and board) which can be made available to them only through institutional
facilities ....
42 U.S.C. § 1396r(a) (2000).
78. FROLIK, supra note 12, § 12.08, at 12-30 to 12-31 and app. 12-4, atAI2-11 to A12-66.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r.
80. E.g., FROLIK, supra note 12, § 12.08, at 12-32. Nursing homes are generally not
required to admit seriously mentally ill or mentally retarded patients, although dementia is not
included in these categories. Id. § 12.08, at 12-31; see also Schneider, supra note 77, at 506-08. See
generally BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAw, THE IMPACT OF PASARR (1992)
(reviewing the effectiveness of the required Preadmission Screening and Annual Resident
Review program in preventing the inappropriate admission of people with mental disabilities to
nursing homes).
81. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Barrett, 1997 Elder Law Issues, SB90 ALI-ABA 1365, 1375 (1997)
(noting that, historically, people of limited means who could not stay in their own homes were
moved into nursing homes). Prior to the advent of the federal Medicaid program in 1965, many
counties maintained "old folks' homes" for people who could not afford private sector care. See
infra text accompanying note 88. See generally DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DIsCOVERY OF THE
ASYLUM (1971).
82. Mary L. Lubin, Inside the Nursing Home: The Structure, in NURSING HOME LITIGATION:
INVESTIGATION AND CASE PREPARATION 14 (Patricia W. Iyer ed., 1999).
83. FROLIK & BROWN, supra note 56, § 15.01, at 15-2. Nursing homes generally charge on a
per-day basis. See, e.g., Senior Class, supra note 72, at 50-60.
84. See, e.g., Senior Class, supra note 72, at 50-60 (showing that only 13 of the 85 nursing
homes reviewed are restricted to persons over 60 years of age).
85. FROLIK, supra note 12, § 12.01, at 12-2; see also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
86. FROLIK& BROWN, supra note 56, § 15.01, at 15-2; FROLIK, supra note 12, § 12.01, at 12-
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years; fewer than 5% of those aged 75 to 84 now live in nursing homes, and
about 20% of those over 85 reside in such facilities. s7 Indeed, the numbers
might be even smaller were it not for the Medicaid program's institutional
bias in favor of funding stays in nursing homes rather than in ALFs or other
types of lower-care residences.88
There are many types and sizes of nursing homes. Most are free-
standing (i.e., not associated with other licensed health care or domiciliary
facilities), but in recent years, retirement communities have often included a
nursing home as part of their facilities. The size of a nursing home is
generally described in terms of the number of "beds" provided, with the size
varying from as few as four beds to over a thousand.8 9 Ownership patterns
also vary. Historically, nursing homes were run primarily by religious
organizations, but today, many are owned by other types of entities,
including for-profit corporations and not-for-profit associations."
87. FROLIK& BROWN, supra note 56, § 15.01, at 15-2; see also FROLIK, supra note 12, § 12.01,
at 12-2; Schneider, supra note 77, at 495-96 (providing statistics showing that a much larger
portion of the disabled senior population remains "in the community" rather than residing in
nursing homes); Erin Ziaja, Do Independent and Assisted Living Communities Violate the Fair Housing
Amendments Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 9 ELDER L.J. 313, 320 n.44 (2001) (noting
that only 4.2% of those over 65 live in nursing homes).
88. See, e.g., Michael Wytychak, III, Payment of Nursing Home Bills Through the Medicaid
Program, 36 IDAHO L. REv. 243 (2000); Steve Gold, Institutional Bias in Medicaid: Nursing Homes
Rule Long Term Car, Information Bulletin # 35, available at http://www.stevegoldada.com/
stevegoldada/cgi/getlink.cgi?54 (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
The Medicaid Act, starting at 42 U.S.C. § 1396, establishes "a cooperative federal-state
program that provides federal funding for state medical services to the poor." Frew (ex rel. Frew)
v. Hawkins, 124 S. Ct. 899, 901 (2004). Begun in 1965, Medicaid is now a $214 billion/year
program that includes a nursing home benefit under which the full cost of care for several
million low-income beneficiaries is paid by the federal government. See, e.g., THE KAISER
COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID: A PRIMER 1-2 (2001) (showing that
Medicaid financed 46% of U.S. nursing home costs in 1998), available at
http://www.kff.rg/inedicaid/loader.cftn'url=commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=1376
0 (on file with the Iowa Law Review); see also U.S. CENTER FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERV.,
NURSING HOME DATA COMPENDIUM 2001 tbl.2.6a, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
medicaid/survey-cert/datacomp.asp (on file with the Iowa Law Review). However, Medicaid
does not pay for housing, only for specified supports and services covered under a state
Medicaid plan, and most state Medicaid plans currently do not cover assisted-living placements
except under waiver programs that strictly limit the number of "slots" funded each year. See, e.g.,
MOLLICA & SNOWE, supra note 67, at 1-2; Nat'l Ctr. for Assisted Living, Medicaid Waiver Slots
Allocated, ASSISTED LIVING NEWS (Aug. 2003), available at http://www.ncal.org/news/
alnews/a10308.htm (on file with the Iowa Law Review). As a result, many ALFs limit the number
of Medicaid placements, which in turn means that many low-income seniors who need
something less than full-time nursing care may nevertheless end up in a nursing home because
they are unable to secure a place in an ALF or similar lower-care facility. See, e.g., David Nolan &
John Rimbach, A Model of Affordable Assisted Living, PROVIDER 73 (Oct. 1997) (concluding that
the majority of ALFs are "beyond the reach of most low and moderate-income Americans" in
the course of describing efforts by some foundations to develop affordable assisted living for
Medicaid recipients).
89. See, e.g., Senior Class, supra note 72, at 51-60.
90. Lubin, supra note 82, at 
1 4
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f Continuing Care Retirement Communities
Continuing care retirement communities ("CCRCs") offer in a single-
campus setting a variety of residential options designed exclusively for senior
citizens, including those here described as "independent living," "assisted
living," and "nursing home." The housing units available include cottages,
townhouses, apartments, and nursing-infirmary rooms.9' In addition to
offering dining and recreational facilities to all, a range of health and
personal-care services is provided, from independent living with perhaps
minor services to full-time care in nursing home-type units. Assuring
convenient access to higher levels of care through transfer arrangements is
one of the advantages of residing in a CCRC.
While the CCRC concept is at least 100 years old,93 CCRCs have become
particularly popular in recent years, especially for middle- and upper-income
seniors. 4 Their attractions include a community designed for older people;
recreation and social activities for such a peer group; and availability of later
assistance with daily living and ultimately nursing home-type care.9 5 Most
people enter CCRCs in their 70s, with the average age being around 75 and
with women making up 75% of the residents. 6 The vast majority of CCRCs
are not-for-profit communities, but the fact that a not-for-profit or even a
religious entity owns a CCRC may have little effect on its day-to-day
operations, because often a management company is interposed between
the owner and the resident, and the management company generally
determines how the facility is run.
97
Evolving out of the old "life care" model pioneered by religious
organizations at the beginning of the twentieth century,9 the CCRC industry
has developed three basic payment-financing-insurance options to cover the
combined cost of their housing and services over the long term. The most
common has been the so-called "extensive" or "life care" agreement, which
91. FROLIK, supra note 12, § 8.01, at 8-2. Some newer CCRCs are composed of
condominiums or cooperatives, so entry into the community is accomplished by purchasing a
condo or co-op shares. Id. § 8.02, at 8-7.
92. Id. § 8.01, at 8-2 to 8-3.
93. Id. § 8.01, at 8-2. Originally, CCRCs were organized by religious organizations to
provide lifetime care for individuals who did not have a family, and even today, many not-for-
profit entities that operate CCRCs are affiliated with a religious group. Id.
94. Id. The number of CCRCs in the United States is now well over 1000 and is growing
rapidly. Id. § 8.01, at 8-2; see alto U.S. GEN. ACcOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONG. REQUESTERS
HEALTH CARE SERV.: HOW CONTINUING CARE RETIREMENT CMTYS. MANAGE SERV. FOR THE
ELDERLY (1997) (finding that in 1997 there were some 1200 CCRCs housing more than 350,000
residents).
95. FROLIK, supra note 12, § 8.01, at 8-2.
96. Id.
97. Id. § 8.09, at 8-17.
98. See Stephanie Edelstein, Assisted Living: Recent Developments and Issues for Older
Consumers, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 373, 381-82 n.5 (1998).
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involves a substantial entry fee,99 but then covers the full cost of "housing,
residential services and amenities, prepayment of medical expenses and
unlimited long-term care without substantial increases in periodic
payments." 00 The second payment option is the so-called "modified
agreement," which specifies a certain number of days of care each year, with
additional days subject to a daily charge. l01 The third option is a fee-for-
service agreement in which "[h]ealth care is guaranteed on-site, but
payment is out-of-pocket, with the resident bearing responsibility for getting
third party (Medicare/Medicaid) reimbursement."
0 2
There are no federal regulations governing independent living or
assisted living as offered by CCRCs,
10 3 but most states regulate CCRCs.' 
4
Absent a state law provision to the contrary, admission and termination of
residential rights are governed by the private contract between the housing
provider and resident.
1 5
g. Hospitals and Hospital-like Facilities
Hospitals are state-licensed facilities designed to provide the highest
degree of medical care for patients whose health needs are acute. 1 6 In
addition, certain hospice facilities offer on-site care for terminally ill
99. A CCRC's entry fee is usually non-refundable, even if the resident dies shortly after
moving in. FROLIK, supra note 12, § 8.06, at 8-12 to 8-13. See also M & I First Nat'l Bank v.
Episcopal Homes, 536 N.W.2d 175, 185 n.12 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (citing various cases where
large entry fees charged by lifetime-care housing facilities for seniors were retained by the
facility).
100. Lauren Sturm, Fair Housing Issues in Continuing Care Retirement Communities (CCRCs):
Can Residents be Transferred Without Their Consent?, 6 N.Y. CrTy L. REV. 119, 125 (2004). The large
admission fee helps support the CCRC's capital costs, but more importantly, it serves as "a sort
of health care insurance payment [because] [in most cases ... [a CCRC's] fees do not rise (or
rise only modestly) even if a resident whose health declines must move from the independent-
living unit to the assisted-care or nursing home facility." FROUK, supra note 12, § 8.01, at 8-2.
101. Sturm, supra note 100, at 125.
102. Id.
103. FROLIK, supra note 12, § 8.09, at 8-15. However, if a CCRC includes a nursing home,
that home would be subject to federal nursing-home regulations. See supra notes 79-80 and
accompanying text.
104. FROLIK, supra note 12, § 8.09, at 8-16 and app. 8-5 at A8-21 to A8-22. See also Edelstein,
supra note 98, at 376 (arguing that, in the absence of tight governmental regulation, senior
residents of assisted living and CCRCs will experience the same kinds of neglect and abuse that
have occurred in nursing homes); Michael D. Floyd, Should Government Regulate the Financial
Management of Continuing Care Retirement Communities?, 1 ELDER L.J. 29, 34 (1993) (arguing
against further governmental regulation of CCRCs, because "[mlarket mechanisms have the
potential to solve most or all of the perceived financial problems with CCRCs").
105. FROLIK, supra note 12, § 8.09, at 8-17.
106 See, e.g., IA LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA OF PERSONAL INJURIES AND ALLIED
SPECIALTIES § 2.6 (Richard M. Patterson ed., 2001). Although licensed and regulated by state
health agencies, hospitals may also be subject to significant regulation under such federal
programs as Medicare and Medicaid. See, e.g., DAN J. TENNENHOUSE, ATrORNEY'S MEDICAL
DESKBOOK § 7:17 (3d ed. 1993).
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107
persons. Hospitals and institutional hospices are not designed for long-
term stays and are thus not really a "residential choice" for older persons,
but they are listed here as a type of place to stay because a significant portion
of older people spend the last days of their lives in 
such facilities.
1 0 8
II. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT's APPLICABILITY TO HOUSING FOR OLDER PERSONS
A. OvERviEw OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AND OTHER LA W
DEALING WTH HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
1. Fair Housing Act
The FHA's substantive prohibitions outlaw discrimination on the basis
of seven criteria in various housing-related practices dealing with every
"dwelling" not covered by one of the statute's exemptions.' °9 For example,
the FHA's most important prohibition makes it unlawful "[t] o refuse to sell
or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the
sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any
person because of race [or other prohibited factor)."" Because the FHA's
definition of "dwelling" and some of its exemptions are so important in
determining the statute's applicability to the types of housing dealt with in
this Article, these topics are discussed in detail infra in Part II.B. Here, the
banned bases of discrimination and the particular practices prohibited are
briefly reviewed.
The original Fair Housing Act was passed in April of 1968 shortly after
the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and the publication of the
Kerner Commission Report with its dramatic conclusion that the Nation was
"moving toward two societies, one black, one white-separate and
unequal.""' The 1968 FHA, which banned discrimination only on the basis
of race, color, religion, and national origin,"2 was intended by its
proponents to replace residential ghettos "by truly integrated and balanced
living patterns. ""' Congress later added three additional bases of prohibited
107. FROLIK, supra note 12, §§ 13.01-02, at 13-1 to 13-3. While some hospices have their
own facilities, the vast majority of hospice services are provided in an individual's own home. Id.
Most hospice patients (67%) are over 65 years old, about 80% have cancer, and most are served
for less than two months. Id. at 13-2.
108. See, e.g., Marshall B. Kapp, Legal Anxieties and End-of-Life Care in Nursing Homes, 19
ISSUES IN LAW AND MEDICINE 111, 112 (2003) (citing Miriam S. Moss, End of Life in Nursing
Homes, 20 ANN. REV. GERONTOLOGY& GERIATRICS 224 (2000)).
109. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3603-3607, 3617 (2000).
110. Id. § 3604(a); see also infra note 125.
111. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NAT'I. ADVISORY
COMM'N ON CIVILDISORDERS 1 (1968).
112. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606, 3617 (1970).
113. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (quoting 114 CONG. REC.
3422 (1968) (remarks of Senator Mondale)).
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discrimination to the FHA: "sex" was added by a 1974 amendment," 4 and
"familial status" and "handicap" were added by the 1988 Fair Housing
Amendments Act ("FHAA").1 5 The FHAA's ban on handicap discrimination
was intended to be "a clear pronouncement of a national commitment to
end the unnecessary exclusion of persons with handicaps from the American
mainstream."" 6
By prohibiting discrimination only on the basis of the seven criteria
specified, the FHA implies that all other grounds for judging prospective
residents are permitted. 17 Thus, housing providers may insist that applicants
114. See Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 808,88 Stat. 633, 729 (1974).
115. See Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988). The FHAA defined "familial status" as
meaning an individual under the age of 18 years being domiciled with a parent or legal
guardian. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(k) (2000). "Handicap" under the FHAA means:
with respect to a person -
(1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such
person's major life activities,
(2) a record of having such an impairment, or
(3) being regarded as having such an impairment,
but such term does not include current, illegal use of or addiction to a controlled
substance (as defined in section 802 of tide 21).
Id, § 3602(h). In addition to persons who have such a handicap, the FHAA also authorized
claims by persons who reside or are associated with such persons. Id. § 3604(f) (1)-(2).
The FHAA's definition of "handicap" is identical to the definition of "disability" in the
two other principal federal statutes that ban discrimination based on this factor. See
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 705(9) (2000 & Supp. 2004); Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). Even with respect to the FHAA, the term "disability" is
often used instead of "handicap." See, e.g., Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1146 n.2
(9th Cir. 2003). For these reasons, this Article uses the terms "handicap" and "disability"
interchangeably and often uses the term "disability" in describing the FHAA's coverage of
"handicap" discrimination.
In adding "familial status" and "handicap" to the FHA, the FHAA did not alter the
basic substantive prohibitions of the 1968 law, other than by making some changes in one
provision dealing with home financing, see 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (2000), and by enacting some
special handicap provisions now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)-(9). See infra note 127 and
accompanying text. The FHAA did, however, make substantial changes in the FHA's
enforcement procedures, which are codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610-3614. See SCHWEMM, supra
note 6, chs. 23 to 26, at 23-1 to 23-41,
116. H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 18 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2179
[hereinafter 1988 House Report]. Furthermore, according to this House Report, the FHAA
"repudiates the use of stereotypes and ignorance, and mandates that persons with handicaps be
considered as individuals. Generalized perceptions about disabilities and unfounded
speculations about threats to safety are specifically rejected as grounds tojustify exclusion." Id.
117. E.g., Madison v. Jeffers, 494 F.2d 114, 117 (4th Cir. 1974) (citing Pughsley v. 3750 Lake
Shore Drive Coop. Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055, 1056 (7th Cir. 1976)); cf Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U-S. 228, 239 (1989) (stating that other than eliminating the specified illegal bases of
discrimination, Title VII "preserv[es] employers' freedom of choice" and "does not purport to
limit the other qualities and characteristics that employers may take into account in making
employment decisions").
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be able to meet all of the "essential requirements of tenancy," which would
include such items as timely payment, care of the premises, respect for the
rights of others, law-abiding behavior, and compliance with other reasonable
standards set by the provider."" In particular, discrimination on the basis of
an individual's economic status is considered acceptable under the FHA. " 9
Furthermore, and of special relevance for this Article, the FHA does not bar
age discrimination. It should be noted here that other laws-such as a
state or local fair housing statute-may ban types of discrimination beyond
the seven bases enumerated in the FHA, 12 ' and that the FHA, itself, may be
violated by an otherwise legal policy that has a disparate impact on an FHA-
protected group.1 2 However, apart from these caveats and certain special
handicap-only provisions,1 23 the FHA is limited to prohibiting discrimination
based only on race, color, national origin, religion, sex, handicap, and
familial status.
The FHA outlaws a variety of discriminatory housing practices.124 For
the purposes of this Article, the statute's most important substantive
provisions are:
§ 8604(a), which makes it unlawful to refuse to sell, rent,
negotiate for, or "otherwise make unavailable or deny, a
dwelling to any person because of race [or other prohibited
factor] ,; 15
118. See PUB. & ASSISTED HOUS. OCCUPANCY TASK FORCE, REPORT TO CONG. AND TO THE
DEP'T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV. 1-3 (1994); see also Edelstein, supra note 98, at 379 (stating
that the FHA allows housing facilities to "deny admission to protected individuals who fail to
meet eligibility requirements (e.g., those who cannot afford the fees or require care that the
facility is not licensed to provide)"); infra note 313 and accompanying text.
119. E.g., Boyd v. Lefrak Org., 509 F.2d 1110, 1112-14 (2d Cir. 1975); see also 114 CONG.
REC. 3421 (1968) (remarks of Senator Mondale) (stating that the FHA's purpose is "to permit
people who have the ability to do so to buy any house offered to the public if they can afford to
buy it. It would not overcome the economic problem of those who could not afford to purchase
the house of their choice."); itd at 5643 (remarks of Senator Mondale) (stating that the FHA
"permits an ownei to... insist upon the highest price"); infra notes 313, 380 and accompanying
text.
120. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606, 3617 (2000). But cf infra note 146 (noting that state and
local fair housing laws often do ban age discrimination).
121. See infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
122. See SCHWEMM, supra note 6, § 10:4, at 10-28 to 10-38.
123. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
124. The prohibitions are contained in 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606, 3617.
125. The bases of discrimination outlawed by § 3604(a) are race, color, religion, sex,
familial status, and national origin. The 1988 F-AA added a similarly worded provision-§
3604(f)(1)-to deal specially with handicap discrimination. For a discussion of Congress's
reasons for dealing with handicap discrimination in a separate provision, see infra text
accompanying notes 304-07. Because the practices prohibited by § 3604(t)(1) are virtually
identical to those prohibited by § 3604(a), this Article uses § 3604(a) throughout as if it also
prohibits handicap discrimination. See generally Smith v. Pacific Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d
1097, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2004).
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0 § 3604(b), which prohibits discrimination in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of the sale or rental of a dwelling and
in the provision of services or facilities in connection
therewith;1
2 6
* § 3604(c), which prohibits discriminatory notices, statements,
and advertising relating to housing;
* § 3604(f), which contains a number of provisions designed to
provide equal housing opportunities for people with
disabilities, including three special provisions in § 3604(f) (3)
that make it unlawful, respectively, to refuse to permit
reasonable physical modifications of certain premises; to refuse
to make reasonable accommodations in housing rules and
policies; and to fail to include certain accessibility features in
the design and construction of new multifamily dwellings;
12 7
and,
* § 3605, which outlaws discrimination in home loans and certain
other housing-related transactions.128
2. Other Potentially Applicable Anti-discrimination Laws
In addition to the FHA, a number of other anti-discrimination laws may
apply to housing for older persons. One is the 1866 Civil Rights Act, whose
non-discrimination requirements with respect to contracts
129 and property13 0
have been held to prohibit racial discrimination in housing.13' While § 1981
and § 1982 forbid only "racial" discrimination, this concept includes
discrimination against Jews, Arabs, most other national origins, and many
126. As with § 3604(a), the bases of discrimination outlawed by § 3604(b) are race, color,
religion, sex, familial status, and national origin, while a similarly worded provision-
3604(f) (2)-deals specially with handicap discrimination. See supra note 125 and accompanying
text. Because of § 3604(f)(2), references to § 3604(b) in this Article should be considered to
cover handicap discrimination as well as the other six bases of discrimination outlawed by the
FHA.
127. See § 3604(f)(3)(A) (pertaining to reasonable modifications); § 3604(f)(3)(B)
(pertaining to reasonable accommodations); and § 3604(f)(3)(C) (pertaining to accessibility
requirements). These mandates apply only to handicap discrimination under the FHA and,
therefore, are not available in claims based on the other types of discrimination outlawed by the
statute. For further discussions of these § 3604(f)(3) provisions, see infra Part III.C.2.d
(discussing reasonable accommodations) and Part III.E.1 (discussing reasonable modifications
and accessibility requirements).
128. In addition to the prohibitions described in the text, the FHA also bans discriminatory
misrepresentations concerning the availability of housing; blockbusting; discrimination in
multiple-listing and other brokerage services; and coercion and other types of interference with
the rights guaranteed by §§ 3604-3606. See, respectively, §§ 3604(d), 3604(e), 3606, 3617.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
130. Id. § 1982.
131. E.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968). See generally SCHWEMM,
supra note 6, §§ 27:1-26, at 27-1 to 27-68.
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minority religions, because the Congress that passed the 1866 Act
considered such groups separate "races."" Furthermore, the courts have
made clear that this statute is independent of the FHA, which means that it
applies even in situations that the FlA specifically exempts.1
3
In situations involving disability discrimination, two other federal
statutes may come into play in certain housing cases. These statutes are §
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, s4 which prohibits discrimination
against people with disabilities in any program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance, and Title II of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), 3 1 which applies a § 504-like mandate to services, programs, and
activities of state and local governments. 36 Together, § 504 and Title II
guarantee nondiscrimination against people with disabilities in all
government-assisted housing,13 7 a similar mandate to the one contained in
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which bans discrimination in federally
assisted programs based on race, color, and national origin.
3
With respect to public accommodations, the ADA's Title 111, 39 prohibits
disability discrimination, and Title 1I of the 1964 Civil Rights Act bans
132. See Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987); Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-
Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
133. See, e.g., Jones, 392 U.S. at 416-17; see also Bachman v. Saint Monica's Congregation, 902
F.2d 1259, 1261 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that § 1981 and § 1982 "contain no similar defense, at
least explicitly" as FHA's religious exemption). See generally SCHWEMM, supra note 6, § 27:2, at 27-
6 to 27-9.
134. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (West 1999 & Supp. 2004).
135. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
136. Id. § 12132. In addition to the basic nondiscriminatory mandates of § 504 and Title II,
both of these statutes also require covered entities to reasonably accommodate persons with
disabilities in the same manner as is required by the FHA. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f) (3) (B) (2000)
(FHA); id. §§ 12131(2)-12132 (Title 1I); 24 C.F.R. § 8.11 (2003).
137. See, e.g., Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d 1002, 1010 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating
that § 504 applies to nursing homes that receive federal funding); Stephanie Edelstein et al.,
Housing Rights of Group Home and Nursing Home Facility Residents, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 664,
669 (1995) (concluding that all nursing home facilities that receive Medicaid and/or Medicare
funds are subject to § 504); Schneider, supra note 77, at 491 (arguing that ADA's Title II covers
nursing homes operated by states, counties, and municipalities and those that accept Medicaid
payments).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). A similar prohibition exists with respect to age
discrimination in programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance as a result of the
Age Discrimination Act of 1975, see 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (2000), although this prohibition does not
prevent federally assisted housing from taking age into account when this is "necessary to the
normal operation or the achievement of any statutory objective of" a federal program or
activity. 24 C.F.R. § 146.13(b) (2003); see also supra note 64 (describing section 202 housing
program for persons age 62 and older).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Accommodations covered by this law include any privately
owned "place of lodging" (other than those with five or fewer rooms for rent where the
proprietor resides); "sales or rental establishment"; health-care office; "hospital, or other service
establishment"; and any "senior citizen center, homeless shelter,.... or other social service
center establishment." Id. § 12181 (7)(A), (E), (F), (K). However, "religious organizations [and]
entities controlled by religious organizations" are exempted from this statute. Id. § 12187.
90 IOWA LAWREVIEW [2004]
discrimination based on race, color, religion, and national origin.140 These
laws may be relevant to housing matters relating to senior citizens in two
ways: (1) they apply to housing developments' sales and rental offices that
might not be covered by the FHA; 14 1 and (2) their coverage extends to
hospitals, nursing homes, and similar service establishments, regardless of
whether these facilities qualify as "dwellings" under the FHA. 42
Thus, depending on factors such as the nature of the facility involved,
whether it receives governmental assistance, and the particular type of
discrimination alleged, a place where seniors live might be covered by one
or more federal anti-discrimination laws in addition to the FHA. Indeed, a
number of cases have been reported where both the FHA and one or more of
these other laws were held to apply. 143
In addition to these federal laws, most states and scores of
municipalities have fair housing laws that are at least as broad as the FHA.' 44
The FHA specifically authorizes state and local laws to ban housing
discrimination in situations beyond those covered by the federal statute.
4
5
Many of these laws do go beyond the FHA, either by outlawing bases of
discrimination not included in the FHA or by providing narrower
exemptions than the FHA allows. 46 Finally, other federal, state, and local
140. Id. § 2000a(a). Accommodations covered by this law include all establishments that
"provide lodging to transient guests" (other than those with five or fewer rooms for rent where
the proprietor resides) and all other establishments "physically located within the premises of"
such a place. Id. § 2000a(b) (1), (4).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1135, 1149-50 (D.
Idaho 2003) (holding that an apartment complex's ground-floor unit that had been converted
into a rental office is covered by ADA's Title 1II); Sapp v. MHI P'ship, Ltd., 199 F. Supp. 2d 578,
583-87 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (holding that a housing development's sales office in a model home is
a 'public accommodation" covered by ADA's Title I1); cases cited in SCHWEMM, supra note 6, §
29:3, at 29-9 n.16.
142. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E), (F) (ADA's Tide III covers hospitals and other
service establishments); 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 679 (2003) (nursing homes that provide
certain services may be covered by ADA's Title III); Edelstein et al., supra note 137, at 669
(concluding that privately operated nursing facilities are subject to ADA's Title 11); Schneider,
supra note 77, at 491-94 (arguing that ADA's Title III covers nursing homes).
143. See, e.g., Reg'l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 45-55 (2d
Cir. 2002), ce. denied, 537 U.S. 813 (2002) (holding that both FHA and ADA apply);
Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc. v. Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 781-87 (7th Cir. 2002)
(same); Dadian v. Wilmette, 269 F.3d 831, 836-41 (7th Cir. 2001) (same); Cason v. Rochester
Hous. Auth., 748 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that both FHA and § 504 apply); see
also 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 678-79 (stating that nursing homes and other "mixed use"
facilities may be covered by both the FHA and ADA).
144. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
145. See 42 U.S.C. § 3615 (2000).
146. "Age" and "marital status" are bases of discrimination not covered by the FHA that are
commonly included in state and local fair housing laws. See, e.g., California Civil Rights Acts,
CAL. CIVIL CODE § 51.2 and CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12955 (2003); Illinois Human Rights Act, 775
ILL. COMP. STATE. 5/1-103(Q), 3-102 (2001); New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. EXEC. LAw §
296-2a(a)-(b), § 296-5 (2001). For an example of a narrower exemption, see the Kentucky Civil
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laws may also be available along with the FHA to challenge discriminatory
housing practices in particular situations.
While a given case may thus support claims under a variety of laws, the
focus of this Article is the FHA, because it is the model upon which most
state and local fair housing laws are based and because it is the most
comprehensive of all federal laws dealing with housing discrimination.
14
Where appropriate, however, we will note the availability of other applicable
anti-discrimination laws, particularly in those situations where the FHA's
coverage is uncertain and therefore another law's applicability may be
critical to the issue of liability.
B. PROPERTIES COVERED BY THE FAiR HousiNG ACT
1. "Dwellings"
The FHA's non-discrimination requirements extend to all dwellings
except those covered by a specific exemption in the statute. For purposes of
the FHA, a "dwelling" is defined as "any building, structure, or any portion
thereof which is occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a
residence" by any individual or family and "any vacant land which is offered
for sale or lease for the construction or location thereon of any such
building, structure, or portion thereof.
" 149
In addition to the obvious coverage of houses and apartments, this
definition includes every other kind of "residence," a concept that has been
held to cover any accommodation intended by its occupant for more than a
Rights Act, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.365(1)(a) (Michie 1997), whose prohibitions against
housing discrimination contain an exemption for owner-occupied apartment buildings with two
or fewer units as opposed to the FHA's comparable exemption in § 3603(b) (2) that covers four
or fewer units.
147. See, e.g., Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 191, 194-99
(2003) (challenging the municipality's delay in approving subsidized housing development
based on the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment as well
as under the FHA); Cartwright v. Am. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 880 F.2d 912, 925-27 (7th Cir. 1989)
(discussing a mortgage discrimination claim brought under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1998), as well as the FHA); cases cited infta note 468.
148. Other reasons to focus on the F14A as the dominant federal statute in this field include
its embrace of a disparate-impact standard, see supra note 122 and accompanying text, which
may result in prohibition of a broader range of practices than other applicable civil rights laws,
and its enforcement procedures and relief provisions, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610-3614, which are
generally superior to other such laws. See, e.g., Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002) (holding
that punitive damages may not be awarded in private suits under the ADA's Title II or § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act, as is also true under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act); see also United
States v. Forest Dale, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 954, 969-70 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (wife of disabled person
may sue under FHA but not § 504).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(b) (defining "dwelling"); see also id. § 3602(c) (defining the term
"family," which is used in the definition of "dwelling," to include "a single individual").
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brief stay.' 5° While the most important factor in determining whether a
particular place is a "dwelling" subject to the FHA is the length of time one
expects to stay there,'5 ' this is not the only consideration. 152 One other
crucial factor may be "the absence of an alternative place of residence." 15 3 As
one court noted in holding the FA applicable to a homeless shelter:
Although the Shelter is not designed to be a place of permanent
residence, it cannot be said that the people who live there do not
intend to return-they have nowhere else to go .... Because the
people who live in the Shelter have nowhere else to 'return to,' the
Shelter is their residence in the sense that they live there and not
in any other place.
54
With respect to those housing options of special appeal for older
persons identified in Part I.B.2 supra, the FHA has been held to cover: (1) all
types of "independent-living" units, including condominiums, cooperatives,
mobile home parks, and various other age-restricted residences;' 55 (2) all
150. See, e.g., N.J. Rooming & Boarding House Owners v. Asbury Park, 152 F.3d 217, 219
(3d Cir. 1998) (applying the FHA to rooming and boarding houses); United States v. Columbus
Country Club, 915 F.2d 877, 881 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that the FHA covers summer
bungalows); United States v. Mass. Indus. Finance Agency, 910 F. Supp. 21, 24 (D. Mass. 1996)
(applying the FHA to residential school for children with emotional disturbances); Villegas v.
Sandy Farms, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 1324, 1327-28 (D. Or. 1996) (holding that the FHA covers
camp-like facilities for migrant farm workers); United States v. Hughes Mem'l Home, 396 F.
Supp. 544, 548-49 (W.D. Va. 1975) (applying the FHA to children's home); cases cited infra
notes 154, 166, and 175; see also Turning Point, Inc. v. City of Caldwell, 74 F.3d 941 (9th Cir.
1996) (assuming the FHA covers emergency homeless shelter); Garcia v. Condarco, 114 F.
Supp. 2d 1158, 1160 (D.N.M. 2000) (noting the wide variety of structures designed for
temporary living that have been held to be covered by the FHA). See generally SCHWEMM, supra
note 6, § 9:2, at 9-4 to 9-8 nn.6-28 and accompanying text.
151. E.g., Villegas, 929 F. Supp. at 1328; Woods v. Foster, 884 F. Supp. 1169, 1173 (N.D. Ill.
1995).
152. See, e.g., Garcia, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 1160 (holding that county jail is not a "dwelling"
subject to the FlIA because it was "designed as a detention facility not a 'residence,'" and,
despite the year-long stays of some inmates, such a facility was not intended to be covered by
Congress); see also infra note 172 and accompanying text (noting a HUD regulation identifying
length-of-stay as one of three factors to consider in determining whether a continuing care
facility is a dwelling covered by the FHA).
153. Villegas, 929 F. Supp. at 1328 (citing Woods, 884 F. Supp. at 1173).
154. Woods, 884 F. Supp. at 1173-74. In addition to Woods, a number of other FHA
decisions involving homeless shelters have been reported, the gist of which seems to be that
determining whether a specific shelter is covered by the FHA depends on the "specific facts,
circumstances, and expectations of the individuals who are being served by the particular
shelter involved." SCHWEMM, supra note 6, § 9:2, at 9-8 n.27 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., Elderhaven, Inc. v. Lubbock, 98 F.3d 175, 176 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying the
Fl-A to shared living residence for elderly disabled persons); HUD v. Courthouse Square Co.,
2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 25,155, at 26,232 (HUD ALJ Aug. 13, 2001)
(applying the FHA to HUD-assisted apartment complex "for the elderly and the handicapped");
HUD v. Ocean Sands, Inc., 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 25,055, at
25,530-31 (HUD ALJ Sept. 3, 1993), rev'd in part on other grounds, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending
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types of "assisted-living" units, including those in age-restricted
communities;' and (3) all types of residential units in age-restricted
retirement communities, including cottages, townhouses, and apartments.57
(Aspen Law & Bus.) 25,056 (HUD Secretary Oct. 4, 1993) (applying the FHA to 10-unit
condominium to which complainants moved after they retired); cases cited in SCHWEMM, supra
note 6, § 9:2, at 9-2 n.3 (citing cases applying the FHA to condominiums, cooperatives, and
mobile home parks); see also 54 Fed. Reg. 3238 (Jan. 23, 1989) (noting HUD's commentary on
its FHA regulations indicating that the statute's definition of "dwelling" is "clearly broad
enough to cover ... mobile home parks, trailer courts, condominiums, cooperatives, and time-
sharing properties"); cases cited infra note 157.
156. See, e.g., Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 284 F.3d 442, 445-46, 459
(3d Cir. 2002) (noting that the parties agree that ninety-five-bed care facility for the elderly is a
"dwelling" under the FHA); Parkview Assocs. P'ship v. Lebanon, 225 F.3d 321, 322-23 (3d Cir.
2002) (assuming the FlA applies to fifty-bed personal care facility); Smith & Lee Assocs., Inc. v.
Taylor, Mich., 102 F.3d 781, 785 (6th Cir. 1996); Smith & Lee Assocs., Inc. v. Taylor, Mich., 13
F.3d 920, 922 (6th Cir. 1993) (applying the F14A to adult foster care home for disabled elderly
persons); Barry v. Rollinsford, No. Civ. 02-147M, 2003 WL 22290248, at *2, 5-7 (D.N.H. Oct. 6,
2003) (assuming the FHA applies to an assisted-living facility for frail elderly persons); Town &
Country Adult Living, Inc. v. Mt. Kisco, No. 02 CIV4441 (LTS), 2003 WL 21219794, at *1-3
(S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2003) (assuming the FHA applies to assisted-living residence for disabled
senior citizens); Chiara v. Dizoglio, 81 F. Supp. 2d 242, 244-47 (D. Mass. 2000), affd, 6 Fed.
Appx. 20 (1st Cir. 2001) (applying the FHA to proposed assisted-living facility for seniors);
Assisted Living Assocs. v. Moorestown Township, 996 F. Supp. 409, 414, 433-41 (D.N.J. 1998)
(applying the FHA to an assisted-living facility designed to care for the elderly and
handicapped); United States v. Lorantffy Care Ctr., 999 F. Supp. 1037, 1040 (N.D. Ohio 1998)
(applying the F14A to assisted-living center for the elderly); see also Gamble v. Escondido, 104
F.3d 300, 303-04 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying the FHA to a facility with housing units for physically
disabled elderly adults); HUD v. Country Manor Apartments, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending
(Aspen Law & Bus.) 1 25,156, at 26,248 (HUD ALJ Sept. 20, 2001) (applying the FlA to multi-
phase housing facility for seniors that includes 45 assisted-living units); Supplement to Notice of
Fair Housing Accessibility Guidelines: Questions and Answers About the Guidelines, 59 Fed.
Reg. 33364 (June 28, 1994) (discussing whether continuing care facilities are "dwellings"
subject to the FHA); Ziaja, supra note 87, at 320 (concluding that assisted-living centers are
covered by the FHA); cf Weinstein v. Cherry Oaks Ret. Cmty., 917 P.2d 336 (Colo. App. 1996)
(applying the state's FHA-equivalent to residential care facility for senior citizens).
157. See, e.g., Fair Hous. in Huntington v. Huntington, 316 F.3d 357, 360, 366 (2d Cir.
2003) (applying the FHA to an age-restricted residential development for seniors); E. Paralyzed
Veterans v. Lazarus-Burman Assocs., 133 F. Supp. 2d 203, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (assuming the
FHA applies to senior-citizen housing development); United States v. Hillhaven Corp., 960 F.
Supp. 259, 260 (D. Utah 1997) (applying the FHA to a retirement community); United States v.
Forest Dale, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 954, 958 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (applying the FIA to a federally
assisted senior-citizen apartment project); HUD v. Country Manor Apartments, 2A Fair Hous.-
Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 25,156, at 26,248-49 (HUD ALJ Sept. 20, 2001) (applying
the FHA to a housing facility for seniors that includes "senior apartments" as well as assisted-
living units and a nursing home); see also Consent order, United States v. Pooler, Ga., No. CV
401-263, (N.D. Ga. June 16, 2003) (resolving case alleging FHA violations by municipality that
blocked proposed apartment complex for low-income senior citizens), settlement agreement at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/poolersettle.htm (on file with the Iowa Law
Review); Consent order, United States v. Resurrection Ret. Cmty., Inc., No. 02-CV-7453 (N.D.
II. Oct. 17, 2002), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/resurrectsettle.htm (on
file with the Iowa Law Review) (resolving case alleging FHA violations by retirement
community, also discussed at supra note 10); cf Canady v. Prescott Canyon Estates Homeowners
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In addition to these judicial decisions, the FHA's legislative history includes
a number of references to the statute's potential coverage of homes for
older persons.158
These authorities would seem to make clear that all assisted living
facilities and retirement communities, even those providing substantial
supportive services, are subject to the FHIA. Still, there is a good deal of
evidence that providers of such housing often behave as if they are exempt
from many of the anti-discrimination commands of this statute. 159 The fact
that ALFs and some CCRCs provide health-related services along with their
residential units has apparently led many of them to assume that the
"mixed" nature of their productjustifies exemption from the FHA.' 6
It does not. The text of the FHA does not recognize any distinction
between dwellings in "pure" housing developments and those in housing-
plus-service developments. Courts have thus uniformly applied the FHA
even to facilities such as "group homes" and homeless shelters that include,
along with their dwelling units, some therapeutic services not usually
associated with traditional rental housing. 161 Furthermore, the fact that
Congress has written a number of exemptions into the FHA-including one
specifically dealing with housing for older persons' 62-but chose not to
provide an exemption for ALFs or other housing that includes health-
related services is further evidence that the FHA was intended to cover such
facilities.1 61 In only one area of which we are aware-the authority of
Ass'n, 60 P.3d 231 (Ariz. App. 2002) (applying the state's FHA-equivalent to an age-restricted
senior living community).
158. E.g., Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary on S. 3296, Amendment 561 to S. 3296, S. 1497, S. 1654, S. 2845, S. 2846, S. 2923 and S.
3170, 89th Cong. 396 (1966) [hereinafter 1966 Senate Hearings] (referencing "homes for the
elderly" and "a residential home for the elderly people of the Jewish faith"); id. at 1078-79
(referencing "a home for aged members of that [Jewish] faith" and "homes for aged Masons
and heir wives"); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
judiciary on S. 1026, S. 1318, S. 1359, S. 1362, S. 1462, H.R. 2516 and H.R. 10805: Proposed Civil
Rights Acts of 1967, 90th Cong. 142 (1967) (referencing "homes for the aged"); Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Hous. and Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency on S. 1358, S.
2114, and S. 2280 Relating to Civil Rights and Housing, 90th Cong. 365 (1967) (referencing
"[o]ld-age homes").
159. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 8-10; cases cited infra notes 310, 327-30; infra notes
260, para. 2, 274, and 284.
160. See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 100, at 123, 129-31; cases cited supra notes 8-10; cases cited
infra notes 310 and 321-24; infra notes 260, 2, 274, and 284.
161. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 154; cases cited infta note 175.
162. See infra Part II.B.2.a for a discussion of the FHA's "housing for older persons"
exemption. The FHA's other exemptions are reviewed infra note 178 and in Part II.B.2.b-.c.
163, See, e.g., Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 338 (1994) (construing one
statutory exemption differently from a more broadly worded exemption in the same statute
because "[i]t is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely" when it
"includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another" and that
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housing providers subsidized under the "Section 202" program to favor
persons with certain types of disabilities over others-have courts
interpreted the FHA to allow a limited form of disability-based
discrimination, 164 a result prompted by the need to reconcile the FHA with
section 202's explicit directives and one that is manifestly not present with
respect to any ALF, CCRC, or other housing development not subsidized
under section 202. In short, there is no basis for concluding that the nature
of the services offered by ALFs and CCRCsjustifies their exemption from the
FHA.
Nursing homes present a more difficult issue. It is true that a number of
courts have applied the FHA to such facilities. 165 As the Third Circuit
remarked in holding that a nursing home for elderly persons was subject to
the FHA, to the "persons who would reside there, Holiday Village would be
their home, very often for the rest of their lives. '' 166 Most of these decisions,
therefore the provision under review here "shows that Congress knew how to draft [an
exemption in this statute] when it wanted to" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
164. See Beckert v. Our Lady of Angels Apartments, Inc., 192 F.3d 601, 606-07 (6th Cir.
1999) (rejecting FHA-based claim by mentally handicapped applicant for section 202 housing
complex that favored elderly and physically handicapped persons on the ground that section
202, as authoritatively interpreted by HUD, was intended to serve "certain eligible groups of
tenants while denying other eligible groups" and that Congress did not intend the FHA to
"supercede the provisions of section 202"); cf Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Hous. Ctr., 815
F.2d 1343, 1352-54 (10th Cir. 1987) (rejecting in pre-FHAA decision similar section 504-based
claim by mentally handicapped applicant who was refused a unit in a section 202 development);
Brecker v. Queen B'Nai B'Rith Hous. Dev. Fund Co., 798 F.2d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1986) (same).
Although a section 202 senior housing complex may therefore favor one category of disabled
persons over another among its under-62 residents, it may not exclude all handicapped persons
in favor of "physically independent" seniors without violating the FHA. See United States v.
Forest Dale, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 954, 959, 963-65, 968-69 (N.D. Tex. 1993); see also Jainniney v.
Maximum Indep. Living, No. 00CV0879, slip op. (N.D. Ohio Feb. 9, 2001), at
http://www.hazelon.org/issues/housing/cases/jainniley-.vjmaxindliv.pdf (on file with the
Iowa Law Review) (holding the same with respect to housing complex subsidized under an
offshoot of the section 202 program-section 811 of the Cranston-Gonzales National Affordable
Housing Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 8013 (1995 & Supp. 2004)-specifically designed for certain
categories of tenants with disabilities).
For a description of the evolution of the section 202 program, see, for example, Forest Dale, Inc.,
818 F. Supp. at 958-61; see also supra note 64 and accompanying text. For a description of the
section 811 program, seeJainniney, No. 00CV0879, at 8-10.
165. See, e.g., Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 284 F.3d 442, 459 (3d Cir.
2002) (noting that the parties agree that a nursing home for the elderly is a "dwelling" under
the FHA); Hovsons, Inc. v. Brick, NJ., 89 F.3d 1096, 1098, 1102 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that a
proposed nursing home for senior citizens is a "dwelling" under the FHA); Caron v. Pawtucket,
307 F. Supp. 2d 364, 355-66 (D.R.I. 2004) (applying the FHA in a case involving a nursing
facility described as "a convalescent home for the elderly" and "a de facto retirement home");
United States v. Puerto Rico, 764 F. Supp. 220, 221 (D.P.R. 1991) (applying the FHA in a case
involving a nursing home for elderly individuals); HUD v. Country Manor Apartments, 2A Fair
Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 25,156, at 26,248 (HUD ALJ Sept. 20, 2001)
(applying the FHA to a multi-phase housing facility for seniors that includes a 172-bed nursing
home).
166. Hovsons, 89 F.3d at 1102.
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however, were rendered in the context of FHA-based challenges by the
nursing homes themselves against local land-use restrictions, rather than in
the context of nursing homes being sued for FHA violations by their
residents or would-be residents. This distinction could be important, even
though in both types of cases, the coverage question should be answered by
considering the same factors, particularly the likely length of stay of the
occupants of the subject facility.16 7 In a land-use case, a court would likely
treat a nursing home offering both short- and longer-term stays as a single
entity and therefore may be held covered by the FHA, even if only some of
its occupants are longer-term residents.'8 On the other hand, in a claim
against such a facility by a short-term occupant-say, a person seeking only a
temporary rehabilitative stay before returning home-the FHA might not
apply. Given the dearth of cases involving FHA claims against nursing homes
and the fact that many occupants of such facilities stay for only a limited
time, 1r9 the issue of the FHA's coverage of nursing homes as defendants
requires further analysis.
The FHA's coverage of facilities that offer both short-term and long-
term stays has been reviewed by both the Department of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD"), the agency charged with enforcing the FHA and
whose views on the statute are therefore entitled to substantial deference,
170
and the Department of Justice, which also has some FHA enforcement
responsibilities. According to HUD, whether a continuing care facility is
subject to the F1-A "depends on whether the facility is to be used as a
residence for more than a brief period of time," and this in turn means that
each of these facilities "must be examined on a case-by-case basis."
172
Similarly, the DOJ has opined that the FHA may cover facilities offering both
167. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text; infra notes 172-75 and accompanying
text.
168. Cf Turning Point, Inc. v. Caldwell, 74 F.3d 941, 942-45 (9th Cir. 1996) (assuming that
entire homeless facility is subject to the FHA and its prohibitions against handicap
discrimination because 75% of the facility's residents are handicapped).
169. See supra text accompanying note 83.
170. E.g., Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 287-88 (2003); see a~to infra notes 247-48 and
accompanying text. For other FHA decisions that have deferred to HUD's interpretive
regulations, see cases cited in SCHWEMM, supra note 6, § 7:5, at 7-13 to 7-15 n.17.
171. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610(e), 3612(o), 3614 (2000).
172. Supplement to Notice of Fair Housing Accessibility Guidelines: Questions and Answers
About the Guidelines, 59 Fed. Reg. 33364 (June 28, 1994). The factors that HUD believes are
relevant in determining the FHA's coverage of such a facility-project:
include, but are not limited to: (1) the length of time persons stay in the project;
(2) whether policies are in effect at the project that are designed and intended to
encourage or discourage occupants from forming an expectation and intent to
continue to occupy space at the project; and (3) the nature of the services
provided by or at the project.
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residential and short-term stays, but a "case-by-case" determination is
required.
173
In its analysis of this issue, the DOJ concluded that nursing homes are
analogous to homeless shelters and other facilities "that provide social
services... where persons may reside for varying lengths of time." 74 The
case law with respect to homeless shelters is mixed, with some, but not all, of
these shelters being held subject to the FHA, depending primarily on the
intended length of stay of their occupants.1
71
Thus, it appears that to determine the FHA's applicability to a given
nursing home, its individual circumstances must be examined, particularly
whether the length of stays of the individual complainant and others living
there are likely to extend beyond a brief period of time. 76  This
individualized examination, however, will occur against the backdrop of
existing case law, which generally favors nursing-home coverage and is at
least sufficient to establish that many, if not most, nursing home cases will be
subject to the FHA.'77
To summarize, the vast majority of housing options for older persons
would be considered "dwellings" subject to the FHA. Other than hospitals
and isolated cases involving hospices and nursing homes, all places where
older persons are likely to be living must, therefore, comply with the non-
discrimination requirements of the FHA, subject only to the statute's
exemptions/defenses discussed in the next section.
173. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 678 (2003). This observation was made in connection with
an analysis of the FHA's applicability to a hotel that offers some long-term units, but the DOJ
indicated that a 'similar analysis would also be applied to... nursing homes.., and other
facilities where persons may reside for varying lengths of time." Id. at 679. With respect to such
facilities, the DOJ also opined that, if the facility has separated its "residential" units from its
short-term accommodations, only the former would be covered by the FHA. Id. at 678.
174. Id. at 679.
175. See supra note 154. A similar view has been the basis for holding that the FHA covers
group homes for persons whose disabilities might allow them to stay in the home for a limited
but uncertain period of time. See, e.g., Conn. Hosp. v. New London, 129 F. Supp. 2d 123, 125-
26, 132-34 (D. Conn. 2001) (discussing how the FHA covers a group home for recovering
substance abusers who stay only as long as they are participating in an out-patient treatment
program); Baxter v. Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 731 (S.D. Il. 1989) (finding that the FHA
covers hospice costs for people with AIDS); cf. Gamble v. Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 303-04 (9th
Cir. 1997) (applying the F1A to a building that was to have adult day care facility on lower floor
and housing units for physically disabled elderly adults on upper floors); Turning Point, Inc. v.
Caldwell, 74 F.3d 941, 942-45 (9th Cir. 1996).
176. To the extent that a nursing home, hospice, or similar facility is not covered by the
FlIA because of the short length of stay of its occupants, such a facility would almost certainly
be considered a "public accommodation" and therefore subject to other federal anti-
discrimination laws. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 678-79 (2003) (discussing the Justice
Department's regulations interpreting ADA's public accommodations provisions to cover such
facilities). The same would hold true for hospitals and other acute-care facilities. See supra notes
139-42 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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2. Exemptions/Defenses
The FHA provides for a number of exemptions/defenses, three of
which are described below in some detail because they are particularly
relevant to housing for seniors. 7 With respect to these and all other FHA
exemptions, the courts have made clear that, because the Fl-A is remedial
civil rights legislation that is to be accorded a generous construction,' 9 its
exemptions are to be narrowly construed."s Furthermore, defendants who
claim the benefit of one of the FHA's exemptions bear the burden of
proving that their situation qualifies for the particular exemption claimed.'
8'
Finally, it should be noted that even if one of the FHA's exemptions does
cover a particular housing provider, that provider is still barred from
engaging in racial discrimination by the 1866 Civil Rights Act 82 and from
engaging in disability discrimination in federally assisted housing by the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . 8 Neither of these statutes is subject to any of the
exemptions found in the FHA.
18 4
a. The "Housing for Older Persons" Exemption
One of the FHA's exemptions that is important for seniors is the
"housing for older persons" exemption, which provides that the FHA's
prohibitions against familial status discrimination (i.e., discrimination
against households with children under the age of 18) do not apply to
housing for older persons ("HFOP") . For purposes of this exemption,
178. In addition to the three exemptions discussed in the text, the FHA's other principal
exemptions cover apartment buildings with four or fewer units where the owner resides ("Mrs.
Murphy" apartments), certain single-family-house transactions, and private clubs. See,
respectively, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3603(b)(1), 3603(b) (2), 3607(a) (2000). The statute also authorizes
the use of reasonable occupancy standards. See id. § 3607(b)(1).
None of these exemptions appears to be of any greater relevance to housing for
seniors than it is to other types of housing. In particular, the "Mrs. Murphy" exemption would
not be available in any sizeable multi-unit development, and the single-family house exemption,
though theoretically available in retirement communities made up of single-family houses, is
lost if the subject house is marketed using either the services of a real estate broker or
discriminatory advertising (as would be the case in virtually all "housing for older person"
situations, see infrta note 190). See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (1), (A)-(B).
179. E.g., City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731 (1995); Trafficante v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1972); see also Havens Realty Corp v. Coleman, 455
U.S. 363, 380 (1982) (noting the "broad remedial intent" of Congress "embodied in the Act").
180. E.g., Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. at 731-32; cases cited in SCHWEMM, supra note 6, § 9:3,
at 9-10 n.4.
181. E.g., cases cited in SCHWEMM, supra note 6, § 9:3, at 9-10 n.2.
182. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (referencing the 1866 Act); Robinson v.
Gorman, 145 F. Supp. 2d 201, 205-06 (D. Conn. 2001) (holding that the Rehabilitation Act is
not subject to FHA exemptions).
185. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1) (2000).
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HFOP is defined to include three types of dwellings: (1) "housing provided
under any state or federal program" that HUD determines is "specifically
designed and operated to assist elderly persons";"" (2) housing "intended
for, and solely occupied by, persons 62 years of age or older";187 and (3)
housing that has at least 80% of its units occupied by at least one person who
is at least 55 years old and meets certain other requirements showing that it
is "intended and operated for occupancy by persons 55 years of age or
older. '" t The age restrictions contained in the latter two categories are
presumably just the type of requirements that would be included in, and
indeed be a defining element of, a community designed for older persons.
The HFOP exemption, which was enacted along with the ban on
familial status discrimination as part of the 1988 FHAA, 9 was designed to
ensure that the FHAA's familial status prohibitions do not unfairly limit the
housing choices of older persons. 9 Thus, the law allows seniors to live in
housing communities that are limited to similarly-aged persons, because
Congress recognized "that some older Americans have chosen to live
together with fellow senior citizens in retirement-type communities" and
"appreciate[d] the interest and expectation these individuals have in living
in environments tailored to their specific needs." 91 Furthermore, no other
186. Id. § 3607(b)(2) (A). This part of the HFOP exemption has been rendered a virtual
nullity as a result of current HUD policy, which has deternmined not to designate any of HUD's
elderly housing programs as exempt tinder this provision. See SCHWEMM, supra note 6, § llE:6,
at I 1E-35 to II E-36 nn.7-8 and accompanying text.
187. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(B).
188. Id. § 3607(b) (2) (C). In addition to its age-based restriction, the "55-or-older" option
requires that the facility "publishes and adheres to policies and procedures" demonstrating its
intent to operate for this age group and comply with HUD-issued rules for verification that
occupancy is limited to this age group. See id. §§ 3607(b) (2) (C) (ii), (iii). This means, inter alia,
that such housing "must in its marketing to the public and in its internal operations hold itself
out as housing for [older] persons." See Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act
of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3255 (Jan. 23, 1989) (providing HUD commentary on its FHAA
regulations quoting memorandum of Senators Kennedy and Specter at 134 CONG. REC. S10456
(1988)). As a result, the type of age-based marketing and admissions inquiries that would
generally violate the FHA if based on race, color, national origin, religion, sex, and handicap,
see infra Parts 11.B and II[.C.2.c, are not only permissible when conducted by a facility qualifying
for the "55-or-older" exemption, but may be required of such a facility.
Even those facilities that intend to qualify for the "62-or-older" exemption, see supra
note 187 and accompanying text, will generally also try to qualify for the "55-or-older"
exemption in order to protect their exempt status should they desire to accommodate an
occasional person under 62 (e.g., the new spouse of a current resident). Thus, virtually all such
facilities will also meet the additional requirements of "55-or-older" housing (i.e., they will
adhere to published policies indicating their age-limitations and will employ formal age-
verification techniques).
189. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
190. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3252
(Jan. 23, 1989) (providing HUD commentary on its FHAA regulations, citing statement of Sen.
Karnes at 124 CONG. REC. S10465-66 (1988)).
191. 1988 House Report, supranote 116, at21.
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U.S. law bans familial status discrimination, so exemption from the FHA
means that HFOP is protected against liability from all federal sources.
92
For purposes of this Article, the most important feature of the HFOP
exemption is its narrowness-it only allows such housing to be exempt from
the FHA's ban on familial status discrimination. This means that the other
six prohibited forms of discrimination-those based on race, color, national
origin, religion, sex, and handicap-apply to HFOP as well as to other
nonexempt dwellings under the FHA.9'9
b. The "Religious Organization" Exemption
A second FHA exemption with potential importance to housing for
older persons allows certain religious organizations and related institutions
to limit some of their dwellings to persons of the same religion. 1, 4 Because so
many nursing homes, assisted-living facilities, and retirement communities
are operated by organizations with a religious affiliation, 1 5 this exemption
might at first glance appear to exclude a significant portion of senior
housing from the commands of the FHA.
There are a number of reasons, however, for concluding that this
exemption only applies to a very narrow portion of the overall senior
housing market.19 First, the exemption by its terms extends only to those
dwellings that are "owned or operated for other than a commercial
purpose, which means that all religious-affiliated housing operated for a
commercial purpose would fail to qualify for this exemption.19 8 Second, this
192. The question of whether a state or local fair housing law could prohibit familial status
discrimination without providing for an HFOP exemption similar to the FHA's has not been
decided. This question, however, is not of great practical importance, because virtually every
state and local fair housing law does provide for such an exemption.
193. For examples of FHA decisions entertaining claims of non-familial status
discrimination in connection with housing for older persons, see cases cited supra in notes 8-
10, 157, and 165. See also Canady v. Prescott Canyon Estates Homeowners Ass'n, 60 P.3d 231
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding FHA "reasonable accommodations" challenge to minimum-
age rule of seniors-only community by homeowners who sought to have their 26-year-old
disabled son live with them).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(a) (2000).
195. See supra note 90 and accompanying text; supra notes 93, 158; see also infra notes 267,
269 and accompanying text.
196. In addition to the reasons given infra in the text for concluding that the religious
exemption will not protect most senior housing from FHA liability, it is worth remembering
that even if a housing development for older persons is covered by this exemption, it would still
be subject to suit under the 1866 Civil Rights Act for discrimination against Jews and certain
other religions. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
197. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(a).
198. The meaning of the "for other than a commercial purpose" phrase in the FHA's
religious exemption has never been authoritatively construed, see Bachman v. Saint Monica's
Congregation, 902 F.2d 1259, 1261 (7th Cir. 1990), but it must be deemed to be different from
"nonprofit," a term that Congress used elsewhere in this exemption and presumably would have
simply repeated had the intention been to include all non-profit housing within the exemption.
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exemption only authorizes a qualifying institution to discriminate in favor of
its co-religionists and thus does not authorize racial or other non-religious
types of discrimination.'" Third, the exemption only allows a religious
organization to favor its co-religionists with respect to certain transactions-
"limiting the sale, rental or occupancy" and "giving preference"'°°-thereby
implying that such organizations may not engage in the other types of
discriminatory transactions condemned by the FHA, such as discriminating
in the terms of rental in violation of § 3604(b), publishing discriminatory
advertisements in violation of § 3604(c), or refusing to take certain
mandated steps for persons with disabilities in violation of § 3604(f) (3)."f1
See Rusello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (noting that Congress's use of particular
language in one section, but not another, of the same statute generally indicates an intent to
convey a different meaning). Thus, the fact that a religious-affiliated housing complex for
seniors is a non-profit entity would not, by itself, qualify its dwellings for exemption as being
operated "for other than a commercial purpose." Cf Presbyterian Residence Ctr. Corp. v.
Wagner, 411 N.Y.S.2d 765, 766-67 (N.Y. 1978) (holding that a Presbyterian corporation's
nonprofit apartment building for over-62 residents who paid fees similar to those charged by
for-profit rental units is "indistinguishable from a commercial apartment complex" and
therefore not entitled to charitable exemption under state tax law).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Lorantify Care Ctr., 999 F. Supp. 1037, 1044 (N.D. Ohio
1998). In Lorantff, the court rejected the claim of an assisted-living center for elderly persons
that it was covered by the FHA's religious exemption on the ground that the defendant was
accused of discriminating in favor of white applicants over blacks and not of simply preferring
persons of its own religion. See also Woods v. Foster, 884 F. Supp. 1169, 1170-78 (N.D. 111. 1995)
(upholding FHA claim based on sexual harassment in a homeless shelter operated by the
defendants, a group of religious organizations); United States v. Hughes Mem'l Home, 396 F.
Supp. 544, 550 (W.D. Va. 1975) (holding that FHA's religious exemption was "inapplicable by
its terms" to a home for needy children that was accused of racial discrimination, because, inter
alia, "religion is not the basis for [the alleged illegal] discrimination").
To further guarantee that the FHA's religious exemption would not be used to
countenance racial or national origin discrimination, Congress explicitly provided that the
exemption is not available to religions that are "restricted on account of race, color, or national
origin." 42 U.S.C. § 3607(a) (2000).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(a).
201. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(b), 3604(c), 3604(0(3) (2000), described supra text
accompanying notes 126-27. See, e.g., United States v. Salvation Army, 4 Fair Hous.-Fair
Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 1 16,387 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1999) (noting that a nonprofit
religious and charitable corporation accused of violating § 3604(f) (3) (B) defends on the merits
rather than claiming to be covered by FHA's religious exemption). With respect to
discriminatory advertising, see, for example, 1966 Senate Hearings, supra note 158, at 396
(containing an exchange between Senator Ervin and a representative of a realtors' association
agreeing that it would be unlawful for homes for elderly persons of a particular religion "to
place an advertisement in print of any kind saying that they were operating these homes for the
benefit of the elderly people of their respective faiths").
In addition, it is unclear whether even the ability to engage in the discriminatory
transactions authorized by the FHA's religious exemption might be lost if a qualifying religious
organization first chooses not to "limit occupancy" or "give preference" to members of its own
religion (e.g., a Presbyterian Home retirement community adimits some Methodists), and then
later seeks to adhere to a "co-religionists only" policy. There is no case law on this question. Cf
Hughes Meml Home, 396 F. Supp. at 550 (holding that FlA's religious exemption could not be
invoked by a home fbr needy children because, inter alia, the home was "open to children of all
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Fourth, the FHA's religious exemption is not available unless the
particular housing involved is owned or operated by either "a religious
organization, association, or society" or a "nonprofit institution or
organization operated, supervised or controlled by or in conjunction with"
such a religious organization, association, or society.202 The former phrase
would cover only a few religiously affiliated senior housing complexes, 20 3 and
even under the more generous second alternative, many such complexes
would fail to qualify because they lack a sufficiently close involvement with
204their affiliated religious organization .
The leading case interpreting this second alternative is United States v.
Columbus Country Club,50' where a divided panel of the Third Circuit denied
the exemption to a religiously-oriented social and recreational club that
restricted its summer bungalows to Roman Catholics and had numerous
2016connections with the Catholic Church. judge Seitz's majority opinion first
held that the club was not "supervised [or] controlled by" the Catholic
Church, because there was "no formal or legal relationship" between the
club and the Church.0 7 Thus, simply having a church approve of and
creeds"). Even if such a community were allowed the benefit of the FHA's religious exemption
under these circumstances, it presumably would not be able to discriminate against the existing
non-adherent tenants in the "terms, conditions, or privileges" of occupancy without violating §
3604(b), because the exemption does not authorize this type of discrimination. See supra text
accompanying this note.
202. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(a).
203. See, e.g., United States v. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877, 882 (3d Cir. 1990)
(discussing a religiously affiliated defendant who does "not dispute that it is not itself a
'religious organization'" so as to qualify under this part of the exemption). Like the defendant
in Columbus Country Club, most senior housing complexes would fail to qualify under the first
part of the exemption covering "a religious organization, association, or society." Cf EEOC v.
Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1993) (construing similar
language in Title VII's religious exemption to apply only to "churches, synagogues, and the
like" and "those institutions with extremely close ties to organized religions"); EEOC v. Townley
Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 618 (9th Cir. 1988) (same); Saint Elizabeth Cmty. Hosp. v.
NLRB, 708 F.2d 1436, 1442 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that a hospital that is owned and operated
by a Catholic religious order does not qualify for religious exemption from NLRB jurisdiction,
because the hospital's "primary purpose" and "principal function" were not religious and its
character was "pervasively secular"); Presbyterian Residence Ctr. Corp. v. Wagner, 411 N.Y.S.2d
765, 766-67 (N.Y. App. 1978) (described supra note 198). See generally Claudia J. Reed, Note,
Housing Law-United States v. Columbus Country Club: How "Religious"Does an Organization Have
to Be to Qualify for the Fair Housing Act's Religious Organization Exemption ?, 15 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
61, 94-100 (1993) (describing cases under various laws).
204. See infra notes 267, 272-73 and accompanying text; see also M & 1 First Nat'l Bank v.
Episcopal Homes, 536 N.W.2d 175, 185 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the primary purpose
of church-founded housing facility for older persons was not religious).
205. 915 F.2d 877, 882-83 (3d Cit. 1990).
206. For example, the club's facilities included a chapel where Catholic services were
sometimes held and its by-laws emphasized the religious aspects of the community's life and
only allowed persons to qualify for full membership who were certified by their parish priest as
being practicing Catholics in good standing. Id. at 879, 886-87.
207. Id. at 882.
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support the entity by, say, "permitting religious services to be conducted on
the premises" is not sufficient to satisfy this part of the FHA's religious
exemption.208 With respect to the exemption's final option covering entities
that operate "in conjunction with" a religious organization, the Columbus
Country Club majority held that the club's relationship with the Catholic
Church lacked sufficient interaction and mutual involvement for it to qualify
under this language.0 9
Even if the "in conjunction with" phrase is interpreted more generously
than the Columbus County Club majority was willing to do,21° this option
would at least require an entity seeking its protection to have significant and
formal ties with a church or other religious organization. This, in turn,
means that determining whether a particular religiously-affiliated senior
housing complex qualifies for this exemption would necessitate an
individualized evaluation of that complex's relationship with the religious
211organization with which it is affiliated.
c. The "Direct Threat" Defense
A third exemption/defense that might arise in some FHA cases
involving older persons with disabilities provides that nothing in the FHA's
key prohibitions against handicap discrimination "requires that a dwelling
be made available to an individual whose tenancy would constitute a direct
threat to the health or safety of other individuals or whose tenancy would
result in substantial physical damage to the property of others."212 This
"direct threat" provision was enacted along with the prohibitions against
208. Id.
209. Id. at 883. Thus, according to the Columbus Country Club majority, a housing provider
does not qualify under the "in conjunction with" phrase merely because it is a religious-oriented
institution with substantial ties to an established church or other religious organization, unless
those ties amount to a "mutual relationship" with that organization. Id.
210. In his dissent in Columbus Country Club, Judge Mansmann argued for a broader
interpretation of this phrase, one that would include "a number of different types of
relationships" between the entity and its affiliated religious organization. Columbus Country Club,
915 F.2d at 887.
211. Cf EEOC v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1993)
(determining whether an employer qualifies for Title VII's religious exemption, and holding
that "'each case must turn on its own facts . . . . [a]ll significant religious and secular
characteristics must be weighed to determine whether the corporation's purpose and character
are primarily religious'" so as to qualify for the exemption) (quoting EEOC v. Townley Eng'g &
Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 618 (9th Cir. 1988)). Among the relevant factors to be considered are:
the basic character of the housing complex, its primary purposes and/or mission, and its
ownership, organizational, and governing structures. Cf Kamehameha Sch., 990 F.2d at 461-62;
Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d at 618-19. See also Reed, supra note 203, at 107 (concluding
that a "comprehensive checklist" of factors should be considered in determining whether a
religiously affiliated housing provider is covered by the FHA's religious exemption).
212. 42 U.S.C § 3604(f)(9) (2000). By its terms, this defense only applies to "this
subsection" (i.e., § 3604(f)), which means that it is not available in handicap-based claims under
§§ 3604(c), 3604(d), 3604(e), 3605, 3606, or 3617.
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handicap discrimination in the 1988 FHAA,2 Is and was intended to make
clear that housing need not be made available to persons whose
214impairments make them dangerous to others.
This "direct threat" defense, however, rarely succeeds in defeating a
claim of handicap discrimination under the FHA.215 The legislative history of
this provision makes clear that it was not intended to permit housing to be
denied based on the presumption that people with disabilities generally
pose a greater threat to the health or safety of others than people without
216disabilities. This defense may be invoked only when the defendant proves
217that the individual complainant does indeed pose such a threat.
Furthermore, a housing provider is not authorized by this provision to ask
prospective tenants "blanket questions" about their disabilities; only
questions that "relate directly" to "a prospective tenant's ability to meet
tenancy requirements" and that are asked "of all other applicants" are
213. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
214. See 1988 House Report, supra note 116, at 28-29. According to this Report, the FHAA's
"direct threat" provision was intended to track the law under section 504 of the 1973
Rehabilitation Act, see supra note 134 and accompanying text, as the U.S. Supreme Court
recently interpreted in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.16 (1987).
1988 House Report, supra note 115, at 28-29. In Arline, the Court held that "[a] person who poses
a significant risk of communicating an infectious disease to others in the workplace will not be
otherwise qualified for his or her job [and thus not protected by section 504] if reasonable
accommodation will not eliminate that risk." 480 U.S. at 287 n.16.
In the housing context, the FHAA's "direct threat" defense means that "[a]n
individual is not otherwise qualified if, for example, he or she would pose a threat to the safety
of others, unless such threat can be eliminated by reasonable accommodation." 1988 House
Report, supra note 116, at 28. Examples of FHA section 504 cases in which older residents whose
disabilities caused them to behave in ways that made them not "otherwise qualified" include
Wiesner v. 321 W, 16th St. Assocs., No. 0O CIV.1423 (RWS), 2000 WL 1191075 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22,
2000) (involving a tenant whose mental disability caused her to place personal effects in
common areas, creating a fire hazard that threatened the health and safety of other residents)
and Nichols v. Saint Luke Ctr, 800 F. Supp. 1564, 1567-70 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (involving nursing
home resident whose disability caused him to behave violently toward others).
215. See SCHwEMM, supra note 6, § I ID:3, at 1 ID-24 to I ID-25 n.18 (citing numerous cases
rejecting or narrowly construing the "direct threat" defense in FHA litigation).
216. See 1988 House Report, supra note 116, at 29 ("Any claim that an individual's tenancy
poses a direct threat and a substantial risk of harm must be established on the basis of a history
of overt acts or current conduct. Generalized assumption, subjective fears, and speculation are
insufficient to prove the requisite direct threat to others."); see also id. at 18 (quoted supra note
116); HUD v. Country Manor Apartments, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.)
25,156, at 26,253-54 (HUD ALJ Sept. 20, 2001) (holding that senior housing facility failed to
justify its policy of requiring residents who used motorized wheelchairs to obtain liability
insurance in part because the policy reflected an unfounded stereotypical view that users of
such chairs posed a unique risk to the safety and health of other tenants).
217. See SCHWEMM, supra note 6, § l1D:3, at 1ID-25 nn.19-20 and accompanying text; see
also 1988 House Report, supra note 116, at 30 (providing that only "objective evidence that is
sufficiently recent as to be credible, and not from unsubstantiated inferences, that the applicant
will pose a direct threat" is sufficient to satisfy the defendant-landlord's burden under this
provision).
SENIORS AND THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
justified.'1 Finally, if an individual does pose the kind of direct threat that
would give rise to this defense but "a reasonable accommodation would
eliminate the risk, [housing providers] are required to engage in such
accommodation" before they may reject or evict that individual .
C. SUMMARY: THE FHA 'S BASIC REQUIREMENTS REGARDING SENIOR HOUSING
Part II has established that virtually all types of housing for older
persons, including assisted living facilities and even most nursing homes,
should be considered "dwellings" covered by the FHA, unless they qualify for
one of the statute's exemptions. Most of these exemptions, such as the ones
for "Mrs. Murphy" apartments and certain single-family house
transactions,220 would clearly not apply to any sizeable multi-unit housing
development for seniors. Indeed, the only exemption that would generally
be available in this field is the one for "housing for older persons," but this
only authorizes such housing to discriminate against families with children,
leaving intact the FHA's bans on discrimination based on the statute's six
other specified criteria. 2 The religious exemption might also be available
for certain senior housing facilities, but only for those with substantial ties to
a religious community, and even then, only to allow certain types of religious
preferences, leaving racial and the other types of discrimination condemned
by the FHA unlawful.222 Senior housing that receives federal assistance under
218. 1988 House Report, supra note 116, at 30. For a more detailed discussion of how the
FHA's restriction on disability-related inquiries applies to providers of senior housing, see infra
Part III.C.2.c.
219. 1988 House Report, supra note 116, at 29; see also Roe v. Hous. Auth., 909 F. Supp. 814,
822-23 (D. Colo. 1995) (before disabled tenant may be evicted based on FHA's "direct threat"
provision, landlord "must demonstrate that no 'reasonable accommodation' will eliminate or
acceptably minimize any risk [tenant] poses to other residents"); Roe v. Sugar River Mills
Assoc., 820 F. Supp. 636, 639 (D.N.H. 1993) (holding that prior to eviction, the resident of a
senior housing complex is entitled to a determination whether any reasonable accommodation
might mitigate the direct threat posed by his behavior); Wieaner, 2000 WL 1191075, at *5-8
(tenant may challenge eviction otherwise justified under § 3604(f) (9) if reasonable
accommodation could ameliorate the threat she is causing to other residents); 1988 House
Report, supra note 116, at 28 ("Handicapped individuals are 'otherwise qualified' if, with
reasonable accommodation, they can satisfy all the requirements for a position or service"); cf.
Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d 1002, 1014-17 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that section
504 bars nursing home from denying services to individual whose disability may result in
aggressive or violent behavior if defendant-home could ameliorate this problem through a
reasonable accommodation); Nichols, 800 F. Supp. at 1569-70 (same); Citywide Assocs. v.
Penfield, 564 N.E.2d 1003 (Mass. 1991) (holding that section 504 bars section 8 landlord from
evicting an elderly tenant with a mental disability that caused her to do minor damage to
apartment in light of possibility that reasonable accommodation would curb this problem).
The FRA's "reasonable accommodation" requirement is set forth in 42 U.S.C. §
3604 (f) (3) (B) (2000) and is further discussed infra in Parts IIl.C.2.d and IIl.D.2.
220. See supra note 178.
221. See supra notes 189-95 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 197-211 and accompanying text.
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the Section 202 program may be entitled to favor non-elderly applicants with
certain disabilities over others, but is otherwise subject to all of the FHA's
anti-discrimination commands.2 3 Finally, the "direct threat" defense is
available in disability cases, but only in very limited circumstances that the
defendant must prove to exist in the particular case at hand. 4
To summarize, the vast majority of ALFs, CCRCs, nursing homes, and
all other types of residences of special interest to older persons are
forbidden by the FHA from discriminating on the basis of race, color,
national origin, and sex. Most would also be barred from religious
discrimination, although some communities with significant ties to a
particular religious organization are authorized to limit themselves to
members of that religion. 2 5 Disability discrimination is also outlawed in all
such housing subject only to the limits of the Section 202 program and the
"direct threat" defense, and indeed the FHA imposes three additional
requirements to guarantee against such discrimination (i.e., allowance of
reasonable physical modifications; allowance of reasonable accommodations
in rules and policies; and, for certain multifamily units constructed after
1991, inclusion of specified accessibility features). 7 The only type of
discrimination outlawed by the FHA that may be practiced in housing for
older persons is discrimination against families with children, and then only
228if the community has adopted certain age-restrictive policies and practices.
Thus, resident-selection criteria for virtually all housing for older
persons may not discriminate on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex,
and, in most cases, handicap and religion. With this basic point established,
Part III next considers other types of practices that might also lead to FHA
liability in such housing.
III. SPECIFIC ISSUES ARISING FROM THE FHA's APPLICABILITY TO
HOUSING FOR OLDER PERSONS
A. OVERVIEW; PHASES OF THE HOUSING-PROVISION PROCESS
Part III will provide an analysis of the key issues that are likely to arise
when the FHA is applied to senior housing. Taken together, the FHA's
substantive prohibitions make the statute applicable to all phases of the
housing-provision process. 2 9 These include not only admission to housing
through sale or rental, but also the design and construction of housing; its
223. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
225. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
226. See supra note 164 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I1.B.2.c.
227. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
228. See supra Part I.B.2.a.
229. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
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marketing, financing, and insurance; and the terms and conditions of its
occupancy, including eviction. Part III deals with these phases in four
sections-advertising and other marketing techniques in III.B; admissions in
III.C; terms and conditions during residency in III.D; and other issues,
including design and construction (accessibility), financing, and insurance
in III.E-thereby providing a comprehensive review of those situations in
which the FHA affects the provision of housing for older persons. One area
that we do not address is challenges by housing providers to zoning and
other land-use restrictions used to block the development of senior housing
units. NWhile this is an area of substantial FIA litigation,230 it is one that tends
to align housing providers with, not against, their prospective residents and is
therefore beyond the scope of this Article.23'
It is assumed throughout Part III that the housing facilities being
considered-whether independent-living communities, assisted-living
complexes, nursing homes, or a combination thereof232-qualify for the
FHA's "housing for older persons" exemption by imposing minimum age-
restrictions and otherwise taking steps to indicate that they are intended and
operated only for seniors. 32 It is also assumed that the housing involved
does not qualify for either the FHA's "Mrs. Murphy's apartments" exception
(because only developments with more than four units are considered) nor
the single-family-house exception (because more is involved than the sale or
rental of a single-family house by its owner without the use of a broker).234
The result of these realistic assumptions is that all of the housing considered
here is forbidden by the FHA from discriminating on the basis of race, color,
national origin, religion, sex, and handicap; that is, all of the bases outlawed
by the FHA except familial status, which would be a permissible form of
230. See, e.g., Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 284 F.3d 442, 442-68 (3d
Cir. 2002); Hovsons, Inc. v. Brick, N.J., 89 F.3d 1096, 1096-106 (3d Cir. 1996); Assisted Living
Assocs. v. Moorestown Township, 996 F. Supp. 409, 409-47 (D.N.. 1998); see also Fair Hous. in
Huntington v. Huntington, 316 F.3d 357, 357-68 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding a municipality's
approval of age-restricted housing in a predominantly white area that was unsuccessfully
challenged as increasing segregation in violation of the FHA); Consent order, United States v.
Pooler, Ga., No. CV 401-263, (N.D. Ga. June 16, 2003) (resolving case alleging FHA violations
by municipality that blocked proposed apartment complex for low-income senior citizens),
settlement agreement at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/poolersettle.htm (on
file with the Iowa Law Review) (described supra note 157). For an overview of FHA litigation
involving zoning and other land-use restrictions, see SCHWEMM, supra note 6, § 11D:5, at I 1D-28
to 11D-53, §§ 13:8-14, at 13-31 to 13-56.
231. Articles dealing with this subject include those cited in SCHWEMM, supra note 6, §
I 1D:5, at 11D-30 n. 10 and Michael Kling, Note, Zoned Out: Assisted Living Facilities and Zoning, 10
ELDER L.J. 187 (2002).
232. For descriptions of these types of housing, see supra Part I.B.2.c, d, and f.
233. The "housing for older persons" exemption is discussed supra Part II.B.2.a.
234. See supra note 178 (describing the "Mrs. Murphy" and single-family-house
exemptions).
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discrimination as a result of the complex's qualifying for the "housing for
older persons" exemption.
Three of these outlawed bases of discrimination-race, color, and
national origin-are so clearly forbidden that liability is assured if a complex
refuses admission or otherwise discriminates against an applicant based on
one of these factors. This would also seem to be true for sex discrimination,
although the paucity of gender cases under the F-A means that this
proposition has not yet been fully tested.23 5 Finally, religious and handicap
discrimination would also generally be forbidden, but because these two
bases of discrimination raise some special issues,36 they must often be
discussed separately.
B. ADVERTISING AND OTER MARKETING ThCHNQUES
Housing for older persons, like other goods and services in the United
States, is marketed to the public. Advertisements for such housing appear in
magazines and newspapers, on Web sites, and in direct-mail solicitations.3 7
235. While no reported decision has ever countenanced sex discrimination in a non-
exempt dwelling under the FHA, there are some cases in which single-sex housing providers
have invoked the FHA to challenge adverse governmental land-use restrictions, without
prompting any negative judicial comments about the providers' sexual exclusivity. See, e-g., Doe
v. Butler, Pa., 892 F.2d 315, 316 (3d Cir. 1989) (reviewing FHA claims against municipality on
behalf of a "shelter for abused women and children"); Cmty. Hous. Trust v. Dep't of Consumer
and Regulatory Affairs, 257 F. Supp. 2d 208, 212, 219 (D.D.C. 2003) (ruling in favor of FHA
claims against municipality based on plaintiffs' efforts to provide separate group homes for men
and women with mental disabilities); United States v. Jackson, Miss., 3 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending
(Aspen Law & Bus.) 16,663, at 16,663.2 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 23, 2002), affd, 359 F.3d 727 (5th Cir.
2004) (referring to a FHA suit brought by the United States on behalf of a "non-profit personal
care home" for "elderly women in the early-to-moderate stages of Alzheimer's Disease"). These
cases, however, cannot be taken to suggest that exclusion of an otherwise qualified homeseeker
on the basis of sex is permitted under the FHA. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 298.
236. See supra, respectively, Parts II.B.2.b. (relating to religion) and II.B.2.c (relating to
handicap).
237. See, e.g., Richard A. Nulman, Adult Community Advertising: Why It's Different, SENIORS'
Hous. NEWS 21 (Winter 2001); id. at 23 (publishing an advertisement for a company that
advises housing developments targeting the 55-and-older market); Shrivastava, supra note 49, at
C-2 (noting "a distinct change in the way these [senior] communities are marketed"); see also
Paul C. Luken & Suzanne Vaughan, "Active Living" Transforming the Organization of Retirement
and Housing in the U.S., 30 J. Soc'Y. & Soc. WELFARE 145, 148-65 (2003) (describing special
advertising campaign undertaken in the 1950s and 1960s by the developer of Sun City, Arizona,
one of the nation's first planned retirement communities).
Examples of newspaper and magazine advertisements for housing for older persons
include: Esplanade Senior Residences, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2004, (Magazine) at 10; Westminster
Communities of Bradenton, Florida, BRADENTON HERALD, May 13, 2003, at 12C; Richmond Place
Senior Living Networ, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Apr. 25, 2000, at 12; Atria Retirement and
Assisted Living Communities, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2000, (Magazine) at 75. Examples of Web sites
include http://www.presbyterianhomes.org; http://www.loomiscommunities.org; and
http://www.westminsterretirement.com. Examples of direct-mail advertising include brochures
received by the authors from Bristol Village in Waverly, Ohio, and from the Loomis
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In addition, many housing developments catering to older persons produce
their own brochures, newsletters, and other literature describing their units
and services.2 38 All of these marketing efforts are subject to the FHA's §
233604(c), "  which outlaws every discriminatory "notice, statement, and
advertisement" relating to housing.
Three particular areas of concern prompted by § 3604(c)'s applicability
to senior housing advertising are dealt with here: (1) the use of problematic
words and phrases, including the use of religious terms in naming or
otherwise describing housing complexes; (2) the use of human models in
brochures and other ads; and (3) other questionable practices. Before these
areas are explored, however, some general principles governing § 3604(c)
must be noted.
Section § 3604(c) is worded in a unique way that makes it essentially a
"strict liability" statute.241 Unlike the FHA's other substantive prohibitions,
which generally outlaw behavior undertaken "because of" a prohibited
ground and thereby focus on the actor's intent in engaging in such
behavior,2 42 § 3604(c) bans any housing-related communication that
"indicates" discrimination. Numerous courts have held that, by making
Communities, in Amherst, Holyoke, and South Hadley, Massachusetts (on file with the Iowa
Law Review).
238. Examples of brochures include those produced by: Mayfair Village and Marriott's The
Lafayette in Lexington, Kentucky; Presbyterian Homes and Services' Echo Ridge and Oak
Meadows, both in Oakdale, Minnesota; Presbyterian Homes' Westminster Place in Evanston
Illinois; Holiday Retirement Corp.'s Lodge at White Bear in White Bear Lake, Minnesota; and
Walker Methodist Foundation's Hazel Ridge in Maplewood, Minnesota (all on file with the
Iowa Law Review).
239. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2000). See 24 C.F.R. § 100.75(b) (2003) (noting that § 3604(c)
covers "any applications, flyers, brochures, deeds, signs, banners, posters, billboards or any
documents used with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling").
240. Section 3604(c) outlaws the publication of "any notice, statement, or advertisement"
relating to housing that "indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination" based on a
FHA-prohibited ground, or "an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or
discrimination." § 3604(c). For a detailed description of the background and meaning of this
provision, see Robert G. Schwemm, Discriminatory Housing Statements and § 3604(c): A New Look at
the Fair Housing Act's Most Intriguing Provision, XXIX FORDHAm UR3. L. J. 189 (2001). Numerous
articles have dealt with § 3604(c)'s prohibition of discriminatory advertising. See, e.g., Michael E.
Rosman, Ambiguity and the First Amendment: Some Thoughts on All-White Advertising, 61 TENN. L.
REV. 289 (1993); id. at 290-91 nn.3, 5 (citing pertinent articles); Katherine G. Steams,
Comment, Countering Implicit Discrimination in Real Estate Advertisements: A Cal for the Issuance of
Human Model Injunctions, 88 NW. U. L. REv. 1200 (1994).
241. E.g., HUD v. Roberts, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 25,151, at
26,217 (HUD ALJJan.19, 2001); HUD v. Dellipaoli, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law &
Bus.) 125,127, at 26,077 (HUD ALJJan. 7,1997).
242. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), 3604(b), 3604(d), 3604(f)(1), 3604(0(2), and 3605. Under
certain circumstances, a showing of discriminatory effect without a showing of illegal intent may
be sufficient to establish a violation of these provisions, see supra note 122 and accompanying
text, but this is based on an interpretation of their "because of" language and not the similarity
between this language and § 3604(c)'s.
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liability turn on what a housing ad, notice, or statement "indicates," §
3604(c) bars any such communication that conveys discrimination to an
"ordinary" reader or listener, regardless of whether the message was
intended to be discriminatory.243
A second noteworthy feature of § 3604(c)'s ban on discriminatory
advertising is that it has been the subject of a good deal of administrative, as
well as judicial, interpretation. HUD's current regulation dealing with §
2443604(c), though relatively brief, does make clear that at least two specific
types of housing ads are prohibited: (1) those "[u]sing words, phrases,
photographs, illustrations, symbols, or forms which convey" that housing is
or is not available to particular groups of persons based on any FHA-
prohibited ground;245 and (2) those "[s]electing media or locations for
advertising" that "deny particular segments of the housing market
information about housing opportunities" because of any FHA-prohibited
246ground.
In addition to this regulation, HUD has provided substantial guidance
in other formats concerning problematic advertising practices, which,
though perhaps not entitled to the same degree of deference as a• - 247
regulation, is nevertheless entitled to considerable deference in
interpreting § 3604(c). 248 The most important example is a set of HUD
guidelines originally issued in 1972 identifying types of housing ads that
raise problems under § 3604(c), including those that use certain
inappropriate words and phrases and those that selectively use human
models or other content or media. 49 Additional guidance about other
243. E.g-, Tyus v. Urban Search Mgmt., 102 F.3d 256, 266-67 (7th Cir. 1996); Jancik v.
HUD, 44 F.3d 553,556 (7th Cir. 1995); Ragin,Jr. v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 6 F.3d 898,
905-07 (2d Cir. 1993); Hous. Opportunities Made Equal v. The Cincinnati Enquirer, 943 F.2d
644, 646 (6th Cir. 1991); Ragin, Jr. v. The N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999 (2d Cir. 1991);
United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 1972); Spann v. Colonial Vili., Inc., 899
F.2d 24, 29-30 (D.C. Cir. 1990); other cases cited in SCHWEMM, supra note 6, § 15:8, at 15-30
n.2.
244. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.75 (2003).
245. Id. § 100.75(c)(1).
246. Id. § 100.75(c)(3).
247. In accordance with the doctrine established in Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, HUD regulations interpreting the FHA are to be followed so long as they are "a
permissible construction of the statute." 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984). See also supra note 170
and accompanying text.
248. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972) (holding that a
long-standing interpretation of FHA by HUD fair housing staff "is entitled to great weight"); see
also Gladstone, Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 107 (1979) (holding that the fact that HUD
"consistently has treated [the issue presented here in a certain way] ... commands considerable
deference"). See generally United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228-31 (2001) (describing
degree of deference owned to an agency's non-regulation interpretations of the statutes it
enforces).
249. See 37 Fed. Reg. 6700 (Apr. 1, 1972) (publishing HUD's "Advertising Guidelines for
Fair Housing"). These guidelines were codified as a part of HUD's FHA regulations in 1980, see
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potentially unlawful words and phrases was provided by HUD's top fair
housing official in a 1995 memorandum, 250 which also addressed a number
of religion-based concerns such as the propriety of ads that mention
religious services and those that use "the legal name of an entity which
contains a religious reference.,
2 5
1
1. Problematic Words and Phrases; Properties with Religious Names
The HUD advertising guidelines list numerous words and phrases that
might convey illegal discrimination under § 3604(c). These include
"restricted," "exclusive," "private," and "traditional."2' 5 2 In addition, the
guidelines caution against use of words or phrases relating to a particular
race or national origin (such as "Irish" or "Polish") and against providing
directions to housing developments that make reference to landmarks with a
253racial or national origin significance.
Fair Housing Advertising Guidelines, 45 Fed. Reg. 57,102-07 (Aug. 26, 1980) (promulgating 24
C.F.R. pt. 109), and they were updated shortly after enactment of the 1988 FHAA to reflect the
addition of handicap and familial status to the statute's list of prohibited bases of
discrimination. See 54 Fed. Reg. 3308-10 (Jan. 23, 1989). In 1996, HUD removed the guidelines
from the Code of Federal Regulations because it felt that such "nonbinding guidance" was not
appropriate for inclusion in regulations, but the agency made clear at that time that it
continued to view these guidelines as "very helpful" in determining how § 3604(c) should be
applied in specific situations. Office of the Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and Equal
Opportunity; Regulatory Reinvention; Streamlining of HUD's Regulations Implementing the
Fair Housing Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 14,378, 14,380 (Apr. 1, 1996).
The text of the post-FHAA version of 24 C.F.R. pt. 109, which had contained the most
recent version of the HUD advertising guidelines when they took the form of regulations, is set
forth at 54 Fed. Reg. 3308-10 Uan. 23, 1989).
250. Memorandum from Roberta Achtenberg, Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and
Equal Opportunity to senior HUD Fair Housing Enforcement Staff (Jan. 9, 1995), reprinted in I
Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 5365, at 5365-66 [hereinafter Achtenberg
Memo] (providing the "FHEO Guidance Regarding Advertisements Under § 804(c) of the Fair
Hotising Act").
251. Id. at 5366.
252. See 54 Fed. Reg. 3309 (Jan. 23, 1989) (setting forth former 24 C.F.R. § 109.20(b) (8)
(1990)).
253. Id. (setting forth former 24 C.F.R. §§ 109.20(b) (4), 109.20(e)); see also Hous. Rights
Ctr. v. Donald Sterling Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1139 (C.D. Cal. 2003), affd, 84 Fed. Appx.
801 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the defendants' use of "Korean" in the title of their apartment
buildings is likely to violate § 3604(c), because many persons "would understandably regard the
decision to place the word 'Korean' in the name of a building in a racially diverse
neighborhood as a coded message: 'Koreans and Korean-Americans are welcome and
preferred; others are not'").
For some examples of national origin references in senior housing, see Senior Class,
supra note 72, at 49 (identifying a CCRC run as the "Swedish Retirement Association"); id. at 52,
54 ("Russian," "Korean," and "Spanish" programs offered by nursing homes); see also Ethnic
Nursing Homes Grow in Chicago, Oct. 12, 2004, at http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/10/12/
nursing.homes.ap/index.html (reporting on "a growing number of Chicago-area nursing
homes that assemble residents by ethnicity" so that "Asians live on one floor, Hispanics are on
another").
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The HUD guidelines also offer examples of problematic language
relating to the FHA's other illegal bases of discrimination. With respect to
sex, the guidelines caution against using words that state or imply that
individual units are available to persons of only one sex and not the other
"except where the sharing of living areas is involved."25 4 With respect to §
3604(c)'s ban on handicap discrimination, HUD makes the obvious point
that housing ads should not contain explicit exclusions, limitations, or other
indications of handicap discrimination (e.g., "no wheelchairs") . 55 On the
other hand, the agency believes that descriptions of the property (e.g.,
"walk-in closets") and those describing the conduct required of residents
216(e.g., "non-smoking" or "sober") are permitted. Also acceptable are
advertisements containing descriptions of accessibility features.257
HUD's list of handicap-related words and phrases to avoid includes
"impaired" and "physically fit."'"5 The latter phrase's impropriety raises a
question about using the conceptually similar term "independent living,"
which often appears in ads and brochures for senior housing communities.
Based on HUD's view that property and service descriptions are generally
allowed, 59 it would seem that "independent living" could be used if its only
function is to describe the nature of the services offered by a housing
complex. On the other hand, if this phrase is used to describe the type of
people who would be particularly welcome as residents, it would almost
certainly indicate an illegal preference in violation of § 3604(c).160 Similarly,
254. 54 Fed. Reg. 3309 (Jan. 23, 1989) (setting forth former 24 C.F.R. § 109.20(b) (5)). See
infra text accompanying notes 406-07 for further discussion of this provision.
FHA litigation involving sex-based claims of discriminatory advertising has been
extremely rare. However, one common practice of retirement communities that might be
questionable is to offer sex-separate services or recreational opportunities. See, for example,
monthly activities list of Marriott's The Lafayette in Lexington, Kentucky, for May 2001 (giving
notice of a "Men Only Luncheon" on May 21). Putting aside for the moment the question of
whether providing such discriminatory services might itself be illegal-a question discussed
infra in Part. III.D.1-the legality of advertising or giving notice of such services under 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(c) (2000) finds some support in HUD's view that simply describing discriminatory
services does not per se "state a preference for persons likely to make use" of these services. See
Achtenberg Memo, supra note 250, at 5366.
255. See Achtenberg Memo, supra note 250, at 5366.
256. Id.
257. See 54 Fed. Reg. 3309 (Jan. 23, 1989) (setting forth former 24 C.F.R. § 109.20(b) (6)
(1990)).
258. Id.
259. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
260. See, e.g., Niederhauser v. Independence Square Hous., 4 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending
(Aspen Law & Bus.) 16,305, at 16,305.6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 1998) (holding that housing
provider's publication of rules, policies, and lease terms that express "independent living"
limitations on tenancy violated § 3604(c)); Consent order, United States v. Resurrection Ret.
Cmty., Inc., No. 02-CV-7453 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2002), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/
documents/resurrectsettle.htm (on file with the Iowa Law Review) (setting FHA claims based
in part on allegations that senior retirement community violated § 3604(c) by making
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use of the word "active" to describe the clientele sought in a senior housing
community would seem to indicate a preference for nonhandicapped
261people .
With respect to religious discrimination, a preliminary determination
must be made as to whether the particular housing complex involved is
covered by the FlA's religious exemption and, if so, whether this exemption
authorizes the complex to engage in religiously discriminatory advertising.262
A negative answer to either of these questions would mean that the complex,
even if it has some religious affiliation, is subject to the commands of §
3604(c).
The religion-based commands of § 3604(c) have prompted a good deal
of specific guidance from HUD in addition to the agency's general
admonition that "[a]dvertisements should not contain an explicit
preference, limitation or discrimination on account of religion."2 2
According to HUD, words and phrases to avoid include 'Jewish home" and
indeed any reference to the words "Protestant, Christian, Catholic, [or] Jew"
in the description of a dwelling or its residents.264 In addition, HUD has
opined that directions to housing developments that make reference to a
synagogue, congregation, or parish may also indicate an illegal
preference.265
On the other hand, based on HUD's belief that descriptions of
properties and services are generally permitted, the agency has determined
that ads containing such descriptions as "chapel on the grounds" and
"kosher meals available" do not "on their face state a preference for persons
likely to make use of those facilities" so as to violate the FHA.266 This is an
statements intended to discourage disabled applicants and to suggest that people with certain
kinds of disabilities would not be comfortable living there).
Ads and notices by senior housing providers that include "independent living" and
similar disability-based restrictions are ubiquitous. See, e.g., Ziaja, supra note 87, at 315-16; Senior
Class, supra note 72, at 62-67 (described infra note 326). For a discussion of the separate, but
related, issue of whether senior housing providers can insist that their residents have the ability
to "live independently," see infra Part III.C.2.b.
261. See generally Jane Adler, Adult Communities Mean It When They Say "Active," CHI. TRia.,
Aug. 3, 2003, at A-3 (describing various Chicago-area senior developments that "pitch
themselves as 'active adult'"). Other examples of the use of "active" in advertisements for
housing for older person include an ad touting the River Woods development as "Active adult
condominium living in your own backyard" in CHI. TRIB., Apr. 13, 2002, § 4, at 10; see also
Shrivastava, supra note 49, at C-2 (describing trend of younger seniors to move to an "active
adult community").
262. The FHA's religious exemption is discussed supra in Part II.B.2.b. With respect to the
specific question of whether a complex covered by this exemption is thereby authorized to
engage in religiously discriminatory advertising, see supra note 201.
263. SeeAchtenberg Memo, supra note 250, at 5366.
264. 54 Fed. Reg. 3309 (Jan. 23, 1989) (setting forth former 24 C.F.R. § 109.20(a), (b) (3)
(1990)).
265. I& (setting forth former 24 C.F.R. § 109.20(e)).
266. Achtenberg Memo, supra note 250, at 5366.
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important principle, because many senior housing facilities do offer
religion-related services that are featured in their advertising. 267 Still, it
should be noted that, although HUD views descriptions of such services as
not "on their face" violative of § 3604(c), the possibility remains that such a
description might, along with other elements in an ad, be suggestive of an
268
illegal religious preference.
With respect to housing developments that have religious names-and
many senior developments do269 HUD has taken the position that:
Advertisements which use the legal name of an entity which
contains a religious reference (for example, Roselawn Catholic
Home) . . . , standing alone, may indicate a religious preference.
However, if such an advertisement includes a disclaimer (such as
the statement "This Home does not discriminate on the basis of
race, color, religion, national origin, sex, handicap or familial
status"), it will not violate the [FHA].ZT
This guidance is apparently designed for those properties that, while
having some religious affiliation, are not sufficiently connected with a
271
religious organization to qualify for the FHA's religious exemption.
Among the many senior housing communities that fall into this category are
those operated under the auspices of various Presbyterian homes. Many of
these Presbyterian-affiliated communities either have adopted non-religious
names or include at least some disclaimer that they do not discriminate in
267. See, e.g., Senior Class, supra note 72, at 42-67 (showing that the vast majority of ALFs,
CCRCs, nursing homes, and retirement communities surveyed offer religious services). This
phenomenon is not limited to senior housing facilities that have a formal affiliation with a
particular denomination, such as the Presbyterian Homes. See, e.g., id (showing that most
facilities offering such services do not have formal church affiliation); MAYFAIR VILLAGE
BROCHURE IN LEXINGTON, KENTUCKY (listing among 22 other services "Vespers and Bible
Studies") (on file with the Iowa Law Review); MARRIorr's THE LAFAYE'ITE MAY 2001 MONTHLY
NEWSLETrER IN LEXINGTON, KENTUCKY (offering Bible Study on most Tuesdays and a protestant
church service or hymn sing on most Sundays) (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
268. As discussed earlier with respect to sex-based advertising, see supra note 254, it is a
separate question whether, apart from the legality of an advertisement touting the provision of
religious services under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2000), the provision of such services itself might
violate § 3604(b)'s ban on discriminatory housing services. This question is dealt with infra in
Part III.D.1.
269. See, e.g., Senior Class, supra note 72, at 42-67 (showing that religious names were used
in nine of forty-four retirement communities, four or thirty-two ALFs, eight of twenty-one
CCRCs, and thirteen of eighty-five nursing homes surveyed in Chicago area); infra note 274.
270. Achtenberg Memo, supra note 250, at 5366; cf Hous. Rights Ctr. v. Donald Sterling
Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1139 (C.D. Cal.), affid, 84 Fed. Appx. 801 (9th Cir. 2003). See
supra note 253 for a description of the Housing Rights Center case.
271. See supra notes 202-11 and accompanying text.
272. See, for example, the Presbyterian Homes and Services' Echo Ridge and Oak Meadows
retirement communities in Oakdale, Minnesota brochure (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
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favor of members of this denomination."3 On the other hand, there are
numerous examples of nursing homes and other housing developments for
older persons that have, either through use of a religious name without an
assurance-of-nondiscrimination disclaimer or otherwise, included religious
references that would appear to indicate an illegal religious preference.27 4
2. The Use of Human Models in Brochures and Other Ads
Much of the litigation involving § 3604(c)'s ban on discriminatory
advertising has dealt with race-based challenges to the exclusive use of white
human models in housing ads. v The key issue in these cases has been
whether the use of such models in the defendants' ads violated § 3604(c).
The courts have generally agreed that, regardless of a housing advertiser's
intent, it may be found to have conveyed an illegal preference either by a
single ad that depicts "a large group of all-white models" or by a multi-ad
campaign that involves "repetitive publication of advertisements depicting a
large number of all-white models."276 The HUD advertising guidelines
support these decisions by listing the "selective use of human models" as a
potential § 3604(c) violation.2 7
For present purposes, perhaps the most relevant of the human models
decisions is Saunders v. General Services Corp.2 7" because it involved not only a
housing complex's newspaper advertisements but also its pictorial brochure.
In Saunders, Judge Merhige determined that "the virtual absence of black
models from the sixty-eight photographs in that brochure containing
human models" violated § 3604(c), because this would indicate a racial
preference to the "ordinary reader" in the area (Richmond, Virginia).279 In
273. See, e.g., PRESBYTERIAN HOMES' WESTMINSTER PLACE BROCHURE IN EVANSTON ILLINOIS
(noting that it is a "Non-sectarian Member of Presbyterian Homes") (on file with the Iowa Law
Review).
274. See, e.g., Mason Christian Village and Mount Healthy Christian Hone, CIN. MAG., Oct. 1999,
at 93 (advertising housing with no disclaimer that includes the claim that the Mount Healthy
Christian Home provides a "Christian atmosphere") (on file with the Iowa Law Review);
BRIARWOOD ADVERTISEMENT AND BROCHURE IN UNIONTOWN, OHIO (referring to an assisted
living/nursing home as a "Christian" facility that is philosophically "committed to providing
exceptional medical, physical and emotional care to individuals... by implementing the
Christian principles of love of God and love for others") (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
275. See, e.g., Tyus v. Urban Search Mgmt., 102 F.3d 254 (7th Cir. 1996); Ragin,Jr. v. Harry
Macklowe Real Estate Co., 6 F3d 898 (2d Cir. 1993); cases cited infra notes 276, 278. See
generally SCHWEMM, supra note 6, § 15:6.
276. Hous. Opportunities Made Equal v. The Cincinnati Enquirer, 943 F.2d 644, 648 n.4
(6th Cir. 1991); see also Ragin, Jr. v. The N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1002 (2d Cir. 1991)
(stating that for housing advertisers that "use a large number of models and/or advertise
repetitively ... , the message conveyed by the exclusion of a racial group" can be a strong
indicator of an illegal preference).
277. 54 Fed. Reg. 3309-10 (Jan. 23, 1989) (setting forth former 24 C.F.R. § 109.25(c)
(1990)).
278. 659 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Va. 1987).
279. Id. at 1058.
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reaching this conclusion, the court noted that "advertisers choose models
with whom the targeted consumers will positively identify"80 and that
therefore "the natural interpretation" of defendants' brochure was to
indicate that their "apartment complexes are for white, and not black,
tenants, thus discouraging blacks from seeking housing there."281
For purposes of evaluating the legality of a senior housing
development's brochure or other display ad that uses multiple human
models, the lesson from Saunders and related cases is that "the models
should be clearly definable as reasonably representing majority and minority
groups in the metropolitan area."8 2 Our review of various brochures for
housing complexes for older persons suggests that, while some reflect
sensitivity to these concerns,
2
83 many others do not.
2 84
280. Id; accord The N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d at 1000-01 (recognizing that advertisers
consciously choose human models, including those of particular races, in order to attract
certain kinds of prospective customers); see also Luken & Vaughan, supra note 237, at 163
(describing how the pictorial images used in ads for Sun City, Arizona, and the placement of
those ads in certain periodicals were designed by Sun City's developer to produce residents who
"were able-bodied, heterosexual, white, middle income, Christian couples unencumbered by
children").
281. Saunders, 659 F. Stspp. at 1058. According to Saunders.
[[It is natural that readers of the [defendants'] Lifestyle brochure would look at the
human models depicted as representing the kinds of individuals that live in and
enjoy [defendants'] apartment complexes. If a prospective tenant positively
identified with these models, the message conveyed would be that, "I belong in
these apartments. 'My kind of people' live there." Conversely, if the prospective
tenant reading the brochure saw no models with whom he or she could identify,
the reader would obtain a message that "these apartment are not for me or 'my
kind.'"
Id.
282. 54 Fed. Reg. 3309-10 (Jan. 23, 1989) (setting forth former 24 C.F.R. § 109.30(b)
(1990)).
283. See, e.g., WALKER METHODIST FOUNDATION'S HAZEL RIDGE BROCHURE IN MAPLEWOOD,
MINNESOTA (featuring four photos of human beings that include one identifiable African-
American couple); Covenant Retirement Communities in Northbrook and Batavia, Illinois, CHI. TRIB.,
July 13, 1997, (Magazine), at 23; Richmond Place Senior Living in Lexington, Kentucky, LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER, Apr. 25, 2000, at 12 (featuring three photos of human beings in a full-page
advertisement that includes one identifiable African-American); Majorie P. Lee Retirement
Community in Cincinnati, Ohio, CIN. MAC., Oct. 1999, at 25 (featuring two photos of human
beings in a full-page advertisement that includes one identifiable African-American couple);
River Woods Condominium in Chicago, Illinois, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 13, 2002, § 4, at 10 (featuring two
photos of human beings in an advertisement that includes one identifiable African-American
couple) (all on file with the Iowa Law Review).
284. See, e.g., Matt Whittaker, Group Alleges Discrimination in Senior Housing Advertising,
BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 17, 2003, at IB (reporting on yearlong study of print publication
advertisements for Baltimore-area senior housing finding that "of the 365 advertisements using
human models, 63% used only white models, 20% were racially mixed and 5% used exclusively
black models"). See also LOOMIS ADVANTAGE NEWSLETTER OF THE LOOMIS COMMUNITIES IN
AMHERST, HOLYOKE, AND SOUTH HADLEY, MASSACItUSETS (containing, respectively, eight and
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One element that might arguably distinguish the persons depicted in a
senior housing development's brochure from those in Saunders is that the
former might involve actual residents, while the latter were professional
models. Thus, it might be thought that simply using photos of actual scenes
and people showing "real life" in the development would send a less
discriminatory message than the more conscious act of selecting racially
identifiable human models to portray an idealized version of the complex.
No reported § 3604(c) case has yet dealt with "real life" models, so this
potential defense is at least theoretically viable.
The problem with such a defense, however, is that it focuses on the
advertiser's lack of discriminatory intent, which is generally not a relevant
factor in determining liability under § 3604(c) . Because the key to liability
is the nature of the message sent by the racial make-up of the people in the
photos, it would seem not to matter whether they are paid professional
models or simply local residents. Furthermore, even if only local-resident
pictures are used, the fact remains that the creator of a housing ad or
brochure still exercises choice in the selection of which photos to use. Thus,
if the chosen photos "indicate exclusiveness because of race,"
55 the display
would presumably be just as problematic under § 3604(c) as if professional
models were used.
Another issue that has yet to be the subject of a reported § 3604(c) case
and is therefore somewhat murky is whether the theory of the race-based
human model decisions applies with equal force to other FHA-prohibited
bases of discrimination. Would, for example, the failure to show any
wheelchair users in a multi-photo retirement community ad or brochure
indicate illegal discrimination on the basis of disability? The HUD guidelines
dealing with the selective use of human models do explicitly forbid
techniques that "indicate exclusiveness because of... handicap" and all
other FHA-banned criteria as well as race.287 It is unclear precisely what is
required by this guidance with respect to certain disabilities, national
origins, and religions that are not readily identifiable in photographs, but
other categories, such as sex and disabilities involving mobility impairments,
could well be the basis for a § 3604(c) claim if the persons depicted in a
senior housing development's ads indicate exclusiveness based on these
factors.
five photos of one or more human beings in the Spring 2004 and Summer 2003 issues, none of
whom appears to be African-American) (all on file with the Iowa Law Review).
285. See supra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
286. See 54 Fed. Reg. 3309-10 (Jan. 23, 1989) (setting forth former 24 C.F.R. § 109.30(b)
(1990)).
287. Id.; see also id. (setting forth former 24 C.F.R. § 109.25(c) (cautioning against
selectively using human models on the basis of sex)).
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3. Other Problematic Marketing Techniques
Other marketing techniques commonly employed by housing
developments for older persons may also violate § 3604(c). The essence of
such a development's marketing is presumably to identify its potential
customers and to focus its advertising on this target audience through
selected publications, direct-mail solicitations, or other media. The methods
employed in this targeting process may result in illegal discrimination.
The HUD guidelines specifically address the possibility that the
"selective use of advertising or... media.., can lead to discriminatory
results" in violation of the FHA. 28 The guidelines give two examples of such
problematic media selection that seem particularly relevant for senior
housing in racially diverse areas: (1) the distribution by mail of "brochure
advertisements... within a limited geographic area"; and (2) "advertising in
particular geographic coverage editions of major metropolitan newspapers
or in newspapers of limited circulation which are mainly advertising vehicles
for reaching a particular segment of the community.",2 9 Furthermore,
according to HUD, "the use of English language media alone or the
exclusive use of media catering to the majority population in an area, when,
in such area, there are also available non-English language or other minority
media" may indicate illegal discrimination. 290
FHA case law involving the selective use of media is virtually
nonexistent. The only reported decision appears to have occurred in 1975 in
NAACP v. 17Y Community Development Corp.,' 9' which simply approved a
consent order in a private class action alleging that the defendant's
advertising and marketing practices for its Florida development had been
focused away from racial minorities in violation of § 3604(c). The court-
approved settlement required the defendant to take a number of affirmative
steps to correct these practices, including using minority models in its
advertising, developing a direct-mail program targeted to minority
prospects, hiring more minority salespersons, and spending $55,000 of its
future advertising budget in media that served primarily black audiences.
92
Another marketing technique that some senior housing developments
employ is to invite individually identified prospects to an open house, meal,
or other gathering. The methods used for determining which persons to
invite to such events (e.g., gathering prospect names from current residents,
from local churches, or from purchased lists based on certain demographic
288. 54 Fed. Reg. 3309 (Jan. 23, 1989) (setting forth former 24 C.F.R. § 109.25).
289. Id. (setting forth former 24 C.F.R. § 109.25(a)). See also Luken & Vaughan, supra note
237, at 163 (describing how "the placement of these advertisements in certain periodicals" by
the developer of Sun City, Arizona, helped create a restricted image of the types of residents
desired). See discussion supra note 280.
290. 54 Fed. Reg. 3309 (Jan. 23, 1989) (setting forth former 24 C.F.R. § 109.25).
291. 399 F. Supp. 366 (D.D.C. 1975).
292. Id. at 368-69.
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and/or zip code criteria) might narrow the pool of invitees in ways that
violate the FHA. While no case involving a § 3604(c) claim based on this
theory has yet been reported, there are FlA decisions in analogous areas
that would support such a theory. For example, in Langlois v. Abington
Housing Authority, 3 the court held that the practice of public housing
authorities in predominantly white towns of giving a preference to local
residents had the unjustified effect of discriminating against racial
294
minorities and therefore violated the FHA. Applying a similar approach to
senior housing developments in white areas that use local-resident targeting
devices suggests that the resulting white-preferred prospect pools for their
marketing programs might run afoul of the FHA.
C. ADMISSIONS
1. In General
Perhaps the most dramatic conclusion of this Article-although one
that seems obvious from a legal standpoint-is that the FA makes it
unlawful for senior housing of any type to discriminate in admissions on the
basis of race, color, or national origin. This conclusion is dramatic, because
racial segregation is still the norm in much of America's housing.295 While
this fact alone does not establish that any particular development has
engaged in illegal racial or national origin discrimination, there is a growing
amount of anecdotal evidence indicating that such discrimination is
widespread in housing for older persons.296 Indeed, it would be surprising if
this were not so, because America's housing markets continue to be
293. 234 F. Supp. 2d 33, 55-70 (D. Mass. 2002).
294. See also United States v. Hous. Auth., 504 F. Supp. 716, 732 (S.D. Ala. 1980) (holding
that the residency requirement of the City of Chickasaw's all-white public housing authority
violates the FHA because it "has an adverse impact on all non-Caucasians; it perpetuates
segregation").
295. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCYA. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 61-78 (1993); JOHN YINGER, CLOSED DOORS,
OPPORTUNITIES LOST: THE CONTINUING COSTS OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 110-17 (1995);
Nancy A. Denton, The Persistence of Segregation: Links Between Residential Segregation and School
Segregation, 80 MINN. L. REV. 795, 797-801 (1996). See generally U.S. DEP'T Or COMMERCE, RACIAL
AND ETHNIC RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 1980-2002 (Aug. 2002),
http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/briefs.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2004) (on
file with the Iowa Law Review).
296. See, e.g., United States v. Lorantffy Care Ctr., 999 F. Snpp. 1037 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Fair
Housing of Marin Publishes Audit of Discrimination in Residential Care Faclilites, 1 Fair Hous.-Fair
Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 1 8.4 (2003) (reporting that testing-based investigation of twenty
residential care facilities for older persons in Marin and Sonoma Counties, California, revealed
"differential treatment favoring the white testers at 60 percent of the sites"); Whittaker, supra
note 284, at IB; see also David Falcone & Robert Broyles, Access to Long-Term Care: Race as a
Baier, 19J. HEALTlt, POL., POL'Y & L. 583 (1994) (finding that, in addition to demographic
trends, race discrimination may be limiting the number of people of color in ALFs and nursing
homes).
90 IOWA LA WREVIEW
characterized by a large degree of race and national origin discrimination,297
and there is no reason to believe that those segments of the housing industry
that cater to older persons are exempt from this phenomenon.
Sex discrimination in admissions is also clearly forbidden by the FHAy,
but there is little evidence to suggest that retirement communities and other
types of housing for older persons generally engage in this practice.2 9g
Nevertheless, as we shall see,3 ° the fact that sex discrimination is barred by
the FHA may carry with it some additional requirements relating to the
admissions-and-assignment process that many senior housing facilities are
not complying with.
The two remaining applicable bases of forbidden discrimination-
religion and handicap-would also generally be outlawed in housing for
older persons, but each raises some special issues. With respect to religion,
housing developments must be divided into two groups: (1) those run by
nonprofit religious-oriented organizations that are so closely associated with
a particular religion that they qualify for the FHA's religious exemption,
which would allow them to limit admission to members of their own faith;
30 1
and (2) all others, which include religious-oriented developments not
sufficiently affiliated with a religious organization to qualify for the religious
exemption and which, not having the benefit of this exemption, are fully
subject to the FHA's mandates against religious discrimination.
With respect to handicap, some of the FHA's non-discrimination
commands are written in a unique way that require individual attention,
which is provided in the next section. Basically, however, the FHA does
outlaw discrimination against people with disabilities in the admission phase
subject only to the "direct threat" defense.0 2 In addition, the statute's
297. See, e.g., MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV.,
DIScRIMINATION IN METROPOLITAN HOUSING MARKETS: NATIONAL RESULTS FROM PHASE I HDS
2000 iii-v (2002) (concluding based on a nationwide paired-testing study that "discrimination
still persists in both rental and sales markets of large metropolitan areas" and showing that
whites were consistently favored over blacks in 21.6% of rental tests and 17.0% of sales tests and
that non-Hispanic whites were consistently favored over Hispanics in 25.7% of rental tests and
19.7% of sales tests). The levels of discrimination found in this study were generally lower than
those found in a similar national study conducted in 1989, although the incidence of
discrimination against Hispanic renters remained essentially the same. Id. at iii. For a
description of the 1989 study and how its discrimination-rate findings mirrored those of a
similar 1977 study, see YINGER, supra note 295, at 19-49.
298. See, e.g., Walker v. Crigler, 976 F.2d 900, 901-03 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Reece, 457 F. Supp. 43, 47-48 (D. Mont. 1978); HUD v. Yankee Dev. Assocs., 2A Fair Hous.-Fair
Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 25,074, at 25,690-91 (HUD ALJ, June 28, 1994).
299. But see United States v. Jackson, Miss., 3 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.)
16,663 (S.D. Miss., Oct. 23, 2002), affid, 359 F.3d 727 (5th Cir. 2004) (described supra note
235 ); infra note 403.
300. See infta text accompanying notes 403-07.
301. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
302. See supra Part II.B.2.c.
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mandate that "reasonable accommodations" must be made to afford such
persons equal housing opportunities also has some important implications
at the admissions phase. 3 3
2. Admissions and the FHA's Prohibitions
Against Handicap Discrimination
a. Basic Prohibitions
This section deals with the question of whether the FHA allows housing
for older persons to discriminate on the basis of handicap in admissions.
The short answer seems to be that such discrimination is allowed if it favors
people with disabilities, but that any discrimination against such individuals
would be unlawful.
This asymmetrical conclusion is dictated by the language of the statute.
In outlawing handicap discrimination in the 1988 FHAA, Congress did not
simply add "handicap" to the list of prohibited bases of discrimination in §
3604(a)'s ban on discriminatory refusals to deal and § 3604(b)'s ban on
discriminatory terms and conditions, as it did with the new prohibition
against "familial status" discrimination and as it had in 1974 when it
3504prohibited "sex" discrimination. Rather, the basic prohibitory language of
§ 3604(a) and § 3604(b) was copied into two new provisions- § 3604(f)(1)
and § 3604(f)(2)-that banned discrimination "because of a handicap" of
any buyer, renter, or person residing or associated with such a buyer or
renter. °5
The reason for treating handicap discrimination in this special way was
apparently to make clear that the amended FHA would not condemn
housing that is made available especially for people with disabilities (i.e., that
the statute does not authorize "reverse discrimination" suits against such
housing by non-handicapped persons). The principal congressional report
supporting the FHAA described § 3604(f)(1) and § 3604(f)(2) as
prohibiting discrimination "against" handicapped persons,3°6 and HUD's
commentary on its FHAA regulations noted that the statute "does not
prohibit the exclusion of non-handicapped persons from dwellings."
30 7
303. See infra Part III.C.2.d.
304. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 125-26. Contrast the language used in 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (b) (2000),
which makes it unlawful to discriminate on the basis of a prohibited ground against "any
person.-
306. 1988 House Report, supra note 116, at 24-25.
307. 54 Fed. Reg. 3246 (Jan. 23, 1989). This commentary was prompted by HUD's
recognition that certain government programs provide assistance for housing that is available
only to persons with disabilities. Id. For example, in a case decided one year before passage of
the 1988 FHAA, the Tenth Circuit in Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Housing Center noted that
"only the elderly and the handicapped are eligible for residency in section 202 housing." 815
F.2d 1343, 1347 (10th Cir. 1987). For more on the section 202 program and its interplay with
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Thus, for example, assisted-living units may be restricted to those
persons whose impaired condition qualifies them for the type of care
provided by such a facility:s 8 Reflecting this conclusion, a number of cases
have applied the FHA in situations that involved an ALF or nursing home
exclusively designed for older persons with disabilities.309
On the other hand, no FHA-covered housing is permitted to
discriminate against any buyer or renter because that person has a disability
or resides or is associated with someone who does.310 This means that
admission to a retirement community or other type of housing for older
persons cannot be denied because of an applicant's disability. It also means
that such housing "may not increase for handicapped persons any
customarily required security deposit." 1' Indeed, any harsher "term or
condition" that is directed against applicants or tenants because of their
disability would violate the FHA's § 3604(f) (2).l
the F-A, see supra notes 64, 164. Despite this concern with subsidized housing, however,
HUD's commentary made clear that any housing provider, including a "privately owned
unsubsidized housing facility may lawfully restrict occupancy to persons with handicaps." 54
Fed. Reg. 3246 (Jan. 23, 1989).
308. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 309-10; cases discussed infra text accompanying notes
327-32.
309. E.g., Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 284 F.3d 442, 445-46, 459 (3d
Cir. 2002) (applying the FHA to a ninety-five-bed care facility for the elderly); Hovsons, Inc. v.
Brick, N.J., 89 F.3d 1096, 1102 (3d Cir. 1996) (applying the FHA to nursing home for disabled
elderly persons); Smith & Lee Assoc., Inc. v. Taylor, Mich., 102 F.3d 781, 795 (6th Cir. 1996);
Smith & Lee Assoc., Inc. v. Taylor, Mich., 13 F.3d 920, 922 (6th Cir. 1993) (applying the FHA to
adult foster care home for disabled elderly persons); United States v. Puerto Rico., 764 F. Supp.
220, 227 (D.P.R. 1991) (applying the FHA in a case involving nursing home for elderly
individuals); HUD v. Country Manor Apartments, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law &
Bus.) 25,156, at 26,248 (HUD ALJ Sept. 20, 2001) (applying the FlA to housing facility for
seniors that "includes a 172-bed nursing home, 45 'assisted living' units, and 155 'senior
apartments'"); HUD v. Courthouse Square Co., 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law &
Bus.) 25,155, at 26,232 (HUD ALJ Aug. 13, 2001) (applying the FIA to HUD-assisted
apartment complex "for the elderly and the handicapped").
310. See, e.g., United States v. Forest Dale, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 954, 961, 968-69 (N.D. Tex.
1993) (upholding § 3604(0 (1) claim challenging apartment complex's policy of renting only to
"ambulatory senior citizens"). See generally 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.60, 100.202(a)-(b) (2003)
(providing HUD's FHA regulations prohibiting handicap discrimination in refusals to sell or
rent dwellings). As noted above, one exception to the FRA's general mandate barring
discrimination against persons with handicaps has been recognized to allow housing complexes
that receive federal assistance under the section 202 program to favor non-elderly tenants with
certain types of disabilities over others. See supra note 164 and accompanying text; see also Forest
Dale, 818 F. Supp. at 963-65.
311. 24 C.F.R. § 100.203(a).
312. See, e.g., Country Manor Apartments, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending at 26,248, 26,252-54
(holding senior housing complex's requirement that tenants using motorized wheelchairs
obtain special liability insurance held to be discrimination in the terms and conditions of rental
in violation of § 3604(f)(2)); see also infra Part III.D.2 (discussing various ways in which §
3604(0 (2)'s guarantee of nondiscriminatory terms and conditions apply to current residents of
senior housing).
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Thus, while a senior housing provider may deny admission to applicants
who cannot meet the provider's basic financial and behavioral standards, 
1 3
it may not exclude people who otherwise meet the qualifications of tenancy
merely because they have a disability or because of the severity of that
disability.3 4 A necessary corollary of these propositions is that, once
admitted, residents cannot be evicted because they later become disabled.
5
15
Furthermore, the FHA seems to bar senior housing providers from denying
their units to those applicants and residents who are unable to "live
independently" and to limit the questions a provider may ask about a
tenant's disabilities, topics that are so crucial to the way many senior housing
complexes are run that they are dealt with separately in the next two
sections.
b. "Independent Living" Requirements
Beginning in 1990 with Cason v. Rochester Housing Authority16 a series of
cases has interpreted the FHA's ban on handicap discrimination to prohibit
housing providers from imposing a requirement that their tenants be
capable of "independent living."31 7 In Cason, three disabled individuals (two
of whom were seniors) brought a § 3604(f) (1) claim against their local
public housing authority after it had rejected them for failing to meet its
"ability to live independently" eligibility requirement. 3 8 The court ruled for
313. See, e.g., Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 1998)
(concerning financial eligibility); Schanz v. Vill. Apartments, 998 F. Supp. 784 (E.D. Mich.
1998) (same); Arnold Murray Constr., L.L.C. v. Hicks, 621 N.W.2d 171 (S.D. 2001) (concerning
behavior). See generally supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
314. See supranote 116 and accompanying text; see, e.g., case cited supra note 310.
315. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 100.60(b) (5) (providing HUD regulation that includes eviction
among the FlA's prohibited practices); Radecki v. Joura, 114 F.3d 115 (8th Cir. 1997) (ruling
that unlawful discrimination occurs when a tenant is evicted from his dwelling due to the
tenant's disability); see also United States v. Forest Dale, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 954, 959, 968-69
(N.D. Tex. 1993) (upholding FHA claim against senior apartment complex whose written
policies included a provision authorizing the complex to terminate a tenancy where "a
prolonged illness of the Tenant shall require special care or treatment and such care or
treatment shall tend to disrupt the general atmosphere and operation of [the complex] or
renders the Tenant to be 'non-ambulatory'"); cases cited infra note 429.
316. 748 F Supp. 1002 (W.D.N.Y. 1990).
317. In addition to Cason, see cases discussed infra notes 327-32; cf Armstrong v. Senior
Citizens Hous. of Ann Arbor, Inc., 317 N.W.2d 255 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (holding a retirement
complex's rejection of an applicant based on her inability to satisfy complex's "live
independently" requirement violated state law's prohibition of disability discrimination in
housing).
318. 748 F. Supp. at 1003-07. The Cason defendant's "ability to live independently"
requirement provided for screening out any applicant who was not able "to perform those basic
functions of adult living for and by him/her self. These activities include... [the] ability to
perform basic housekeeping and personal care." Id. at 1004. In addition to their FFL-A claim, the
Cason plaintiffs also sued under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because the defendant-
Authority received federal financial assistance, see supra note 134 and accompanying text, but
the court decided the case based solely on the FHA. 748 F. Supp. at 1007-09.
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the plaintiffs, concluding that this requirement and the inquiries conducted
by the defendant's staff to implement it "are in clear violation of federal
law."319 In rejecting the defendant's argument that its "ability to live
independently" requirement should be upheld because the Authority had
only relied on it to turn down a small fraction of handicapped applicants (17
out of 276), the Cason opinion pointed out that this requirement still had a
substantial discriminatory effect on handicapped persons because "no non-
handicapped persons" were denied housing on this basis.320 The court also
rejected the defendant's attempt to justify its requirement based on the
FHA's "direct threat" provision, finding "no evidence that the challenged
practices allow the Authority to screen out potentially dangerous tenants."
3 21
Finally, the defendant argued that it lacked the staff and resources to
provide support services to tenants, but, according to the court, plaintiffs:
require nothing of the sort from the Authority; rather, many
handicapped applicants receive support from Medicaid or other
assistance programs. A tenant who is able to meet the objective
requirements of tenancy should not be denied housing simply
because she receives medical assistance or other aid.3 2
The Cason defendant's "ability to live independently" requirement had
apparently received HUD's approval prior to passage of the 1988 FHAA
23
and indeed was typical of screening policies of HUD-assisted public housing
authorities throughout the country. 4 As a result of Cason, however, HUD
revised its public housing occupancy policies to make clear that such
authorities could no longer employ "independent living" eligibility
criteria. 23
319. Id. at 1003. For further discussion of the inquiries part of the Cason decision, see infra
text accompanying notes 344-45.
320. 748 F. Supp. at 1007. Indeed, the defendant simply "never questioned" the non-
handicapped applicants' "ability to live independently." Id. at 1008.
321. Id. at 1008. According to Cazson, there was "no evidence in the record.., to indicate
that an inability to live independently creates the type of threat contemplated by [§
3604(f) (9)]." Id. at 1009. For a description of the FHA's "direct threat" defense in § 3604(f) (9),
see supra Part II.B.2.c.
322. 748F. Supp. at 1009 n..
323. Id. at 1009.
324. Prior to 1990, HUD "had actively encouraged exclusion of applicants deemed not
capable of independent living." Barbara Sard, The Massachusetts Experience with Targeted Tenant-
based Rental Assistance for the Homeless: Lessons on Housing Policy for Socially Disfavored Groups, Part
I, 1 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERIY 182 (1994); see also U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV.,
MULTIFAMILY HANDBOOK 4350.3, HUD Transmittal CHG-24 (Jan. 19, 1993) (giving HUD
guidance to private owners of federally subsidized housing concerning their obligations to
comply with Cason).
325. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., PUBLIC HOUSING OCCUPANCY: ADMISSION
HANDBOOK 7465.1, HUD Transmittal REV-2-CHG-2 (July 12, 1991) (rescinding pre-Cason
Handbook provisions and announcing HUD policy that public housing authorities should not
"judge whether handicapped applicants are capable of living independently [and not] require a
[2004]
SENIORS AND THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
The lessons of Cason and HUD's subsequent policy change have not
been readily absorbed by providers of senior housing, many of whom
continued to impose "independent living" requirements throughout the
1990s and into the new century. s26 Their intransigence has prompted a series
of FHA cases, all of which have been resolved by eliminating the defendant-
provider's "independent living" restriction, either through judicial decisions
or consent decrees.
The principal judicial decisions are Niederhauser v. Independence Square
Housing,327 which struck down an apartment complex's practice of requiring
that tenants "be capable of tending to their needs independently" and "have
a successful history of living independently," and Jainniney v. Maximum
Independent Living,3 28 which held that a landlord's rejection of a disabled
applicant on the ground that he was "not ready to live independently"
violated the FHA. In Niederhauser, the defendant received federal financial
assistance under the section 202 program,3 9 and it argued that this program
justified its "independent living" requirement, an argument that the court
specifically rejected.330 The Jainniney decision is even more dramatic on this
point. The case involved a housing complex subsidized under an offshoot of
the section 202 program-section 811 of the 1990 Cranston-Gonzales
National Affordable Housing Act -specifically designed for certain
categories of disabled tenants. The court held that although section 811
authorized the defendant to favor persons with physical disabilities over
others, the program could not be used
physical examination as a condition of admission"); see also HUD Memorandum from Gordon
H. Mansfield, Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity, andJoseph G. Schiff,
Assistant Secretary for Public and Indian Housing et al., to All Regional Administrators (Dec.
31, 1990) (issuing a HUD memorandum re: PHA Determination of "Ability to Live
Independently" as a Criterion for Admission to Public Housing, which advised public housing
authorities, in light of Cason, to "rescind policies which may treat handicapped applicants
different from others" and to not require proof of the ability to live independently) (on file
with the Iowa Law Review).
326. See, e.g., Ziaja, supra note 87, at 319 (discussing how senior housing facilities often still
"restrict residency to seniors that are ambulatory and require only assistance with housekeeping
efforts"); Barbara Baster, Fighting Back: Active, Bike-Riding Tenant Resists City's Eviction Notice,
AARP BULLETIN, Nov. 2003, at 12 (reporting on Symon
m 
v. City of Sanibel litigation, which is
described infra note 335); Senior Class, supra note 72, at 62-67 (identifying eleven of forty-four
Chicago-area retirement communities in 2003 that included disability-related restrictions, such
as "must be able to live independently," "ambulatory residents only," "active adults," and "no
mentally ill residents").
327. 4 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 16,305, at 16,305.2-.6 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 27, 1998).
328. No. 00CV0879, slip op. at 3, 15 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 9, 2001), available at http://
www.bazelon.org/issues/housing/cases/janniney-v-maxindliv.pdf (on file with the Iowa Law
Review).
329. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
330. Niederhauser, 4 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending at 16,305.4-.5.
331. See supra note 164.
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as a tool for owners to exclude people with physical disabilities who
may also suffer from additional disabilities or to discriminate on
the basis of the ability to live independently.... The exclusion of
Mr. Jainniney and other people with mobility disabilities who have
been deemed by [defendant] to be incapable of independent
living can be viewed at best as a paternalistic attempt to direct these
individuals to more suitable housing and at worst, as prejudicial
discrimination. Either way, the exclusion of those who do in fact
suffer from a mobility disability but who are not able to live
independently is violative of the FHAA and is not condoned by §
811. As such, "independent living" is not a proper admissions
criteria for § 811 housing.332
Of the post-Cason cases decided by consent decrees, perhaps the most
important is United States v. Resurrection Community, Inc., 3 3 where the Justice
Department in 2002 brought a "pattern or practice" complaint against a 500-
unit retirement community, alleging that the defendant's FHA violations
included discouraging prospective residents who used wheelchairs and
requiring applicants to be able to "live independently" and to submit to
medical assessments conducted by the defendant's employees as a condition
of residency. The case is significant not only because it demonstrates the on-
going resistance of senior housing providers-including large, market-rate
retirement communities-to abandoning their "independent living"
requirements, but also as a demonstration of the federal government's
commitment to challenging such requirements as part of its FA
3'14enforcement responsibilities. The Resurrection case ultimately resulted in a
consent decree under which the defendant, in addition to paying $220,000
332. Jainnineyv. Maximum Indep. Living, No. 00CV0879, slip op. at 12-16 (N.D. Ohio Feb.
9, 2001), at http://ww.bazelon.org/issues/housing/cases/ainnincy-y-maxindlivpdf (on file
with the Iowa Law Review).
333. Consent order, United States v. Resurrection Ret. Cmty., Inc., No. 02-CV-7453 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 17, 2002), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/doctsments/resurrectsetle.htm (on
file with the Iowa Law Review).
334. See also United States v. Forest Dale, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (described
supra note 310); Consent order, United States v. Savannah Pines, L.L.C., No. 401CV3303 (D.
Neb. Apr. 30, 2003), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/savannahsettle.htm (on
file with the Iowa Law Review) (senior housing development agrees to abandon rental
agreement thatJustice Department alleged violated the FHA by requiring residents to move out
if they "can no longer care for [their] personal needs"); HUD v. Strawberry Point Lutheran
Home for the Aged, Inc., No. 07-01-0584-8, 2003 WL 1311336 (HUD ALJ Mar. 5, 2003) (settling
HUD's FHA charge based on the retirement complex's attempt to require long-term resident to
move to nursing home because of her need for assistance in transferring from bed to
wheelchair, with center agreeing to cease all eviction efforts and to consult with complainant-
resident and her physician before proposing any future move); HUD v. Wilmette Real Estate,
No. 25-98-0148-8, 2000 WL 1478457 (HUD ALJ Oct. 3, 2000) (settling HUD's FHA charge
based in part on apartment complex's inquiring about rejected complainant-applicants' "ability
to live independently").
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in monetary damages and penalties, agreed to rescind its "independent
living" and medical-exam policies."'
Thus, it would seem that admission to all traditional senior rental
housing is governed by Cason and its progeny. But would an "independent
living" requirement also be illegal if imposed by an ALF, CCRC, or other
facility that provides significant medical and other supportive services along
with its residential units? As an initial matter, one has to note the irony of
these types of housing providers employing such a policy, because their
appeal is inherently directed to that very subset of seniors whose age-related
impairments may make them incapable of meeting an "independent living"
requirement. 16 And yet, such providers who "bundle" together their
housing-and-services charges-"" would naturally be concerned about having
to absorb potentially open-ended health care costs and might therefore seek
to limit these costs by screening out applicants who cannot demonstrate an
ability to "live independently." Certainly, such self-interested pricing
strategies and "bottom line" concerns would not be adequate to justify an
otherwise clear violation of the FHA, any more so than would a housing
facility's desire to foster an "active seniors" or "nonhandicapped"
atmosphere.
A more appealing defense, however, might be the need of some ALFs
and CCRCs to comply with state regulations establishing "level of care"
protections for their residents (i.e., barring such a facility from accepting
people incapable of "independent living" if it is not licensed to serve such
persons) .33 This is a harder issue, and the case law is not yet well developed
335- See Resurrection, No. 02-CV-7453, at 3, 6-7, consent decree available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/resurrectsetde.htm (on file with the Iowa Law
Review); see also Symons v. Sanibel, I Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.), 1.8 (M.D.
Fla. Nov. 3, 2003) (discussing the FHA-based challenge to senior housing complex's attempt to
evict 82-year-old resident for allegedly not being "capable of living independently" results in
settlement providing for resident to remain in place and for defendants to "eliminate any
reference to the ability to live independently from their tenancy criteria"). Author Allen was
counsel for the plaintiff in the Symons case.
336. Cf Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d 1002, 1010 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Obviously,
everyone that applies for admission to a nursing home does so because of his or her disabilities.
Indeed, no one would be able to meet a nursing home's admissions requirements in the
absence of some handicapping condition necessitating nursing home care."); see also supra note
219 (describing the Wagner case in further detail); infa note 375 (same).
337. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
338 See, e.g., Marie-Therese Connolly, Federal Law Enforcement in Long-Term Care, 4 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 230 (2001). Many states have asserted an interest in regulating ALFs,
see supra note 67, at para. 3 and accompanying text, in large part because of concerns that their
residents will be subjected to the same types of abuses that have historically plagued nursing
home residents. See, e.g., Christine V. Williams, The Nursing Home Dilemma in America Today: The
Suffering Must Be Recognized and Eradicated, 41 SANTA CLdRA L. REV. 867 (2001). In order to
forestall such abuses, states generally certify ALFs for a particular "level of care" and prohibit
the admission or retention of residents who need care above that level. See, e.g., Edelstein, supra
note 98, at 378; 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 9/75 (Illinois Assisted Living and Shared Housing Act,
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on this point.3 9 Part of the answer may lie in the degree to which the Fl-A
allows ALFs and other housing-plus-medical-service facilities to inquire
about their residents' health and disability status to ensure compliance with
state licensing requirements, an issue that is discussed in the next section.34D
Overall, we conclude that the persistence of "independent living"
requirements in all types of senior housing, despite substantial FHA case law
to the contrary, amounts to a gathering storm of potential litigation. That
many senior housing and long-term care providers have not conformed
their practices to the mandates of Cason and its progeny suggests that these
providers do not believe the FHA applies to their operations, clearly a
misguided assumption.34 ' Furthermore, in light of the growing willingness of
the senior housing industry's disabled clientele to challenge "independent
living" and similar requirements, 4 2 the pressure feeding this litigation storm
seems unlikely to abate.
c. Prohibited Admissions Inquiries
In Coson and many of the other cases reviewed in the previous
section, 343 the defendant-housing providers were accused of violating the
FHA not only by imposing an "independent living" requirement, but also by
making pre-admission inquiries about applicants' physical and mental
limiting admission and retention in ALFs based, inter alia, upon severity and persistence of
mental illnesses).
339. Compare Weinstein v. Cherry Oaks Ret. Cmty., 917 P.2d 336, 337-38 (Colo. Ct. App.
1996) (noting that, to the extent such requirements "are consistent with the federal Fair
Housing Amendments Act," licensed "mid-care" retirement facilities must comply with state and
local regulations that require, inter alia, denial of admission to and discharge of residents who
"have physical limitations that prevent ambulation unless such limitations are adequately
compensated by artificial means"), with Baggett v. Baird, No. Civ. A4:94CVO2 82-HLM, 1997
WL 151544 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 18, 1997) (invalidating state regulation barring wheelchair users
from residing in personal-care home on the ground that that regulation facially discriminates
against non-ambulatory people with disabilities), and Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va.
Dep't of Health, 19 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570-72 (N.D.W.Va. 1998) (holding that state law and
regulations requiring residents of convalescent group homes to "possess the ability to remove
themselves, physically, from situations involving imminent danger" single out the handicapped
for special treatment and should therefore be analyzed as intentionally discriminatory under
the FHA). See also O'Neal by Boyd v. Ala. Dep't. of Pub. Health, 826 F. Supp. 1368, 1375 (M.D.
Ala. 1993) (rejecting procedural defenses to FHA and ADA claims based on state agency's
threat to revoke ALF's license for not evicting elderly residents suffering from Alzheimer's
disease who were thought to need a higher level of care and noting that the goals of these
federal statutes might conflict with the state's licensing regulations).
340. See infra notes 361-68 and accompanying text.
341. See generally supra Part II.B.
342. See, e.g., Michael Allen & Susan Silverstein, Preserving Elders' Housing Rights, 39 TRIAL
32, 39 (Oct. 2003).
343. See, e.g., cases cited infta notes 353-55; see also United States v. Salvation Army, 4 Fair
Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 16,387, at 16,387.4, 16,387.7 (S.D.N.Y. t999)
(holding that a housing provider's elimination of all questions concerning disability from its
applications forms defeats need for injunctive relief).
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impairments, a practice that has also generally been held to amount to
illegal handicap discrimination. In Cason, for example, the court struck
down the defendant-Authority's practice of conducting "detailed inquiries
into the nature and scope of the applicant's disabling condition."3" In
reaching this conclusion, the Cason opinion relied on HUD's FHA
regulations, which specifically restrict such inquiries.
34 5
According to the relevant HUD regulation, housing providers are not
allowed to make pre-admission inquiries in order "to determine whether an
applicant.., has a handicap or to make inquiry as to the nature or severity
of a handicap of such a person."34 6 Indeed, the HUD regulations do not
even authorize inquiries to determine whether an applicant poses the kind
of "direct threat" that would justify refusal of admission under the FHA. 47
The HUD regulations do allow providers of housing that is made available
especially for people with disabilities, such as units subsidized under the
section 202/section 811 program, to make inquiries necessary to
determine whether applicants are qualified for such housing. 49 Even in
these circumstances, however, handicap-related inquiries are unlawful if they
go beyond those necessary to determine such qualifications.50
These HUD regulations are based directly on statements made in the
Report of the House Judiciary Committee that is the principal source of
legislative history on the 1988 amendments to the FHA barring handicap
discrimination. 35' Furthermore, although the relevant HUD regulation by its
344. Cason v. Rochester Hous. Auth., 748 F. Supp. 1002, 1004 (W.D.N.Y. 1990).
345, Id. at 1008-09 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c) (1990)).
346. 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c).
347. See 54 Fed. Reg. 3247 (Jan. 23, 1989) (discussing HUD's decision not to accede to the
requests of honusing-provider organizations advocating the allowance of such inquiries). The
FHIA's "direct threat" defense is discussed supra in Part II.B.2.c.
348. See supra note 64.
349. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c)(2)-(3), which authorizes inquiries "to determine whether
an applicant for a dwelling is qualified for a dwelling available only to persons with handicaps
or to persons with a particular kind of handicap" and inquiries to determine whether an
applicant "is qualified for a priority available to persons with handicaps or to persons with a
particular type of handicap." Even these inquiries are prohibited, however, unless they "are
made of all applicants, whether or not they have handicaps." I. § 100.202(c).
350. See, e.g., cases cited injra notes 353-54.
351. According to this Report, the 1988 FHAA
is not intended to give landlords and owners the right to ask prospective tenants
and buyers blanket questions about the individuals' disabilities.... Under [the
Fl-fAA], only an inquiry into a prospective tenant's ability to meet tenancy
requirements would be justified. Thus, in assessing an application for tenancy, a
landlord or owner may ask an individual the questions that he or she asks of all
other applicants that relate directly to the tenancy... , but may not ask blanket
questions with regard to whether the individual has a disability. Nor may the
landlord or owner ask the applicant or tenant to waive his right to confidentiality
concerning his medical condition or history.
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terms only outlaws handicap-related inquiries at the admissions stage, the
FHA has also been interpreted to bar such inquiries by a landlord to its
"sitting tenants0,3 5 2
A number of post-Cason decisions have dealt with how far a housing
provider that receives federal subsidies to favor seniors or tenants with a
specific disability may go in making inquiries of applicants to determine
their eligibility for such housing. All have held that the HUD regulation
authorizing inquiries to determine such eligibility does not allow questions
beyond the scope necessary to make this determination, so that, for
example, seeking information about other disabilities or limitations is
prohibited.151 As the Niederhauser court noted in holding that the FHA bars
questions going beyond basic eligibility standards, a landlord subsidized
under the section 202 program
may not inquire into the nature and extent of an applicant's or
tenant's disabilities beyond that necessary to determine eligibility.
For example, if an applicant applies for tenancy at a Section 202
Project intended for the elderly, the applicant may be asked
whether that person meets the minimum age requirement and
whether that person is otherwise qualified for tenancy; e.g., ability
to pay rent. However, it does not appear that the applicant can be
asked if he or she can live independently since this is not an
eligibility criterion. 
3 54
1988 House Report, supra note 116, at 30.
352. E.g., HUD v. Williams, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 25,007, at
25,114-15 (HUD ALJ Mar. 22, 1991) (interpreting FHA's § 3604(0(2) to prohibit handicap-
related inquiries by landlord to sitting tenants); see also infra text accompanying note 354.
353. See, e.g., Robards v. Cotton Mill Assoc., 713 A.2d 952, 954 (Me. 1998) (holding that §
100.202(c) (2) does not authorize a landlord to require an applicant to provide a description of
his handicap); Niederhauser v. Indep. Square Hous., 4 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law &
Bus.) 16,305, at 16,305.4, 16,305.7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 1998) (holding that § 100.202(c) (2)
does not authorize a landlord to inquire into the ability of applicants or tenants to meet their
medical, hygiene, and other personal needs); Jainniney v. Maximum Indep. Living, No.
00CV0879, slip op. at 12-16 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 9, 2001), at http://www.bazelon.org/issues/
housing/cases/jainniney v_maxindliv.pdf (following Niederhauser regarding illegality of
defendant's inquiries) (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
In Jainniney, the court held violative of the FHA the defendant's practice of routinely
asking applicants questions related to the long-term nature of their mobility impairments "as
well as general questions designed to elicit information as to whether the applicant can 'live
independently' and 'access needed services.'"Jainniney, No. 00CV0879, slip op. at 5.
354. Niederhauser, 4 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending at 1 16,305.5; accord Robards, 713 A.2d at 954.
In Robards, the defendant-landlord's health status form contained the following instruction:
"STATEMENT OF HEALTH INCLUDING ANY DISABILITIES (statement of your doctor
should be used here). Physician should state here a brief description of your medical condition,
disability and/or handicap and whether you are able to care for yourself if living alone and/or
able to care for (an] apartment," Id. at 953. Holding that this inquiry went too far, the Maine
Supreme Court concluded:
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Of course, in non-subsidized rental units that are not intended only for
persons with disabilities, the "no inquiry" rule would seem to be virtually
absolute, as demonstrated by the Justice Department's recent action against
a market-rate retirement community in United States v. Resurrection Retirement
Community, Inc.355
Like the "independent living" requirement discussed in the previous
section, the FHA's general prohibition of handicap-related inquiries is still
regularly ignored by senior housing providers some fifteen years after its• 356
initial promulgation. Some of these providers may be using health
inquiries as part of their admission process because they only want residents
who will project an "active-healthy" atmosphere, although this reason can no
more justify a FHA violation than would the desire of a racially segregated
community to project a "white" image .7 More likely, the articulated
justification for health-related screening inquiries would be financial,
particularly for those housing providers who charge a relatively high
admission fee as part of "a sort of health care insurance" system, so that
subsequent monthly charges "do not rise (or rise only modestly) even if a
resident whose health declines must move from the independent-living unit
A permissible inquiry [by a § 202 landlord] is therefore one limited to discerning
whether an applicant has a handicap. Understandably, a landlord is allowed to
request that a physician verify an applicant's handicap. A landlord is not, however,
permitted to require the applicant to provide the landlord with a description of his
handicap. By requesting a description of Robards's disability, Cotton Mill exceeded
the scope of the permissible inquiry allowed by [HUD's regulation in §]
100.202(c) (2).
Id at 954.
355. Consent order, United States v. Resurrection Ret. Cmty., Inc., No. 02-CV-7453 (N.D.
I1. Oct. 17, 2002), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/resurrectsettle.htm (on
file with the Iowa Law Review). In this case, the Justice Department accused a large, market-rate
retirement complex of violating the FHA by, inter alia, inquiring about the severity of
applicants' disabilities and requiring disabled applicants to submit to a medical assessment,
practices that the defendant agreed to abandon in the consent decree. For a further description
of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 333-35. Other FHA cases successfully
challenging disability-related inquiries in non-subsidized housing include HUD v. Wilmette
Real Estate, 2000 WL 1478457 (HUD ALJ Oct. 3, 2000) (described supra note 334); see also
Williams, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending at 25,007, at 25,114-18 (finding that a non-subsidized
landlord's handicap-related questions to current tenant would be prohibited by the FHA, but
for their being excused in the particular circumstances of this case by the "direct threat"
defense of § 3604(f) (9)).
356. In addition to the cases cited supra notes 353-55, see, for example, the Waverly
Heights, Ltd. Medical-Self Evaluation Form, which requires applicants to disclose their physical
and mental impairments and all surgical procedures, hospitalizations, serious illnesses, and
medications used (on file with the Iowa Law Review). See also infra note 359.
357. See supra notes 111, 116, and accompanying text (noting that Congress sought in the
1988 FHAA to end the residential segregation and isolation of disabled persons in much the
same way it sought to end racially segregated neighborhoods in the 1968 FHA); infra note 388
and accompanying text (noting that the FHA generally forbids race-based application
inquiries).
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to the assisted-care or nursing-home facility." 358 Such facilities have an
obvious incentive to screen their applicants through health-related
inquiries.359 As with the "independent living" requirement, however, it seems
unlikely that a provider's desire to maintain its traditional fee structure and
related financial benefits would be sufficient justification for creation of an
exemption from the FHA's ban on disability-related inquiries.
A more plausible defense that might be available for some ALFs and
CCRCs is that they must be permitted to inquire into an applicant's health
care needs in order to comply with applicable state regulations designed to
insure that residents receive an appropriate "level of care" (i.e., that the
facility would be in violation of such regulations if it failed to screen out
people whose medical, nursing, or personal care needs exceeded the level
for which it is licensed)s.6' Putting aside the difficult question of whether
such "level of care" regulations are truly in the best interests of disabled
homeseekers,5 2 it must be conceded that a facility faced with having to
358. FROLIK, supra note 12, § 8.01, at 8-2.
359. Indeed, one commentator has recently suggested that if the FHA's "no inquiry"
precedents are applied to the senior housing industry:
the whole CCRC model might be called into question .... If a CCRC cannot make
inquiries and make determinations about a person's ability to live independently,
then it cannot effectively provide a continuum of care .... If the illegal inquiry
theory were to be adopted by the court, CCRCs would have to completely
reevaluate their entire residency policy, which could lead to negative financial
results, or could tempt them to use other legal residency requirements as a pretext
for excluding the "nonyouthful elderly."
Sturm, supra note 100, at 128-31.
360. Congress clearly intended that a housing provider's rule or practice which
discriminates against people with disabilities could not be justified under the FHA "simply
because that is the manner in which such rule or practice has traditionally been constituted."
1988 House Report, supra note 116, at 25. Furthermore, if this statute does indeed bar senior
housing providers from making the type of health-related inquiries they feel are needed to offer
a financially viable "bundled-fee" care package, such providers would certainly not be prevented
from providing a "continuum of care effectively," compare with supra note 358, but they might
well decide to "unbundle" their fees, which would mean that a resident's ultimate health-care
costs will be more individualized and thus less predictable at the initial move-in phase.
361. See supra notes 338-39 and accompanying text for more on state "level of care"
regulations.
362. Some advocates who believe that self-determination concerning one's housing and
services ought to be accorded a higher value challenge the traditional approach to resident
well-being reflected in "level of care" regulations. See, e.g., NATALIE M. DUVAL & CHARLES
MOSELEY, NEGOTIATED RISK AGREEMENTS IN LONG-TERM SUPPORT SERVICES (2001); see also
Michael Allen & Eric Carlson, Can't We All Just Get Along: A Friendly Argument About Discrimination
in Long-Term Care 14(3) NAELA NEWS 1 (May/June 2002). These advocates argue that residents
should be permitted to assume some risk in order to maximize opportunities for housing and
care in a setting of their choice. Id. For example, an older person or a person with a disability
might be willing to forego some of the services or supports that other residents enjoy in order
to live in a facility that is attractive for other reasons (e.g., proximity to friends and relatives),
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choose between obeying the "no inquiry" commands of the FlA and the
regulations of its state licensing agency has a real dilemma. This is not to say
that state regulatory laws can trump the commands of a federal statute, a
position obviously inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause. 363 Rather, the
argument would be that courts should interpret the FlA in a flexible way
that does not conflict with state health regulations, on the theory that
Congress did not intend the federal statute to override these regulations:
prompting that individual to agree to arrange for her own services and supports (e.g., through
a personal care attendant).
The AI.F industry has responded by offering "negotiated risk" agreements by which
residents "give up their right to sue the assisted living facility in exchange for its
accommodation of a resident choice that might be more likely to cause harm than the
alternative preferred by the [provider]." DuvAL & MOSELEY, supra, at 3; see also GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-97-93, LONG-TERM CARE: CONSUMER PROTECTION AND
QUALITY-OF-CARE ISSUES IN ASSISTED LIVING 6 (1997), at http://ww.gao.gov/archive/
1997/ie97093.pdf (on file with the Iowa Law Review); Marshall B. Kapp & Keren Brown
Wilson, Assisted Living and Negotiated Risk: Reconciling Protection and Autonomy, ] J. ETHICS, L., AND
AGING 11 (1995); Allen A. Lynch, II & Sarah A. Teachworth, Risky Business: The Enforceability and
Use of Negotiated Risk Agreements, 1 SENIORS Hous. & CARE J. 3, 4 (2002). Obviously, such
agreements could prove problematic in some cases. See, eg., Bruce Vignery & Zita Dresner,
Troubling Assisted Living Facility Issues: Negotiated Risk Agreements, VII (4) ELDER L.F. 10 (1995).
On the other hand, they might allow the admission of an individual who would otherwise be
assigned to a higher level of care, such as a nursing home. See, e.g., Edelstein, supra note 98, at
380. Still, the very flexibility to evade generally applicable regulatory limitations on admissions
is worrisome to some commentators. See, e.g., Eric Carlson, In the Sheep's Clothing of Resident
Rights: Behind the Rhetoric of 'Negotiated Risk' in Assisted Living, NAELA Q. I (Spring 2003) (arguing
that overly broad negotiated risk agreements are more likely to simply expand market share of
AIF and CCRC providers while shielding them from liability for matters for which they should
be held accountable). A forthcoming report from the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services on "Negotiated Risk in Assisted Living' may shed further light on this issue. See
Government Research on Assisted Living Released, NORTHEAST NETWORK HEAL-THCARE REV. (July 9,
2004) (noting that this HHS report is scheduled to be released in November 2004), available at
http://wew.healthcarerevicw.com/back-issues/articles.php?show=424 (last visitedjuly 9, 2004)
(on file with the Iowa Law Review).
363. See, e.g., Robards v. Cotton Mill Ass'n, 677 A.2d 540 (Me. 1996) (holding that under
the Supremacy Clause, HUD's regulations governing disability-related inquiries supersede a
state law provision dealing with the same subject); see also 42 U.S.C. § 3615 (2000) (declaring
that any state or local law "that purports to require or permit any action that would be a
discriminatory housing practice under this subchapter shall to that extent be invalid"); NJ.
Rooming & Boarding House Owners v. Asbury Park, 152 F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 1998) (striking
down as inconsistent with the FHA city licensing ordinances allegedly enacted to protect elderly
and disabled residents of rooming and boarding houses because they were "freighted with
discriminatory intent" and did not "allow handicapped persons to live in the residences and
communities of their choice"); United States v. Wisconsin, 395 F. Supp. 732 (W.D. Wis. 1975)
(striking down state's anti-testing law on Supremacy Clause grounds because it conflicted with
the FHA). For the subseqijent history of the Robards litigation, see supra note 354.
364. See, for example, Bangerter v. Orem City, 46 F.3d 1491, 1505 (10th Cir. 1995), which,
in the context of a clash between the FHAA and city restrictions on housing for persons with
disabilities, noted in dicta "the importance of leaving room for flexible solutions to address the
complex problein of discrimination" and concluded that:
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Indeed, even some advocates for ALF residents believe that FHA mandates
should be eased when necessary to protect the health and safety of such
residents.
36"
We believe that the apparent dilemma of long-term residential care
facilities in having to comply both with the FHA and state "level of care"
regulations may be more imagined than real and is certainly capable of
being resolved without disregarding the FHA. Because these facilities
provide both housing and health care, the key in deciding whether a health-
related inquiry is permitted lies in identifying which part of the services
offered dictates such an inquiry. Recall that, for purposes of determining
whether an applicant is to be admitted to housing, the HUD regulations
strictly limit health-related inquiries, unless that information is necessary to
determine whether an applicant is eligible for that housing because it is
available only to persons with a disability.3 6 This latter exception means that
a long-term care facility should be able to obtain health-related information
to the extent it is necessary to determine whether an applicant falls within
the level of care for which admission is sought. Thus, for example, the
required information should be minimal for applicants to the "independent
living" section of a CCRC, since these individuals are not requesting any
367medical care at the time of admission. On the other hand, more
the FHAA should not be interpreted to preclude special restrictions on the
disabled that are really beneficial to, rather than discriminatory against, the
handicapped.... [R]estrictions that are narrowly tailored to the particular
individuals affected could be acceptable under the FHAA if the benefit to the
handicapped in their housing opportunities clearly outweigh whatever burden may
result to them.
Id. at 1504. Accord Marbrunak, Inc. v. Stow, 974 F.2d 43, 47 (6th Cir. 1992) (described infa note
411).
365. See, e.g., Allen & Carlson, supra note 362. Obviously, there is another side to this issue,
as the Allen & Carlson article demonstrates. For example, some have argued that, while states
may have a legitimate interest in licensing and monitoring medical, nursing, and personal care
services, they have no more interest in regulating the housing component of the services
provided in housing-and-services facilities like ALFs than they do with respect to any other
landlord-tenant relationship. See, e.g., NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, FAIR IlOUSING: THE SITING
OF GROUP HOMES FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES AND CHILDREN 28-29 (1999) (giving the
position of the Coalition to Preserve the Fair Housing Act). Furthermore, others have suggested
that ALFs themselves created this dilemma by providing in a single facility both housing and
medical services that involve an inherent contradiction in legal obligations. See, e.g., Henry
Korman et al., Housing as a Tool of Coercion, in COERCION AND AGGRESSIVE COMMUNITY
TREATMENT 95 (Deborah L. Dennis & John Monahan eds., 1996); Jennifer Honig, Impact of
Community Residence Tenancy Law on the Use of Housing to Coerce Treatment, THE ADVISOR, Spring
1997, at 17.
366. See supra notes 346-49 and accompanying text.
367. Similarly, nursing homes should need only a relatively small amount of such
information at the admission stage, because such facilities are required to be able to provide
care for a broad spectrm of medical conditions. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(b)-(c) (2000)
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information would presumably be needed from applicants for ALFs and
other facilities that are licensed to offer an intermediate level of care.
Whatever the care-level offered, however, the information sought should not
exceed what is needed to determine threshold eligibility and whether an
applicant needs and can take advantage of the services offered.
Thus, we believe that ALFs and other providers of long-term residential
care should take steps to clearly separate their health-related inquiries into
two stages. The admissions stage would be limited to a narrow set of
inquiries designed solely to determine an applicant's eligibility for living in
the facility. The second stage could involve more detailed health-related
inquiries by physicians, nurses, and other health care staff designed to insure
that residents receive proper care. This more detailed information should
be protected from use by the facility's non-medical staff and in particular by
those employees who are responsible for making admission and eviction
decisions. By separating eligibility inquiries from those necessary for care
decisions, a residential-plus-care facility could comply with both FHA and
state "level of care" requirements. Furthermore, there is no legitimate
business reason to conflate these sets of inquiries; health-care personnel may
need full access to a resident's medical information, but admissions staff do
not.168
To summarize, the Congress that passed the 1988 FHAA intended to
make disability irrelevant in all but a narrow range of housing admission
decisions. 3 ' The HUD regulations implementing this law essentially bar
housing providers from asking health-related questions as a means of
screening applicants, excepting only those inquiries designed to favor people
with disabilities for admission. Many ALFs, CCRCs, and other senior housing
providers, however, have chosen to ignore this law. To the extent they have
done so based on reasons other than legitimate "level of care" concerns,
they are simply inviting unwinnable litigation; to the extent that "level of
care" concerns have dictated their behavior, they would be well advised to
adjust their procedures to restrict the nature and use of health-related
inquiries so as not to bar admission to otherwise qualified people with
disabilities.
d. Reasonable Accommodations
An additional consideration in cases involving applicants with
disabilities is how a senior housing facility's admissions process is affected by
§ 3604(f)(3)(B)'s requirement that housing providers "make reasonable
(imposing this requirement on nursing homes according to provisions of the Nursing Home
Reform Act).
368. For a more detailed description of the suggestion made in this paragraph, see Eric
Carlson & Michael Allen, VWhy Does the Business Manager Need Aly Complete Medical History? An
Examination ofHousing Discrimination in Long-Term Care, 16 NAELA NEWS 1, 8 (Mal. 2004).
369. See supra notes 116, 127, 215-19 and accompanying text.
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accommodations in rules, policies, practices or services, when such
accommodations may be necessary to afford [a handicapped person] equal
opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." 370 Examples of required
accommodations under § 3604(f) (3) (B) are waiver of an apartment
complex's "no pet" rule to allow a blind applicant to live there with a seeing
eye dog and waiver of a "first come/first served" rule concerning parking
spaces to allow a mobility-impaired applicant to have a reserved space near
his unit.3
71
The "reasonable accommodation" requirement is, of course, applicable
not only at the admissions stage, but throughout a disabled tenant's
residency, and further examples of how § 3604(f) (3) (B)'s mandate might
apply to senior housing during an on-going tenancy are discussed infra in
Part III.D.2. Here, it is sufficient to note that four types of cases would seem
to arise most frequently at the admissions stage.
The first involves needed changes in the admissions process itself,
where, for example, an applicant with a disability finds it difficult to fill out
the necessary papers by himself or to attend an admission interview in a
particular location, but would be able to supply the required information or
372interview in another way. A second category is made up of cases where an
applicant requests a reduction in the fees charged by the complex, either
because his disability makes it difficult for him to pay in general or because
he cannot benefit from the particular service for which a fee is charged. 3.
The third type of case includes the "no pet" and "parking space" examples
and involves adjustments to a complex's rules that define the terms and
conditions of occupancy; another example of this type of accommodation in
age-restricted senior housing would be allowing in an "under-age"
household member either because he is needed to help a disabled applicant
or because he is by virtue of his own disability dependent on living with the
applicant. 3v4 Finally, a housing provider may not rely on the "direct threat"
defense under § 3604(f) (9) to reject an applicant unless the provider can
prove that the threat posed by the applicant could not be effectively
mitigated by a reasonable accommodation.375
370. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(t) (3) (B) (2000).
371. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(b), ex. (1), (2) (2000).
372. See, e.g., Gaona v. Town & Country Credit, 324 F.3d 1050, 1056-57 (8th Cir. 2003)
(suggesting that entities covered by the FHA might be obligated to provide a sign language
interpreter as a reasonable accommodation for deaf applicants in refusal-to-sell and refusal-to-
rent claims under § 3604(f)).
373. See infra notes 380-83 and accompanying text.
374. See, e.g., Canady v. Prescott Canyon Estates Homeowners Ass'n, 60 P.3d 231 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2002) (holding that the defendant's refusal to waive its 55-or-older age requirement to
allow 26-year-old developmentally disabled son to reside with age-qualified parents violated the
FHA's "reasonable accommodation" mandate); see aLo cases cited infta notes 432, 437.
375. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. Generally, the cases applying this principle
have dealt with applicants and residents with a mental disability, such as Alzheimer's disease,
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It is difficult to provide general guidance with respect to "reasonable
accommodation" claims, because determining whether a particular
accommodation is mandated by § 3604(f) (3) (B) is a "highly fact-specific"
endeavor requiring a "case-by-case" determination.37 c The test is a practical
one that often requires balancing the cost of the requested accommodation
to the housing provider against its benefit for the claimant.
377
It is clear, however, that housing providers need not make
accommodations that impose "undue financial or administrative burdens"
on them or require a "fundamental alteration" in the nature of their
programs.3 78 Thus, for example, a retirement community is not required to
offer new supportive services, such as counseling or medical care, that would
not otherwise be available.379
Furthermore, applicants whose financial resources are limited due to
their handicap are generally not thereby entitled to demand relief from the
essential financial requirements of the housing being sought.3 0 Still, the
whose problematic behavioral manifestations might be curbed by some method that would
qualify as a reasonable accommodation. See, e.g-, Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d
1002 (3d Cir. 1995) (dealing with nursing home's rejection of applicant with Alzheimer's
disease that caused her to occasionally behave in a combative and threatening manner);
discussion supra note 219.
376. Etg., Groner v. Golden Gate Garden Apartments, 250 F.3d 1039, 1044 (6th Cir. 2001);
Dadian v. Vill. of Wilmette, 269 F.3d 831, 838 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Cal. Mobile
Home Park Mgmt. Co-, 29 F.3d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1994); cf PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532
U.S. 661, 688 (2001) (interpreting similarly worded requirement ill the ADA to require "an
individualized inquiry... to determine whether a specific modification for a particular person's
disability would be reasonable under the circumstances as well as necessary for that pet-son").
377. E.g., Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425, 429 (7th Cir. 1995).
378. See, e.g., Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1157 (9th Cir. 2003); Groner, 250
F.3d at 1044.
379. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3249
(Jan. 23, 1989) (providing HUD commentary on its regulation interpreting the FHA's
"reasonable accommodation" requirement).
380. See, e.g., Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F3d 293, 302 (2d Cir.
1998) (rejecting (in a 2-1 decision) § 3604(f)(3)(B) challenge to landlord's policy against
accepting Section 8 tenants, because, according to the majority, "[e]conomic discrimination...
is not cognizable as a failure to make reasonable accommodations" and § 3604(f) (3) (B) cannot
be invoked "every time a neutral policy imposes an adverse impact on individuals who are
poor"); Cal. Mobile Home Park, 29 F.3d at 1417 (noting in § 3604(f)(3)(B) case that "residential
fees that affect handicapped and non-handicapped residents equally ... are clearly proper");
HUD v. Hous. Auth., 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 25,161, at 26,292
(HUD ALJ June 19, 2002) (rejecting a § 3604(f)(3)(B) claim for outside-meals-expense
reimbursement by a person whose disability prevented him from preparing his own meals,
because complainant "simply wanted to have more money to spend" and "it is not the objective
of the [FHA] to enhance the economic condition or quality of life of the handicapped person
not directly related to his housing needs"). On the general right of housing providers to insist
that their financial standards be met by applicants without incurring FHA liability, see supra
notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
The Salute majority and certain decisions by the Seventh Circuit go even farther by
holding that § 3604(f)(3)(B) can only be used to challenge rules and policies "that hurt
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basic thrust of the "reasonable accommodation" requirement is that an
applicant with a disability may well be entitled to waiver of a housing
development's generally applicable rules,38 ' and this, in turn, may require
the development to incur some costs it otherwise would not have
experienced .st Thus, for example, a development may be required to waive
its "no co-signer" policy or make some other appropriate accommodation
for a disabled applicant who otherwise would not be able to meet the
financial requirements for admission, at least if this does not substantially
increase the risk of non-payment.""'
Apart from the specifics of individual cases, retirement communities
and other types of housing catering to older persons should, at the very
least, be aware that their clientele includes a large portion of persons who
are, or eventually will be, entitled to assert rights under § 3604(f) (3) (B).384
Such housing providers, therefore, would be well advised to have a system in
place for processing and evaluating reasonable accommodation claims, and
this system should be designed to accommodate applicants as well as current
residents.
handicapped people by reason of their handicap, rather than that hurt them solely by virtue of
what they have in common with other people, such as a limited amount of money to spend on
housing.'" Good Shepherd Manor Found. v. Momence, 323 F.3d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Hemisphere Bldg. Co. v. Richton Park, 171 F.3d 437, 440 (7th Cir. 1999)); accord
Salute, 136 F.3d at 301-02. This view was rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Giebeler, 343 F.3d at
1149-56, at least for claims brought by individuals whose handicaps stbstantially limit their
ability to work and therefore directly cause their reduced financial ability- According to Giebeler,
the contrary view of Salute and Hemisphere is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's subsequent
ADA decision in U.S. Airnays v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002), which indicated "that
accomnuodations may adjust for the practical impact of a disability, not only for the immediate
manifestations of the physical or mental impairment giving rise to the disability." Giebeler, 343
F.3d at 1150. Even Giebeler, however, conceded that § 3604(f) (3) (B) probably cannot require
"mandating lower rents for disabled individuals." Id. at 1154; see also id. at 1159 (noting that the
§ 3604(f) (3) (B) claimant there "was in no way trying to avoid payment of the usual rent").
381. E.g., Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1150 (stating that required accommodations tinder §
3604(f)(3)(B) "may indeed result in a preference for disabled individuals over otherwise
similarly situated non-disabled individuals").
382. E.g., id. at 1152-53; Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328, 334-35 (2d Cir.
1995); Cal. Mobile Home Park, 29 F.3d at 1416-18; see also Samuelson v. Mid-Atlantic Realty, 947
F. Supp. 756, 759-62 (D. Del. 1996) (holding that a disabled tenant with limited financial
means may invoke § 3604(f)(3)(B) to seek waiver of landlord's generally applicable lease
termination fees.
383. See, e.g., Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1143 (holding that a financially unqualified disabled
applicant whose financially qualified inother offered to be responsible for the rent may
challenge an apartment complex's "no cosigner" policy under § 3604(f)(3)(B)); Anast v.
Commonwealth Apartments, 956 F. Supp. 792, 801 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that §
3604(f)(3) (B) may require landlord to accept late rent payment from mentally disabled
tenant). But see Schanz v. Vill. Apartments, 998 F. Supp. 784 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (holding that a
landlord's policy of not accepting guarantors does not constitute an unlawful refusal to provide
reasonable accommodation).
384. See mapra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
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3. Admissions Inquiries Regarding Non-Handicapped
Bases of Discrimination
As noted above in Part III.C.2.c, the FlA's basic ban on discrimination
against persons with disabilities has been interpreted to include a
prohibition against making certain medically related inquiries at the
admission-to-housing stage. Similarly, admissions-related inquiries based on
race and some of the other bases of discrimination outlawed by the F-A
have been held to violate § 3604(c), which bans every sale- and rental-related
statement that indicates a discriminatory preference or limitation. Section
3604(c) was considered earlier in connection with its prohibition of
discriminatory advertisingY" but here it is noted as a source of potential
liability when applied to a senior housing project's written admissions
requirements, statements, and inquiries on an application form, or
questions asked by an admissions officer that relate to a basis of
discrimination outlawed by the FHA.1
6
For example, in Soules v. HIUD, 3 7 the Second Circuit opined that §
3604(c) would be violated by any inquiry by a housing provider concerning a
prospective tenant's race, because "[t] here it is simply no legitimate reason
for considering an applicant's race."3"" Of course, a senior housing facility
that qualifies for the "housing for older persons" exemption would be
entitled to inquire about an applicant's familial status. 3 9 Given the probable
385. See supra Part III.B.
386. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Senior Citizens Ilous. of Ann Arbor, Inc., 317 N.W.2d 255, 259
(Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (noting, in reviewing retirement complex's written admissions
requirements, that "most of the provisions of defendant's standards for admission violate.., on
their face" the § 3604(c)-like part of the state's anti-disability discrimination statute).
387. 967 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1992).
388. Id. at 824; accordJancik v. HUD, 44 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
landlord violated § 3604(c) by, inter alia, inquiring about homeseekers' race in phone
interviews); Hous. Rights Ctr. v. Donald Sterling Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1141-42 (C.D.
Cal. 2003), affd, 84 Fed. Appx. 801 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that national origin questions on
application form for apartment services violates § 3604(c)); HUD v. Roberts, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair
Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 1 25,151, at 26,218 (HUD ALJ Jan. 19, 2001) (holding that
landlord violated § 3604(c) by asking the race and nationality of potential tenants); HUD v.
Blackwell, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 25,001, at 25,009 (HUD ALJ Dec.
21, 1989), affd, 908 F12d 864 (11 th Cir. 1990) (holding that homeowner violated § 3604(c) by
asking broker the race of potential buyers).
In Soules, the Second Circuit distinguished racial inquiries from those involving
familial status, which the court held should not be considered per se violations of § 3604(c)
because there are situations in which it is legitimate to make inquiries about children in a
prospect's household (e.g., because of local zoning regulations or neighborhood conditions).
Soules, 967 F.2d at 824. According to Soules, the legality of inquiries that might have some
legitimate basis other than prohibited discrimination are to be judged on the basis of a variety
of factors, including the context of the conversation and the speaker's intent. Id. at 824-25.
389. Indeed, age-related questions may be required for a facility to qualify for this
exemption. See supra note 190. The FlA's "housing for older persons" exemption is discussed
supra Part lI.B.2.a.
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per se illegality of most handicap-related inquiries19"and of those regarding
race, color, and national origin 9 ' this leaves sex and religion.
Application forms that include an inquiry about a would-be resident's
sex are no doubt used by many housing developments for older persons,
and no reported case has ever held that such an inquiry violates the F-1A.1
92
The legality of an inquiry about an applicant's religion is more problematic,
unless, of course, the housing facility qualifies for the religious exemption
and is therefore entitled to give preference to its co-religionists. "s For all
other housing, the question would seem to be analogous to a racial inquiry
and therefore per se illegal, unless situations could be identified in which
housing providers might legitimately use such information.
This is a possibility. In Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Housing Center, 95
applicants who were denied admission to a housing project for seniors and
physically disabled persons sued the landlord on a number of theories,
including religious discrimination under the FHA based on the defendant's
having inquired into the plaintiffs' church affiliation and pastor's name on
the application form. The court rejected this claim, finding that the
defendant's refusal to rent to the plaintiffs was based on factors that had
nothing to do with their religious affiliation and that the defendant was
seeking religious information about its applicants "for a reasonable, secular
purpose, namely, to allow the managers of the project to notify a tenant's
clergyman in the event of death or serious illness."
3 96
As a precedent, however, Knutzen is less than conclusive on the legality
of religious inquiries, because it was based solely on § 3604(a) and did not
even discuss § 3604(c) ,7 which subsequent appellate decisions have applied
390. See supra Part III.C.2.c.
391. See cases cited supra note 388.
392. A gender-based question in a housing application seems an unlikely method of
facilitating illegal discrimination, if for no other reason than that the information sought could
so easily be obtained in other ways (e.g., by observing the candidate in a personal interview). In
addition, following the logic of the Soules decision, see supra note 388, at 2, such an inquiry
would not be considered a per se violation of § 3604(c), because there are situations in which a
retirement community might legitimately use such information (e.g., to plan activities that
might appeal to the sexes differently). See infra note 417 and accompanying text.
393. The FHA's religious exemption is discussed supra in Part I.B.2.b. Even as to a senior
housing facility that qualifies for this exemption, there is some question whether the types of
discrimination allowed include those condemned by § 3604(c), see supra note 201 and
accompanying text, although it would seem, as a practical matter, that a qualifying facility would
have to be allowed to ascertain its would-be residents' religion as a necessary corollary of its
exempt status.
394. See supra note 388, para. 2 (discussing Soues' view that the potential existence of
legitimate uses of familial status information might justify an inquiry about this status).
395. 617 F. Sopp. 977, 983-84 (D. Colo. 1985), affd, 815 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1987).
396. Id. at 984.
397. See id at 983-84.
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quite strictly against racial inquiries. Thus, even if a religious inquiry is not
considered per se illegal for the reasons set forth in Knutzen, it might still
trigger liability under § 3604(c) if the overall context, including the
inquirer's intent, suggests illegal discrimination. Therefore, a housing
development for seniors that uses such questions on its application form
would be well advised both to make clear why it is asking such questions and
that prospective residents are free not to respond to such questions without
jeopardizing their admission.
4. Steering Within a Development: Assigning Units Based on FHA-
Prohibited Factors
"Steering" is the practice of directing prospective homeseekers to
different areas on the basis of race or some other factor outlawed by the
FHA.400 Illegal steering under the FHA may take a variety of forms, one of
which is that a housing provider reserves certain units or areas for one race
while directing other applicants to different areas.401 Certainly, a senior
housing development could not employ such an assignment process based
on race, color, or national origin without clearly violating the FHA.
Religious steering would also seem to be illegal, even for those communities
operating under the FHA's religious exemption, because this exemption, by
its terms, does not authorize discrimination within a complex among
religious groups if applicants of another religion are permitted to become
residents. 412 On the other hand, more difficult issues are raised by some
forms of sex-based and handicap-based steering within a complex.
Can ALFs, CCRCs, or nursing homes assign women to particular floors
or areas and men to others without violating the FHA?403 There is no case
law on this point, reflecting the general dearth of sex discrimination
decisions under the FHA.4 ° 4 Those interpretive sources that are available,
however, suggest that sex-based steering would violate the FHA, 0" meaning,
398. See appellate cases cited supra note 388.
399. See, e.g., Jancik v. HUD, 44 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 1995); Soules v. HUD, 967 F.2d 817,
824-25 (2d Cir. 1992).
400. See, e.g., Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 94 (1979). See generally
SCHW,'EMM, supra note 6, § 13:5, at 13-13 to 13-18.
401. See, e.g., cases cited in SCHWEMM, supra note 5, § 13:5, n.8.
402. Seesupra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
403. For an example of this phenomenon, see Senior Class, supra note 72, at 49 (identifying
a "men only" CCRC).
404. Apart from sexual harassment cases, fewer than 20 FlA decisions involving claims of
sex discrimination have been reported. SeeSCHWENIA1, supra note 6, § llCI, at liC-I to 11G-6.
A few examples are cited supra note 298.
405. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(c) (4) (2003) (steering practices outlawed by the FHA include
"[a]ssigning any person to a particular section of a... development, or to a particular floor of a
building, because of... sex").
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for example, that a senior housing facility could not deny or delay a female
applicant's admission because the only unit available is on a male-designated
floor.
There is, however, some reason to believe that not all sex-based housing
restrictions are to be treated exactly the same as would their race-based
counterparts. For example, HUD has opined that the FHA's prohibition of
sexually discriminatory advertising in § 3604(c) does not apply to cases
"where the sharing of living areas is involved., 4 6 This exception, however,
does not apply to "the rental of separate units in a single or multi-family
dwelling. ", 417 Thus, the "shared living" exception could not be invoked by a
multi-family senior housing facility that offers residences in separate units.
Even in shared-unit situations, such as those involving two-bed nursing home
rooms, HUD's approval of a sex-based exception to the general command of
nondiscriminatory treatment applies only to § 3604(c)'s ban on
discriminatory advertising. Thus, HUD has apparently authorized providers
of shared-unit housing to advertise a preference for one sex over the other,
but not to actually make such a preference in admissions or unit assignments,
thereby leaving the practice of sex-based steering by even shared-living
facilities open to challenge.
With respect to handicap-based assignments, would the FHA allow a
senior housing facility to assign, say, mobility-impaired applicants to
particular floors or areas because they could thereby more easily reach the
dining room or escape the building in an emergency? As noted above, 08 the
FHA generally permits handicap-based discrimination that favors people
with disabilities, which means that a non-handicapped person could not
In addition to this regulation, there is a basic interpretive principle in sex-based cases
under the FlA, derived from the fact that Congress added "sex" to the statute's list of
prohibited bases of discrimination without providing any limits or exemptions, see 42 U.S.C. §§
3604-3606, 3617 (2000), and supra note 114 and accompanying text, that such prohibitions
should be read just as broadly as the FHA's bans on race, color, and national origin
discrimination. Cf L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)
(holding that Congress in Title VII "'intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes'' (quoting Sprogis v. United Air
Lines, 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cit. 1971)); see also 54 Fed. Reg. 3235-36 (Jan. 23, 1989)
(providing HUD commentary on its FHA regulations concluding that the protections afforded
new protected classes under the 1988 FHAA should be interpreted in the same manner as the
protectiouns provided to the FHA's other protected classes). Following this principle would
make sex-based steering illegal. Cf Hamad v. Woodcrest Condo. Ass'n, 328 F.3d 224, 233 (6th
Cir. 2003) (relying on FHA race-based steering precedents as proper guide for determining the
degree to which FHA prohibits steering based on familial status).
406. 54 Fed. Reg. 3309 (Jan. 23, 1989) (proposing FHA regulation that was later adopted as
24 C.F.R. § 109.20(b) (5)). Although this regulation has been removed, it is still viewed by HUD
as a "helpful" source of FHA guidance. See Office of the Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and
Equal Opportunity; Regulatory Reinvention; Streamlining of HUD's Regulations Implementing
the Fair Housing Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 14,378, 14,380 (Apr. 1, 1996).
407. 54 Fed. Reg. 3309 (Jan. 23, 1989).
408. See supra notes 304-07 and accompanying text.
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complain about having his application turned down or delayed because the
only available unit was in a handicap-only area. On the other hand, denying
a "non-handicapped" unit to a person with a disability would be
presumptively illegal, subject only to a potential "direct threat" defense, 40 9
This defense, in turn, could only succeed if the housing provider had
conducted an individualized evaluation of the applicant that produced
reasonable grounds for concluding that assigning him to a unit in a "non-
handicapped" area would indeed pose a direct threat to the health or safety
of others.410 It is an open question whether this defense could he invoked if
the only danger were to the disabled resident himself,41 but even if such a
threat-to-self defense were recognized, it is clear that housing providers may
not assume that all individuals with disabilities pose such a threat.
12
In short, the very practice of creating "nonhandicapped" areas within a
housing facility for older persons would invite liability under the FHA.
409. The FHA's "direct threat" defense is discussed supra in Part II.B.2.e.
410. See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
411. Although the language of the FHA's "direct threat" exemption is limited to those
concerns relating to the health and safety of "other individuals" and the property of "others," see
42 U.S.C. § 3604(0(9) (2000), some courts have opined that defendants may also be
legitimately concerned with dangers to disabled residents themselves. See, e-g., Bangerter v.
Orem City, 46 F.3d 1491, 1503-05 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that the city may justify its special
restrictions on group home for disabled persons either on the ground that they are required by
public safety concerns or on the ground that they are actually beneficial to the home's disabled
residents); Marbrunak, Inc. v. Stow, 974 F.2d 43, 47 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating that the city may
impose special safety standards on housing for developmentally disabled persons "so long as
that protection is demonstrated to be warranted by the unique and specific needs and abilities
of those handicapped persons"). This view, however, has not developed into a general doctrine
that would permit housing providers to exclude people with disabilities from specific units. Cf
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 78 (2002) (upholding EEOC's regulation
interpreting ADA's "direct threat" defense to include threats-to-self as well as threats-to-others
despite the fact that statutory language only explicitly mentions the latter as example of
legitimate ground forjob disqualification in an employment discrimination setting).
In an analogous area under the FHA, housing providers have been unsuccessful in
justifying their discrimination against families with children oii the grotnd that a particular
unit might be unsafe for such a family. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Cong. v. Weber, 993 F. Supp. 1286,
1293-94 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that safety concerns do not justify apartment complex's
policy of not renting second-floor-entry units to families with small children); United States v.
Grishman, 818 F. Supp. 21, 22-23 (D. Me. 1993) (holding that the home owner's refusal to rent
house on a rocky ocean cliff to a family with small children is not excused by defendant's
concern that the property would pose a danger to the children); HUD v. Bucha, 2A Fair Hotis.-
Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 1 25,046, at 25,455 (HUD ALJ May 20, 1993) (holding that
landlord's safety concerns for small children who might fall down steep stairs do not excuse
discriminatory refusal to rent to family). As the court in Grishman concluded: "Nothing in the
[FHA] permits the owner to determine that risks and circumstances of his dwelling and the
neighborhood make it inappropriate for children. That decision is for the tenant." Grishman,
818 F. Supp. at 23.
412. See, e.g., Banger, 46 F.3d at 1504-05; Marbrunak, Inc., 974 F.2d at 47; HUD v. Country
Manor Apartments, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 25,156, at 26,254 (HUD
ALJ Sept. 20, 2001).
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Furthermore, whatever liability might be prompted by such disability-based
steering could not be avoided by requiring applicants with disabilities either
to sign a waiver for the risks identified or to provide for insurance to cover
such risks, because this practice, itself, would amount to illegal
discrimination in terms or conditions in violation of the FHA's §
3604(f) ()41
D. TERMS AND CONDITIONS DURING RESIDENCY
1. The FHA's Basic Mandates; Group-Focused Services
The FHA's § 3604(b) not only protects homeseekers in their efforts to
secure housing on a nondiscriminatory basis, it also guarantees their right to
equal treatment once they have become residents of that housing. This
means, for example, that black tenants who are not permitted to use the
swimming pool or laundry facilities to the same degree as whites have a
claim under § 3604(b).414 It also means that residents may not be evicted for
415
FHA-prohibited reasons.
It is obvious that race and national-origin discrimination in the
provision of services or facilities by a housing complex for older persons is
barred by § 3604(b). The same would also be true for disability
discrimination, and indeed an additional FHA provision-§ 3604(f) (3) (B)'s
"reasonable accommodations" mandate-further ensures that tenants with
disabilities have full and equal access to a development's facilities and
services.41 6 (A further discussion of the implications of these disability
mandates is provided in the next section.)
Apart from these clear mandates, the most interesting issue under §
3604(b) for current residents of senior housing involves the provision of
services that are of particular interest to certain FHA-protected classes, but
not to others. Examples include religious activities geared to a particular
413. See, e.g., Country Manor Apartments, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending 25,156, at 26,248. For
a further discussion of such potential "terms and conditions" violations, see infira Part III.D.2.
414. See, e.g., United States v. Sea Winds of Marco, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1051, 1055 (MD. Fla.
1995) (holding that § 3604(b) bars housing complex from enforcing renter-identification and
monitoring policy only against Hispanic renters); cf Weber, 993 F. Supp., at 1292 (holding that
apartment complex's restriction on children's access to certain common areas violates §
3604(b)); HUD v. Paradise Gardens, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 25,037,
at 25,388-91 (HUD ALJ Oct. 15, 1992) (holding that housing development's restrictions on
swimming pool use by families with children violate § 3604(b)).
415. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
416. See, e.g., 54 Fed. Reg. 3248 (Jan. 23, 1989) (commenting that § 3604(f) (3) (B) applies
to services and would require a landlord to waive its rule against non-tenants using the laundry
room to allow the friend of a disabled tenant to do the tenant's laundry); see also Gourlay v.
Forest Lake Estates Civic Ass'n, 276 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1233-34 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (opining that §
3604(f) (3) (B) provides additional protection beyond § 3604(b) in cases alleging handicap-
based discriminatory services).
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denomination and recreational opportunities designed for one sex (e.g., a
417
women-only or men-only bridge night).
There is no FHA case law on the legality of providing such particular-
interest services, nor do HUD's FHA regulations cast much light on the
subject. According to the specific HUD regulation dealing with § 3604(b), it
is unlawful to "deny or limit" housing-related services based on any FHA-
prohibited factor, and the practices covered by this prohibition include
"[I]imiting the use of privileges, services or facilities associated with a
dwelling."4 18 If this means that an actual denial or limitation of service is
required to violate § 3604(b), then presumably a housing complex-even
419one not protected by the FHA's religious exemption -is permitted to
offer single-denomination religious activities, at least if residents of other
faiths are allowed to attend.42 ° On the other hand, excluding residents
because of their sex from an activity would appear to run afoul of the HUD
regulations.
Even the provision of single-denomination religious services, however,
could become problematic if carried too far. A separate HUD regulation
cautions against any conduct that restricts housing choice "so as to
,,421perpetuate, or tend to perpetuate, segregated housing patterns. Actions
barred by this provision include "[c]ommunicating to any prospective
purchaser that he or she would not be comfortable or compatible with
existing residents of a... development because of... religion. ,422 It takes
little imagination to conclude that a housing development for seniors which
provides a substantial number of single-denomination religious activities
would be engaged in conduct that tends to perpetuate a religiously
segregated clientele and that communicates to prospective residents of
423other faiths that they would not be comfortable there.
417. See, e.g., Senior Class, supra note 72 (referring to religious services); senior housing
brochures cited supra note 254 (referring to single-sex activities).
418. 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(a), (b) (4) (2003).
419. The FHA's religious exemption is discussed supra Part II.B.2.b.
420. This conclusion is supported by HUD's guidance with respect to the FHA's
prohibition of religiously discriminatory advertising, which lists "chapel on the grounds" and
"kosher meals available" as examples of the types of services that housing providers are allowed
to describe without prompting a claim of illegal advertising. See supra note 266 and
accompanying text.
421. 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(a).
422. Id, § 100.70(c)(3).
423. Cf HUD v. Schuster, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 25,091, at
25,829, 25,834-35 (HUD ALJ Jan. 13, 1995) (holding that condominium president's statements
to applicant that no other residents had children and that her children might be "a little
uncomfortable" held to violate FlA by indicating a preference against families with children);
see also United States v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176, 1178, 1180 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that rental
agent's statements to applicant with young child that apartment complex had no playground
equipment and that no other children of the same age lived there were likely to discourage
applicant and thereby helped establish prima facie case of familial status discrimination).
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2. Specific Disability Issues During Residency; Eviction
Because of the correlation between aging and disabilities among
seniors,4 24 a number of disability-specific issues are likely to arise during
residency in senior housing. Two issues in particular have already resulted in
a number of reported cases. One involves the eviction of tenants whose
health needs or difficult behavior have grown beyond the landlord's capacity
to serve or tolerate. The other involves restrictions on the use of motorized
carts and other assistive devices. These situations may give rise to FHA claims
either under the statute's guarantee of nondiscriminatory terms and
conditions for people with disabilities in § 3604(f) (2), or its requirement of
reasonable accommodations for disabled residents in § 3604(f) (3) (B), or
both.42 5
The problems associated with evictions and involuntary transfers of
seniors from nursing homes and subsidized rental housing have been well
426documented, but less attention has been paid to this topic in other types
427of senior housing, such as market-rate developments, ALFs, and CCRCs.
As shown above, all senior housing covered by the FHA is barred from
evicting tenants because they are disabled. 28 Furthermore, even evictions
based on nondiscriminatory and generally acceptable reasons-such as
failure to pay the rent on time, unruly behavior, and poor housekeeping-
may violate the FHA if the offending condition is attributable to the
resident's disability and could be ameliorated by a reasonable
429accommodation under § 3604(f) (3) (B). Indeed, even an eviction because
424. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
425. See generall) supra note 126 (regarding § 3604(0(2)) and text accompanying note 127
(regarding § 3604(f) (3) (B)).
426. As to nursing homes, see, for example, Sally Brooks et al., The Physician Decision-Making
Process in Tran.femng Nursing Home Patients to the Hospital, 154 ARCHIvES INTERNAL MED. 902, 905
(1994); Vicki Gottlich, Protection for Nursing Facility Residents Under the ADA, GENERATIONS,
Winter 1994, at 43-47. As to rental housing, see, for example, Allen & Silverstein, supra note
342, at 39; Joseph AN. McQuade, Note, O'Brien Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez: Upholding Statutory
Eviction Protection For Elderly, Disabled, and Blind Tenants in Connecticut, 24 CONN. L. REV. 599
(1992).
427. But see Edelstein, supra note 98, at 378-79 (dealing with evictions of ALF residents);
Sturm, supra note 100 (dealing with involtntary transfers of CCRC residents).
428. See supra note 315 and accompanying text; eviction cases cited supra notes 219, 334.
429. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 214, para. 2; see also Anast v. Commonwealth
Apartments, 956 F. Stipp. 792, 801 (N.D. Il. 1997) (described supra note 383); Weisner v. 321
W. 16th St. Assocs., No. 00 Civ. 1423(RWS), 2000 WL 1191075, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2000)
(stating that § 3604(f)(3) (B) may bar eviction of tenant with mental disability so long as her
poor housekeeping does not create a public nuisance); Kendall v. Oxford Hous. Auth., No.
3:93CV124-SD, 1995 WL 1945488, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 25, 1995) (holding that §
3604(f)(3)(B) w'as not violated by eviction of mentally disabled tenant who continued to
disregard public housing's housekeeping rules after various steps had been taken to
accommodate him); cf Cobble Hill Apartments Co. v. McLaughlin, 1999 Mass. App. Div. 166
(Mass. App. 1999) (rejecting eviction action under state law fails where landlord did not show it
had first attempted to accommodate disabled resident); Cordrey v. Hous. Atith., No. 80-C-881,
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the resident's health has deteriorated to the point where her ALF or CCRC
believes it can no longer provide an appropriate level of care may be
challenged under the FHA's "reasonable accommodation" mandate 3
At least three reported decisions have dealt with restrictions on
wheelchairs, motorized chairs, and similar assistive devices in senior
housing.43' The first was in 1996 in Weinstein v. Chery Oaks Retirement
Community,432 where provisions of a state fair housing law virtually identical
to the FHA's § 3604(f)(2) and § 3604(f) (3) (B) were held to have been
violated by a senior housing provider's policy of requiring wheelchair users
to transfer to regular chairs in order to eat in the dining room. The
defendant in Weinstein was a "privately-owned, residential care facility for
senior citizens" that was licensed as a "personal care boarding home" and
that tried to justify its wheelchair restriction as necessary to comply with local
fire regulations and as a way of allowing its staff "to observe residents
regularly and to ensure that they were physically appropriate to remain at
the boarding home.0 3' However, the real reason was determined to be so
that the facility could "maintain a 'disability-free' atmosphere," which led the
court to rule against the defendant based on its discriminatory intent and its
refusal to reasonably accommodate Mr. Weinstein 4
The two other cases reached mixed results. In United States v. Hillhaven
Corp.,43 5 a district court in 1997 held that a retirement community's policy of
restricting motorized carts to certain common areas at meal times did not
violate the FHA. The court found that die defendant's policy was motivated
solely by a desire to ensure "the safety of all ... residents, many of whom
have their own handicaps of vision, hearing, or balance"; that the policy did
not prevent the complainant from using her cart at other times and places,
thereby allowing her to have "meaningful access to [the complex] as a
1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17835, at *11 (D. Colo. Dec. 3, 1980) (blocking eviction of disabled
tenant under the U.S. Housing Act and directing defendants to "bear in mind that they are
dealing with an elderly woman who cannot take care of herself and her home with the skill,
vigor, energy and alacrity of a young, healthy person").
430. See, e.g., HUD v. Strawberry Point Lutheran Home for the Aging, No. 07-01-0584-8,
2003 ATL 1311336, at *8 (HUD ALJ Mar. 5, 2003) (described supra note 334). For more on the
potential conflict between "level of care" requirements and the FHA, see supra notes 338-39,
361-68 and accompanying text.
431. In addition to the three decisions discussed infra text accompanying notes 432-38, see
Consent order, United States v. Savannah Pines, L.L.C., No. 401CV3303 (D. Neb. Apr. 30,
2003), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/savannahsettle.htm (on file with the
Iowa Law Review) (providing that defendant-senir housing development will cease enforcing
several restrictions it had placed on motorized scooters and wheelchairs and is enjoined from
"restricting or otherwise interfering with the use of motorized assistive devices ... in a manner
inconsistent with the [FHA]").
432. 917 P.2d 336, 339-40 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
433. Id. at 337.
434. Id. at 339-40.
435. 960 F. Stipp. 259, 263-64 (D. Utah 1997),
90 IOWA LA WREVIEW
whole"; and that whatever discriminatory effect the policy may have had on
mobility-impaired persons was justified by its "genuine business need" and
the absence of any "less restrictive alternative."436
On the other hand, in HUD v. Country Manor Apartments,43v a senior
housing facility was held to have engaged in disability discrimination in
violation of the FHA by requiring its residents who used motorized
wheelchairs to obtain liability insurance. The facility failed in its attempt to
justify this policy as a way of protecting its residents' health and safety,
because it had no "empirical basis to conclude that operators of motorized
wheelchairs pose a substantial risk of harm to themselves or others" and
therefore its policy simply reflected "improper stereotyping.
43
8
Taken together, Weinstein, Hillhaven, and Country Manor are not that
difficult to reconcile-the liability determinations in all three were highly
fact-based-and indeed form a body of precedent that actually gives
substantial guidance to senior housing providers. The unifying theme is that
such providers are permitted to restrict their residents' use of wheelchairs
and other assistive devices only if the restrictions are based on demonstrable
health and safety concerns and even then, only if they are limited in scope
and allow mobility-impaired residents the highest possible degree of access
to the property's facilities.
E. OTHER ISSUES
1. Accessibility: Reasonable Modifications and
New Construction Requirements
In amending the FHA to prohibit handicap discrimination, Congress
added two provisions designed to make dwellings more accessible to people
with disabilities by changing the physical construction of housing. These
provisions-§ 3604(f) (3) (A) and § 3604(f) (3) (C)-require, respectively,
that handicapped persons be allowed to make any "reasonable
modifications" that may be necessary for their "full enjoyment of the
premises" and that most new multifamily housing be designed and
constructed to include seven specified accessibility features.439
436. Id. at 261, 26.3-64.
437. 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 25,156, at 26,252-54 (HUD ALJ
Sept. 20, 2001).
438. In support of the general proposition that a senior housing provider cannot require its
disabled residents to purchase liability insurance as a condition of engaging in a particular
activity absent evidence of the safety risks of that activity, see also HUD v- Twinbrook ViU.
Apartments, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen L. & Bus.) 1 25,157, at 26,265 (HUD ALJ Nov.
9, 2001) (holding that a landlord's refusal to permit construction of accessibility ramps unless
wheelchair users purchased liability insurance violates the FIA).
439. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A), (C) (2000). In addition to these FHA mandates, some
senior housing may also be subject to accessibility obligations under two other federal statutes,
section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act and the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act. See
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The modifications authorized by § 3604(f) (3) (A) must be made "at the
expense of the handicapped person. 440 They may be made to a building of
any age and at any time during a tenancy (i.e., they need not all be made
when a disabled person first occupies a unit),44' and the "premises" that may
be modified include lobbies, main entrances, and other common-use areas
as well as the interior of a disabled tenant's unit. 442 A landlord who places
unreasonable conditions on a § 3604(f) (3) (A) modification or who
unreasonably delays approving such a modification is considered to have
violated this provision. 443 Furthermore, a landlord may not avoid liability by
supra notes 134-42 and accompanying text. Section 504 covers housing that receives federal
assistance and requires an even higher level of accessibility than the FHA, at least for some
units. With respect to new construction or substantial rehabilitation of housing units after June
2, 1988, at least 5% of units in section 504-covered housing must meet the Uniform Federal
Accessibility Standards (UFAS) for people with mobility impairments, and al additional 2% of
units must be made fully accessible to people with hearing and vision impairments. 24 C.F.R. §§
8.22, 8.23 (2003). In addition, section 504-covered housing must make reasonable
modifications to units and common areas to provide for greater accessibility for residents not
living in the designated accessible units. 24 C.F.R. §§ 8.24, 8.33. Finally, such housing must
conduct a self-evaluation to identify and remove physical and programmatic barriers to
participation by people with disabilities in all programs and services. 24 C.F.R. § 8.51.
A senior housing facility will also have to comply with ADA-mandated accessibility
standards to the extent it is considered a "public entity." See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2003). This
would mean that units constructed after January 26, 1992, must comply with UFAS or the ADA's
Accessibility Guidelines (28 C.F.R. § 35.151 (a)), and existing buildings must, to the "maximum
extent feasible, be altered in such manner that the altered portion of the facility is readily
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.. . ." 28 C.F.R. § 35.151 (b). In addition,
any portion of a senior housing facility held out for use by the general public (such as a rental
office, recreation center, social hall, or retail establishment) must meet the accessibility
standards applicable to "places of public accommodation." See supra note 139 and
accompanying text.
440. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3) (A). However, federally assisted housing facilities that are
thereby also subject to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, see supra note 134, must
pay for section 504-mandated modifications. See 24 C.F.R. § 8.23 (2003). The proportion of the
overall senior housing market affected by section 504 is difficult to ascertain, but it is known
that HUD funding supports approximately 663,000 units of privately-owned housing for seniors
and people with disabilities and an additional 537,500 units of public housing limited to these
two populations. See CONSORTIUM FOR CITIZENS WITH DISABILITIES AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
COLLABORATIVE, OPENING DOORS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FEDERAL POLICY TO ADDRESS THE
HOUSING NEEDS OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 13 (1996). These units and others that receive
assistance under similar federal programs are subject to the section 504 requirement that
landlords pay the reasonable cost of physical modifications necessary to comply with the
statute's accessibility mandates.
441. See 54 Fed. Reg. 3248 (Jaii. 23, 1989); cases cited infra note 443.
442. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.201 (2003) (defining "Premises"), § 100.203(a); 54 Fed. Reg. 3247-
48 (Jan. 23, 1989); Garza v. Raft, 3 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 16,406 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 3, 1999).
443. See, e.g, Twinbrook Village Apartments, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending at 25,157, at
26,264-67; IIUD v. Ocean Sands, Inc., 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.)
25,055, at 25,539-42 (1IUD ALJ Sept. 3, 1993), affd in part and remanded in part on other grounds,
2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 25,056 (HUD Secretary), additional relief
awarded, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 25,061 (HUD ALJ Oct. 4,1993).
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offering a different, more accessible unit to a disabled tenant who seeks to
make a § 3604(J) (3) (A) modification to his current unit. 44 Finally, the cost
of violating § 3604(f) (3) (A) may be significant, for, as one judge put it in
awarding $75,000 for the intangible injuries suffered by a disabled tenant
who was forced to be "a prisoner in [her] own home" while waiting 20
months for her landlord to approve a requested modification, the
wheelchair ramp she sought was the "only thing that stood between [her]
and the outside world that she longed to see."4 4"
Perhaps because the expenses of § 3604(0 (3) (A) modifications must be
borne by the disabled residents themselves, only a few cases dealing with this
provision have been reported. Significantly for purposes of this Article,
however, all of these have been brought by mobility-impaired residents who
sought to install a wheelchair ramp or similar device in order to enhance
accessibility to their units. 4 4 6 A need for such accessibility-enhancing
modifications may be expected to occur quite regularly in senior housing,
where residents are likely to have, or at least eventually to develop, a need
for mechanical assistance in moving about.
4
11
The design-and-construction mandates of § 3604(f) (3) (C) apply only to
newly constructed units (i.e., those first occupied after March 31, 1991) and
only to "covered multifamily dwellings" (i.e., all units in elevator buildings
containing four or more units and ground-floor units in non-elevator
In the Twinbrook Village case, for example, a landlord refused to permit ramps to be
built to improve accessibility for wheelchair-bound tenants unless certain changes in the ramps'
design were made and the tenants first procured insurance to cover any injury in the
construction or use of the ramps. As a result, the county Department of Human Services, which
had agreed to pay for the ramps, delayed their construction for 20 months. The insurance
requirement and the unnecessary design changes were held to violate § 3604() (3) (A), because
they amounted to unreasonable preconditions to granting permission for the modifications
sought. Twinbrook Village Apartments, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending at 1 25,157, at 26,264-67. The
insurance requirement was also held to constitute discrimination in the "terms, conditions and
privileges of... rental" in violation of § 3604(f)(2). Id. at 26,267-68.
444. See, e.g., Hunter v. Trenton Hous. Auth., 698 A.2d 25, 26 (NJ. Super. 1997); Twinbrook
Village Apartmenis, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending at 25,157, at 26,267.
445. Twinbrook Village Apartments, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending at 25,157, at 26,269-70. In
determining the amount of this award, the Twinbrook Villagejudge remarked: "What is the price
of freedom? ... Over the 20-month period the $75,000 breaks down roughly to $125 per day. I
find $125 per day of confinement is reasonable compensation-" Id. at 26,270.
446. See Elliott v. Sherwood Manor Mobile Home Park, 947 F. Supp. 1574 (M.D. Fla. 1996);
United States v. Country Club Garden Owners Ass'n, Inc., 159 F.R.D, 400 (E.D.NY. 1995);
United States v. Freer, 864 F. Stipp. 324 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); cases cited supra notes 442-44.
447. Indeed, in at least two of the reported § 3604(f) (3) (A) cases, the complainant was
identified as a senior citizen. See Hunter, 698 A.2d at 26 (noting that plaintiff was 64 years old);
HUD v. Ocean Sands, Inc., 2A Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 1 25,055, at
25,530-31 (noting that complainants were retired couple in Florida condominium); see also
Consent order, United States v. Tamarack Prop. Mgmt. Co., No. CV- 02-79-BLG-RWA (D. Mont.
Aug. 11, 2003), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/tamaracksettle.htm (on file
with the Iowa Law Review) (involving request for wheelchair ramp at a retirement community
in a § 3604(0 (3) (C) case).
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buildings with four or more units).44' Examples of the features required are
doors "sufficiently wide to allow passage by handicapped persons in
wheelchairs" and kitchens and bathrooms in which "a wheelchair can
",449
maneuver.
Multi-unit senior housing developments constructed since 1991 are
subject to § 3604(f)(3) (C). 450 As we have shown earlier, virtually all senior
housing is covered by the FHA's definition of a "dwelling,
451 and in
particular, HUD has noted that continuing care facilities "used as a
residence for more than a brief period of time" are subject to the
accessibility requirements of § 3604(f) (3) (C).
452
One might assume that all developers and operators of senior housing
would incorporate the accessibility features mandated by § 3604(f) (3) (C)
simply as a matter of good business practice in order to meet the needs of
their elderly residents, many of whom have or are likely to develop mobility
impairments. Indeed, we are aware of only one § 3604(f) (3) (C) case that has
been brought against a development for seniors. 453 Still, the possibility of
additional cases seems likely, given the fact that architects and developers
accused of violating § 3604(f) (3) (C) continue to cite lack of awareness of
this provision as the reason for their failure to incorporate the mandated
accessibility features in newly constructed housing. 4 Ignorance of this law,
of course, is not an excuse for its violation,45 and failure to include the §
3604(f)(3)(C)-required features may result in costly remedies, including
substantial damages awards, stop-work orders, and orders to retrofit
inaccessible units.
45 6
448. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f)(3)(C), 3604(f)(7) (2000); 24 C.F.R. § 100.205 (2003); see also
Final Fair Housing Accessibility Guidelines, 56 Fed. Reg. 9472 (Mar. 6, 1991) (providing "Fair
Housing Accessibility Guidelines").
449. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f) (3) (C) (ii), (iii) (IV).
450. See Supplement to Notice of Fair Housing Accessibility Guidelines: Questions and
Answers About the Guidelines, 59 Fed. Reg. 33364 (June 28, 1994).
451. See supra Part II.B. 1.
452. See Supplement to Notice of Fair Housing Accessibility Guidelines: Questions and
Answers About the Guidelines, 59 Fed. Reg. 33364 (June 28, 1994) (providing HUD's
commentary on the applicability of § 3604(f) (3) (C) to continuing care facilities); see also supra
note 172 and accompanying text.
453. See Complaint at 1, United States v. Lytton V Hoiis Corp., (N.D. Cal. 2000) (alleging
violations of § 3604(f) (3) (C) against HUD-funded housing for low-income senior citizens, at
http://www.usdoj .gov/crt/housing/documents/lyttoncomp.htm).
454. See, e.g., United States v. Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1137, 1151-52 (D.
Idaho 2003); United States v. Quality Built Constr., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 756, 767 (E.D.N.C.
2003).
455. E.g., Taigen & Sons, Inc-, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1137, 1152; United States v. Hallmark
Homes, Inc., No. CVrO1-432-N-EJL, 2003 WL 232119807, at *7 (D. Idaho Sept. 29, 2003).
456. See, e.g., cases cited in SCHWEMM, supra note 6, § 1ID:9 n.31, at I ID-79 to 11D-80.
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2. Financing and Insurance
The FHA prohibits discrimination in the financing and insuring of
housing. Mortgage and other housing-related financial discrimination is
explicitly outlawed by the FHA's § 3605 and may also violate § 3604(a)'s ban
on discriminatory practices that make housing "otherwise unavailable" and §
3604(b)'s prohibition of discriminatory housing "services." 457 Insurance is
not explicitly dealt with in the FHA, but a HUD regulation and many judicial
decisions have held that discrimination in home insurance violates § 3604(a)
4581and § 3604(b).
a. Financing
Discrimination may occur at any stage of the mortgage lending process,
which includes "advertising and outreach by lending institutions, responses
to pre-application inquiries from potential borrowers, approval or denial of
loan applications and determination of loan terms and conditions, and
finally, loan administration. ,459 Indeed, evidence of widespread race and
457. E.g., Hargraves v. Capital City Mortgage Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7, 22 (D.D.C. 2000)
(upholding claims under § 3604(a) and § 3604(b) as well as § 3605 based on discriminatory
home-purchase loans); Harrison v. Otto G. Heinzeroth Mgmt. Co., 430 F. Supp. 893, 896 (N.D.
Ohio 1977) (holding that § 3604(a) as well as § 3605 violated by mortgage discrimination
involving home sale); Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 491-93 (S.D. Ohio
1976) (holding that § 3604(a) and § 3604(b) as well as § 3605 apply to mortgage discrimination
involving home sales); see also Cartwright v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 880 F.2d 912, 924-25 (7th
Cir. 1989) (assuming without deciding that mortgage redlining is actionable under § 3604);
Smart Unique v. Mortgage Correspondents of Ill., 3 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (Aspen Law &
Bus.) 15,937, at 15,937.1-.2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 1994) (holding that mortgage redlining is
actionable under § 3604(a) if it results in preventing plaintiffs from buying, building, or renting
homes).
458. The HUD regulation identifies refusing to provide "property or hazard insurance for
dwellings or providing such ... insurance differently because of race [or other prohibited
factor]" as an example of the unlawful provision of housing services. 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d) (4)
(2003); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 1355-60 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding
that insurance redlining violates § 3604(a) and § 3604(b)); NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co.,
978 F.2d 287, 297-301 (7th Cir. 1992) (same); Nat'l Fair Hous. Alliance v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d 46, 55-57 (D.D.C. 2002) (same); see also Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., 345
F.3d 291 (5th Cit. 2003) (assuming dat FHA covers home insurance discrimination). But see
Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 419, 423-25 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that FHA does
not outlaw home insurance discrimination). See generally John F. Stanton, The Fair Housing Act
and Insurance: An Update and the Question of Disability Discrimination, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 141
(2002).
The courts are divided over whether the FH-A's § 3605 also applies to insurance. Compare Am.
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d at 297 ("No"), with Nat ' Fair Hous. Alliance, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 57-
58 ("Yes").
459. Margery Austin Turner et al., THE URBAN INST., ALL OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL: A
PAIRED TESTING STUDY OF MORTGAGE LENDING INSTITUTIONS 1 (2002).
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national origin discrimination in home financing continues to be foundS460
despite the FHA's long-standing condemnation of this practice.
It must be assumed that such discrimination is encountered just as
frequently by seniors as by younger homeseekers. On the other hand, the
problem of mortgage discrimination in senior housing is not likely to raise
unique issues due to the nature of the housing involved or the age of the
homeseekers. In other words, while mortgage discrimination may well occur
in situations involving seniors, it would generally present the same types of
issues and be governed by the same FlA principles as would comparable
cases involving younger borrowers.
There are three potential exceptions to this rule. First, a retirement
complex or other type of senior housing that requires a large initial fee or
investment might provide "in-house" loans or other debt plans for
prospective residents as an option to obtaining financing from an outside
lending institution.46 1 The situation where a housing provider takes on the
additional role of financier does not by itself create any new FHA
requirements, but it would impose on the provider non-discrimination
duties that are traditionally shouldered by separate entities (e.g., a housing
developer and a lending institution). Thus, for example, a retirement
complex with an "in-house" financing plan would have to be careful not only
to select residents on a nondiscriminatory basis, but also to make available
equal services and terms in connection with the loans provided."'
A second special problem in connection with the financing of housing
for older persons is "predatory lending," a devastating, albeit somewhat
illusive, concept that usually involves manipulative sales tactics and
outrageous terms.46 3 Older persons are often targeted by predatory
460. See, e.g., id. at iii (concluding, based on 250 paired tests in Chicago and Los Angeles,
that "African American and Hispanic homebuyers face a significant risk of receiving less
favorable treatment than comparable whites when they visit mortgage lending institutions to
inquire about financing options"); MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER & FELICTY SKIDMORE, MORTGAGE
LENDING DISCRIMINATION: A REVIEW OF EXISTING EVIDENCE 2 (1999) (existing research
evidence shows that minority homebuyers "face discrimination from mortgage lending
institutions"); YINGER, supra note 295, at 63-81 (describing studies showing racial
discrimination in mortgage lending). See generally MORTGAGE LENDING, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION,
AND FEDERAL POLICY (John Goering & Ron Wienk eds., 1996).
461. See, e.g., GARLANDS OF BARRINGTON BROCHURE IN BARRINGTON, ILLINOIS (offering "in-
house" and other financing packages at a retirement community) (on file with the Iowa Law
Review).
462. Cf United States v. Bankert, 186 F. Supp. 2d 623, 626-30 (E.D.N.C. 2000) (holding
that housing provider's refisal to deal with prospective home buyer because of his use of a
black-owned finance company violates § 3605's prohibition against discriminatory lending as
well as § 3604(a)-(b)'s prohibitions against discriminatory sales); United States v. Mass. Indus.
Fin. Agency, 910 F. Supp. 21, 28-29 (D. Mass. 1996) (holding defendant that acted only as a
"conduit" for home financing rather than providing financial assistance directly to borrowers is
liable under § 3605).
463. Predatory lending "involves engaging in deception or fraud, manipulating the
borrower through aggressive sales tactics, or taking unfair advantage of a borrower's lack of
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lenders,464 but this is generally because these targets are persons who have
built up substantial equity in their homes and are borrowing money in order
to "remain-in-place," which is not the primary focus of this Article.
465
Of course, predatory lending can occur in connection with financing a
new home.46 6 When it does, however, the FA is rarely the primary source of
legal redress. It is true that predatory lenders have on occasion been
charged with illegally targeting racial minorities or other classes of persons
467protected by the FHA, but the abusive practices in these cases often are
also challenged under a variety of other federal and state laws that do not
require a showing of discrimination .46 And in those predatory-lending cases
where the facts do show the type of discrimination condemned by the FHA,
a FHA claim would be appropriate even if the loan terms are not egregious
enough to be considered "predatory" for purposes of other legal claims.
A third aspect of the FHA's application to the home lending process
that might arise more frequently in situations involving older persons deals
with the requirement of reasonably accommodating disabled persons
imposed by § 3604(f)(3)(B). This requirement does apply to certain
financial requirements, 469 but it relates only to claims based on § 3604(f) and
therefore does not apply to the F1-A provision most clearly applicable to
financial discrimination in housing (i.e., § 3605). Thus, for example, in
Gaona v. Town & Country Credit,470 the Eighth Circuit held that a mortgage
lender accused of violating § 3605 was under no obligation to provide a sign
understanding about loan terms... often combined with loan terms that, alone or in
combination, are abusive or make the borrower more vulnerable to abusive practices." JOINT
U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URB. DEV.-U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY TASK FORCE ON PREDATORY
LENDING, Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage Lending 1 (June 2000). For alternative definitions of
predatory lending, see Kurt Eggert, Lashed to the Mast and Ciying for Help: How SeT-Limitation of
Autonomy Can Protect Eldersfrom Predatory Lending, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 693, 699-700 (2003) and
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tate of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of
Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1260 (2002).
464. See, e.g., Eggert, supra note 463, at 704-09.
465. See supra Part l.B,2.b.
466. See, e.g., Eva v. Midwest Nat'l Mortgage Banc, Inc., 143 F. Stipp. 2d 862, 884 (N.D. Ohio
2001) (noting that reverse-redlining allegations "often occur in connection with sale of a
dwelling"); Hargraves v. Capital City Mortgage Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2000)
(noting that predatory-lending plaintiff Robinson "purchased residential property").
467. See, e.g., Eva, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 880-90 (upholding FHA claim based on predatory
lending targeted at female borrowers); Hargraves, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 19-22 (upholding some
FHA claims based on predatory lending targeted at African-American neighborhoods).
468. See, e.g., Anderson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1143 (W.D.
Wash. 2003) (involving predatory lending claims tinder state banking and consumer laws and
de federal Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, Truth in Lending Act, and Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act as well as the FHA); Hargraves, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 22-28 (upholding
predatory lending claims based on local fraud law and the federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act
and RICO as well as the FHA).
469. See supra note 382 and accompanying text.
470. 324 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2003).
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language interpreter as a reasonable accommodation for deaf applicants.
47
1
Under Gaona, FHA financing cases seeking a reasonable accommodation
must be brought under § 3604(f)(1)'s "otherwise make unavailable"
provision or under § 3604(f) (2)'s ban on discriminatory "services. 47  These
provisions have generally been held to apply only to financing that is sought
in connection with "acquiring a home" and not also to loans "for maintaining
a dwelling previously acquired" (which are covered only by § 3605).4v3
Even so limited, however, the FHA's reasonable accommodation
requirement would apply in virtually all situations where an older person
seeks financing in order to move into a retirement community or other new
residence. As a result, a variety of reasonable accommodations, such as the
one requested in Gaona, might well have to be made for older disabled
persons seeking financial help in acquiring a new home.47 4
b. Insurance
Like mortgage discrimination, home insurance discrimination based on
race and national origin appears to be a widespread problem,475 but, also as
with financial discrimination, this problem is not likely to raise unique issues
for older homeseekers. Thus, while race-based FHA violations by home
insurance companies may well occur in situations involving seniors, such
471. Id. at 1056-57; accord Webster Bank v. Oakley, 830 A.2d 139, 152 (Conn. 2003)
(agreeing with Gaona that § 3604(f) (3) (B)'s reasonable accommodations requirement does not
apply to § 3605 claims).
472. See supra notes 457 (citing cases holding that § 3604(a) and (h) as well as § 3605
prohibit discrimination in home financing) and 125-26 (noting that the disability-related
commands of § 3604(f)(1) and (2) are virtually identical to those for other bases of
discrimination contained in § 360
4
(a) and (b)).
473. Webster Bank, 830 A.2d at 152 (quoting Eva, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 886); see also Laufman v.
Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 493 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (holding that while § 3604(a)
and § 3604(b) may apply to home-purchase financing, only § 3605 applies when financing is
sought for improving a previously acquired dwelling). But see Hargraves, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 22
(noting the argument made by the United States as amicus curiae that § 3604 as well as § 3605
applies to home equity loans and concluding that this "appears to be a close issue").
474. See also Giebeler v. M&B Assocs,, 343 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that §
3604(f)(3)(B) requires waiver of landlord's "no cosigner" requirement to accommodate
disabled applicant).
475. See, e.g., INSURANCE REDLINING: DISINVESTMENT, REINVESTMENIF, AND THE EVOLVING
ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (Gregory D. Squires ed.,1997) (reviewing research and legal
developments demonstrating the continued existence of widespread discrimination by home
insurers based on the racial composition of urban neighborhoods); VINGER, supra note 295, at
82-83 (concluding that a growing body of scientific evidence reveals that examples of
discrimination and redlining in homeowners insurance reflect systematic behavior rather than
isolated incidents).
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cases would generally present the same issues and be governed by the same
FHA principles as are all other insurance discrimination cases.4 '6
With respect to disability cases, however, there are two situations
involving home insurance for older persons that may present special
issues. 47 The first involves a claim that a company has violated the FHA by
refusing to write insurance for, or by charging higher rates to, disabled
persons or to housing providers with disabled tenants. An example is Wai v.
Allstate Insurance Co.,418 where a district court held that the FHA bars
insurance companies from refusing to provide standard insurance at
ordinary rates to landlords with disabled tenants. The court in Wai held that
this type of insurance discrimination violated the FHA's "otherwise make
unavailable" and "discriminatory terms-and-conditions" provisions as well as
its "reasonable accommodations" inandate.47 While the claims in Wai did
not involve senior housing, it seems probable that senior housing would be a
natural target for this type of insurance discrimination, because a
disproportionately large segment of the residents of such housing are either
48"disabled, perceived to be disabled, or likely to become so.
The second type of noteworthy disability case would be based
exclusively on the FHA's "reasonable accommodations" mandate in §
3604(f) (3) (B). Unlike mortgage discrimination, it is clear that this mandate
does apply to the provision of home insurance, because the main source of
the FHA's condemnation of insurance discrimination is § 3604,4 l thereby
making § 3604(f)(3) (B) applicable.4 2 The availability of the reasonable
accommodation theory in insurance cases means that the FHA might
require waiver of certain standardized rules or practices by insurance
companies in disability cases.489
For example, in Avalon Residential Care Homes, Inc. v. GE Financial
Assurance Co.,484 an insurance company was sued under § 3604(J) (3) (B) for
476. See SCHWEMM, supra note 6, § 13:15 nn.12-44, at 13-58 to 13-66 and accompanying
text; Id. § 14:2, nn.6-7 and accompanying text (describing FlA insurance discrimination
cases).
477. A third type of FHA claim involving insurance in senior housing arises when a housing
provider requires its disabled tenants to obtain insurance against certain risks unique to them as
a condition of residency. See, e.g., HUD v. Country Manor Apartments, 2A Fair Hous.-Fair
Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) 25,156 (HUD ALJ Sept. 20, 2001) (described supra note 437 and
accompanying text). Because this type of claim involves a FHA violation by a housing provider
and not an insurance provider, it is dealt with elsewhere in this Article. See supra notes 437-38
and accompanying text.
478. 75 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5-8 (D.D.C. 1999).
479. Id.
480. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
481. See supra note 458 and accompanying text.
482. See supra notes 470-72 and accompanying text.
483. See supra notes 381-83 and accompanying text.
484. 72 Fed. Appx. 35 (5th Cir. 2003).
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not changing its long-term nursing home care indemnity policy to cover a
disabled resident. In a brief opinion, the Fifth Circuit assumed that the
FHA's reasonable accommodations provision applied, but held that it was
not violated because the defendant offered equal coverage to disabled and
nondisabled persons (i.e., neither group was covered) .48 In concluding that
§ 3604(f) (3) (B) "does not require [defendant] to modify the content of its
policy to give the disabled a choice of homes not offered all
policyholders, the Avalon opinion relied on a decision that had
interpreted an ADA provision forbidding businesses from denying people
with disabilities "the full and equal enjoyment of [its] goods [and] services"
as requiring no more than offering "the disabled access to the same products
offered to others."
48 7
There are two potential problems with the Avalon analysis. First, not all
courts agree that the ADA provision cited is as limited as the Fifth Circuit
418held. Second, Avalon's reliance on this ADA provision to interpret the
FFIA's reasonable accommodations provision seems questionable, for the
latter by its terms goes beyond the simple denial of access to require changes
in a defendant's "rules, policies, practices, or services" that may be necessary
to afford a disabled person equal housing opportunity.4s9 The ADA does, in
fact, have a provision similar to § 3604(f) (3)(B), 49 but it was not the one
relied on in Avalon.
At the very least, therefore, Avalon's narrow interpretation of §
3604(f) (3) (B) seems unlikely to be the last word on the matter. As a result,
the type of claim made there-that an insurance underwriter may be
required by the FHA to modify the coverage it offers if this may be necessary
for a person with a disability to secure a housing unit-may be expected to
he presented on a regular basis in the context of housing for older persons.
CONCLUSION
The dramatic rise in America's senior population that is sure to occur in
the early decades of the twenty-first century will trigger an unprecedented
demand for various types of housing for older persons, virtually all of which
will be subject to the federal Fair Housing Act and similar anti-
485. [d. at 36-37.
486. Id, at 3&
487. Id. at 36-37 (citing McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 179, 186-87 (5th Cir. 2000)
(interpreting ADA provision codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)).
488. See Pallozzi v. Allstate Life his. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 31-33 (2d Cir, 1999) (upholding ADA
claim against company that refused to sell life insurance to disabled plaintiffs). As the Fifth
Circuit has noted, however, the Second Circuit's position in Pallozzi has not been adopted by
other circuits that have considered the issue. See McNeil, 205 F.3d at 188 nn.12-13 (citing
decisions from the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits).
489. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(Q)(3) (B) (2000).
490. See42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (2) (A) (ii) (1995).
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discrimination laws of scores of states and localities. This means that seniors-
only apartment complexes, assisted-living facilities, retirement communities,
most nursing homes, and other types of residences of special interest to
older persons will generally be forbidden from discriminating on the basis of
race, color, national origin, and sex; and on the basis of religion, except for
those few facilities that qualify for the FHA's religious exemption; and on
the basis of disability, with disability-based claims extending not only to
traditional forms of discrimination but also to refusals by housing providers
to reasonably accommodate individuals with disabilities. There is substantial
reason to believe that much of the senior housing industry is currently
oblivious to the FHA's non-discrimination commands, either as a result of
ignorance of these commands or outright disagreement with them.
Whatever the reason, it seems inevitable that a period of increased litigation
will be needed before the industry is made fully aware of and is brought into
compliance with the nation's fair housing laws.
The basic ways in which the FHA applies to ALFs, CCRCs, and other
types of senior housing are fairly straightforward, particularly with respect to
the statute's prohibition of discrimination based on race, color, and national
origin. The main issue here will be whether the high degrees of racial
discrimination and segregation that have continued to plague America's
housing markets despite the FHA's commands to the contrary for over 35
years can be overcome with respect to housing for older persons in the
twenty-first century. A related issue is whether the advertising and other
marketing techniques used by senior housing will reflect racial and national
origin inclusiveness or will instead employ the types of subtly discriminatory
messages that FHA case law has condemned in other types of housing.
The FHA's prohibition against sex discrimination, while unlikely to
create great difficulties for senior housing providers, may present some hard
questions with respect to the admission-and-assignment-of-units process and
the "terms and conditions" of residency. Examples include whether certain
rooms or floors in a senior housing facility may be segregated by gender and
whether certain services or activities may be provided for only one sex.
With respect to religion, the principal question is likely to be which of
the many senior housing facilities run by nonprofit religious-oriented
organizations are closely enough tied to a formal religious entity to qualify
for the FHA's religious exemption and thus are allowed to limit admission to
members of their own faith. Clearly, a large proportion of such facilities will
not meet this test, meaning that they-along with all other senior housing-
will be fully subject to the FHA's mandates against religious discrimination.
For these developments, particularly those with some religious affiliation,
other key issues will be whether they can describe themselves using a
religious name or can offer single-faith religious services without violating
the FHA.
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The FHA's disability mandates may result in some of the most dramatic
changes in the way many senior housing providers operate, for their
clientele is virtually certain to include many residents and would-be residents
whose age-related and other impairments entitle them to the protection of
these mandates. Fifteen years of FHA precedents have clearly established
that housing providers are generally barred by the statute from making
inquiries about an applicant's health and also from requiring an "ability to
live independently" as a condition of residency. These mandates may be
resisted by senior housing developments that either seek to provide
substantial health-related services or, on the other end of the spectrum, want
to project an atmosphere for "active seniors" that is significantly different
from that of a full-care nursing facility. The inevitable clash between these
segments of the senior housing industry and the FHA can only be resolved
by fundamental changes either in the way such housing is operated or the
way the FHA is interpreted. Beyond these basic admission-eligibility issues, a
large number of additional cases are likely to arise as a result of the FHA's
mandate that "reasonable accommodations" must be made for applicants
and residents with disabilities, which will require changes in numerous rules
and practices currently in place at many senior housing facilities, ranging
from limits on the use of electric wheelchairs to certain financial restrictions.
This Article has identified some of the more important ramifications of
the FHA's applicability to senior housing. We readily acknowledge that our
list of possible applications may not be exhaustive. We are confident only
that the types of issues highlighted here will become increasingly important
as America's population ages in the years ahead. As these FHA issues arise
and are dealt with by individual seniors and those who provide housing and
housing-related services for them, the overriding question will be whether
America's older population ends up living in housing that is segregated by
race, national origin, religion, and disability or whether such residential
ghettos will be replaced by the "truly integrated and balanced living
491
patterns" that proponents of the FHA envisioned decades ago .
491. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
